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Manville's "The Asbestos Issue" (1983), Checked Against the Documents

In February 1983, six months after it filed for bankruptcy, Manville made a film to answer the charge that it had hidden what it knew about asbestos. Its rebuttals are about documents this Library holds: the Sumner Simpson Papers, the Lanza correspondence, Dr. Kenneth Smith's memos and testimony, and the plant depositions. We checked the film's claims one by one against them. The film is on its own page, with a shorter account of what the documents show: Manville: The Asbestos Issue (1983). Where a television clip is quoted, the speaker is named as the film's narration names them.

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How this check was done

Each claim was taken from the recording's machine transcript and compared with the documents, with the help of AI tools, then given a verdict: supported (the documents bear it out), qualified (true as far as it goes, but the documents add something it leaves out), contradicted (the documents say otherwise), or not in the Library (we hold nothing that settles it). Each verdict links the documents it rests on, so you can read them yourself. Times are times in the video on the recording's page. Where a quotation depends on words the machine transcript may have misheard, it is marked as not yet checked against the tape.

These pages say what the documents show; they do not say that anyone lied. Nothing on this site is legal advice, including these checks.

Results

44 claims: 9 supported, 19 qualified (true as far as it goes, but leaving out what the documents add), 11
contradicted, 5 not in the Library.

The strongest findings

  1. The Lanza galleys, "not one jot or tittle" (0:11:50–0:12:27). Vandiver Brown asked Lanza on December 10, 1934
    to keep findings "favorable to the industry", including the "milder than silicosis" sentence; on December 18 he
    wrote that Lanza would "accede to most of our requests"; on December 24 he called the changes "beneficial from the
    Industry viewpoint". The letter the film quotes for "jot or tittle" goes on to ask Lanza for this "break".
  2. "There never has been such a policy" of not telling workers (0:18:19). In 1949 Dr. Smith wrote of Canadian
    mill workers that "They have not been told of this diagnosis"; in July 1955 he told the Nashua plant that men with
    signs of lung disease were unaware of their X-ray results and should not be told yet; a 1970 survey reported from
    Billerica that "the philosophy was to withhold this info". The unnamed "hush-hush" plant manager matches Wilbur
    Ruff of the Pittsburg plant (1978 deposition).
  3. "Not one single piece of corroboration" that Smith recommended labels (0:22:25). Smith drafted a caution label
    for Marinite, an asbestos board, in 1958; the division turned it down because it "would make our selling efforts
    most difficult". A 1981 J-M lawyer's letter (Gulley) lists letters from Smith among the "smoking gun documents"
    and records plant doctors saying "they were told not to tell".
  4. "First learned" of the insulators' hazard in 1964 (0:07:10). Contradicted by the 1952 and 1958 label drafts
    and by the insulation division's January 1964 labeling plan, made before Selikoff's paper, to "lessen our exposure
    to claims".
  5. The Simpson–Brown letters, "much ado about nothing" (0:14:45). The magazine letter that began the exchange
    says it had printed nothing on asbestosis because Simpson asked it not to; a week before the January 1934 minutes
    the film cites, the companies agreed to keep the survey results confidential and to find an expert for "court
    work".

The claims

The charge: asbestos a known hazard since the late 1920s, and J-M hid it from employees and customers (0:02:33)

TV clip: "full and complete knowledge" since the 1930s and 1920s, and a 50-year conspiracy with other corporations (0:02:50)

  • Said by: TV clip (attributed in the film to a plaintiff attorney; Thornton repeats the "conspiracy ... over 50 years" line at 0:23:36)
  • On the recording: "they had full and complete knowledge of the dangers of asbestos disease as far back as the 1930s ... they engage in a conspiracy with several other corporations that lasted over 50 years" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Minutes of a J-M and Raybestos-Manhattan Meeting on the Asbestos Dust Hazard (1933) — 1933-12-29 — the two companies agreed "our past policy of keeping this matter confidential is to be pursued." Vandiver Brown to the Saranac Sponsors Enclosing the Revised Report (1949) — 1949-03-03 — nine sponsoring companies held Saranac's results as "the property of those who are advancing the required funds." The library documents joint confidentiality among companies in the 1930s and 1940s. It does not show one agreement lasting 50 years, and "full and complete knowledge" in the 1920s overstates what the early surveys found.

TV clip: J-M "knew since 1929" and told no one until the late 1960s (0:03:08)

The early knowledge was "very minimal" and had little to do with insulation workers; the early reports were on British textile workers (0:03:36)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "that knowledge was very minimal very early in time and really had very little to do with the type of cases ... namely cases involving insulation workers"
  • Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Metropolitan Life ... Dust Survey of the Manville Plant (1929) — 1929 — the first U.S. survey was of J-M's own New Jersey plant, not British textile mills. It found counts at "the pipe-covering saws and the refractory cement mixers were 'excessive,' reaching 44,700,000 particles per cubic foot." Correspondence on Dr. F. V. Meriwether's Reading of Manville Plant X-Rays (1932) — 1932 — the 1932 X-ray survey of the same plant found widespread disease: "in a number of instances these men will develop asbestosis in a relatively short time."

J-M "initiated the first studies on US asbestos textile workers in 1938" (0:04:12)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "Johns-Manville initiated the first studies on US asbestos textile workers in 1938 the US Public Health Service established a recommended level" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Dreessen and Others, A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry (1938) — Aug 1938 — the 1938 textile study was the Public Health Service's own, "made at the request of North Carolina's State Board of Health and Industrial Commission," not J-M's. The Metropolitan Life studies J-M did sponsor began in 1929 (see the 1929 survey above). The transcript may have run two sentences together, so the wording should be checked.

The PHS set a "safe" level below which asbestosis was believed to disappear (0:04:24)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "the US Public Health Service established a recommended level for safe exposure to asbestos a level below which it was believed asbestosis would disappear"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Dreessen and Others (1938) — 1938 — the limit was offered only "tentatively as the threshold value for asbestos-dust exposure until better data are available," and the study cautioned that very few workers had long exposure at low levels.

A 1946 study of four naval shipyards found insulators exposed below the PHS standard and "not engaged in a hazardous occupation" (0:04:30)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "A 1946 U.S. government study of four naval shipyards found insulation workers exposed to levels below the Public Health Service standard"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Fleischer, Viles, Gade and Drinker, "A Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels" (1946) — Jan 1946 — the conclusion ("is not a dangerous occupation") and the four yards (two Navy, two private) are right. But band-saw cutting, cement mixing and installation produced total dust "well above the 5 million particles per cubic foot," most of the men had worked fewer than ten years, and all three asbestosis cases were in men with 20 years or more. (J-M's chronology notes that the "asbestos counts" were within the limit.)

Selikoff's 1964 study found insulators at risk below the recommended level (0:04:47)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "Dr. Irving Selikoff's 1964 landmark study concluded that those insulation workers were at risk even though their exposures were below the recommended level"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Selikoff, Churg and Hammond, "Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia" (1964) — 1964-04-06 — "forty-five died of cancer of the lung or pleura, whereas only 6.6 such deaths were expected," among insulators with "relatively light, intermittent" exposure. Selikoff, Hammond and Churg (1968) notes that insulator surveys had "generally been within the 5 million particles per cubic foot permissible limits."

J-M's response to the 1920s–30s knowledge was to start research with Metropolitan Life under Dr. Lanza (0:05:53)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "when the knowledge came in the 1920s and 1930s J-M's response was to initiate research to ascertain whether or not there was a problem"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Minutes of a J-M and Raybestos-Manhattan Meeting on the Asbestos Dust Hazard (1933) — 1933-12-29 — the research was real, but the meeting that commissioned the expanded survey also agreed to keep the results confidential. It also asked Lanza to recommend an expert "whose services might best be utilized from the standpoint of court work."

Lanza's study was published by the U.S. Public Health Service (0:06:38)

Lanza's recommendations were adopted: dust control, respirators, physical examinations (0:06:44)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "Dr. Lanza's recommendations were adopted by the company. Dust control was installed in the plants, respirators were provided, physical examination programs were initiated"
  • Verdict: Contradicted (in part) (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Lanza, McConnell and Fehnel (1935) — 1935 — Lanza recommended chest X-rays "preferably every year, but at least every 2 years." J-M's own chronology entry for the report records: "Recommended frequent X-rays (1 to 2 year maximum) [not adopted]." Dust-control spending is documented elsewhere (for example $5.5 million at Asbestos, Quebec, in 1949, per Smith's 708-man survey).

In 1964, "when the company first learned" insulation products were a hazard, it started voluntary warning labels (0:07:10)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "1964 when the company first learned that the insulation products containing small amounts of asbestos fiber constituted a hazard ... it initiated a voluntary labeling program"
  • Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Johns-Manville Memos on a Caution Label for Marinite (1958) — Mar–Aug 1958 — six years earlier J-M's general attorney warned of "extensive legal liability" from shipyard dust, and Dr. Smith drafted a label for an asbestos insulating board: "Inhalation of dust produced in sawing, drilling or trimming this board may be harmful." The division rejected it because "a caution label on our products - and none on theirs would make our selling efforts most difficult." Johns-Manville Memos on Labeling Bags of Asbestos Fiber Under the Illinois Rules (1952) — 1952 — J-M's lawyers drafted "Inhalation of asbestos fibre over long periods may be harmful." J. B. Jobe to D. L. Hinmon (1964) — 1964-02-25 — the stated motive in 1964 was to "lessen our exposure to claims for health damage." Labeling was under way in January 1964, before Selikoff's paper appeared in April.

The warning program began some eight years before any federal labeling requirement (0:07:46)

J-M's 1964 label "to this day is more comprehensive" than the federal label (0:07:58)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "the text of the label, the 1964 label of J-M, to this day is more comprehensive than the label required by the federal government"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: NIMA Board Minutes (1964) — 1964 — the 1964 label said only that "Inhalation of asbestos in excessive quantities over long periods of time may be harmful" and named no disease. Pundsack's 1972 testimony — 1972 — J-M opposed the advisory committee's label "May Cause Asbestosis and Cancer" as "unnecessarily frightening and alarming," and proposed that "locked-in" products carry no label. The 1964 label was longer, but it was not stronger. The library does not hold the final federal label text.

Mid-1960s safe-handling seminars for contractors, offered to the Navy and refused (0:08:13)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "for a period of two years in the mid-1960s those seminars were held throughout the united states that seminar by the way was also offered to the United States navy"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium (the Navy offer: NOT IN LIBRARY))
  • The documents: James K. Green to Thomas C. DeLorenzo on NICA Records and Dr. Kenneth Smith's 1964 Talk (1978) — 1978-08-11 — J-M's own attorney found that at the insulation contractors' October 1964 convention Dr. Smith "basically discounted Dr. Selikoff's findings and gave the impression that insulators were not at risk." Green wrote that this "undermines our position of responding to the health hazard of insulation workers once the danger was known."

J-M was the only company to join the union and PHS in the Mount Sinai research program, giving money, people and equipment (0:08:44)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "Johns-Manville was the only company to join hands ... with the Asbestos Workers Union and the United States Public Health Service and initiate a research program at Mount Sinai"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium ("only company": NOT IN LIBRARY))
  • The documents: Carl Thompson of Hill and Knowlton to Bert C. Goss (1968) — 1968-09-19 — confirms that the program was "paid for by the insulators' union and J-M." J-M's PR firm planned the announcement to stress "the cooperative effort rather than the problem being studied" and to "stay off brake linings, mesothelioma, ambient air." Draft Manville Letter to Richard Schweiker (1982) — 1982-10-04 — months before this film, Manville drafted a request for a federal review of all of Mount Sinai's asbestos work under Selikoff.

The first definitive lung cancer study was Doll's in 1955, of factory workers (0:09:16)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "I think the first definitive study on lung cancer was in 1955 by Sir Richard Doll from the United Kingdom in which again he studied the factory workers"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Richard Doll, Mortality from Lung Cancer in Asbestos Workers (1955) — 1955 — the 1955 date and the factory population are right: 11 deaths among long-exposed men "where 0.8 would have been expected." But J-M had earlier warning. Vandiver Brown to M. S. Badollet (1944) — 1944-01-03 — J-M's lawyer asked that a bibliography citing a "highly probable" asbestosis–lung cancer link be cut from a report for Quebec's compensation authorities. In 1949 the Saranac report dropped the mouse lung tumors after the sponsors' review (Brown to the Saranac Sponsors).

The medical profession accepted the lung cancer link by the mid-1960s and the 1964 New York Academy of Sciences meeting (0:09:39)

"Virtually no one" occupationally exposed gets lung cancer unless they smoke (0:09:55)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "virtually no one occupationally exposed to asbestos contracts lung cancer unless they smoke, and in particular if they smoke cigarettes"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Selikoff, Hammond and Churg, Asbestos Exposure, Smoking, and Neoplasia (1968) — 1968-04-08 — in that small cohort none of the 87 non-smokers died of lung cancer. But the same paper found that asbestos workers who smoke have "about 92 times the risk" of non-exposed non-smokers, which is a synergy that makes asbestos a cause, not a bystander. The 1964 paper had concluded that smoking could not account for the excess. The library holds no later work tested against this claim.

Mesothelioma was first linked to asbestos in the early 1960s (0:10:21)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "this rare tumor was first linked with asbestos exposure in the early 1960s though it has causes other than asbestos"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Asbestos Timeline – The 1960s — 1960 — "J. C. Wagner and colleagues report 33 mesothelioma cases in South Africa's crocidolite district, many among people who only lived near the mines."

Plaintiffs' "50 Years of Deception" document; the charge that J-M changed findings and controlled publication is "the biggest piece of nonsense ever" (0:10:39)

  • Said by: Markusson (charge read by Presenter)
  • On the recording: "as to a charge that that research was controlled and contrived by Johns-Manville that is the biggest piece of nonsense ever"
  • Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high (the "50 Years of Deception" document itself: NOT IN LIBRARY))
  • The documents: Vandiver Brown to the Saranac Sponsors Enclosing the Revised Report (1949) — 1949-03-03 — the revised Saranac report "adopts the substance of all of the suggestions" of the sponsors. Brown argued it was "premature to make any reference to 'neoplasms'," and the final report "says nothing about tumors in mice." M. F. Judd to Vandiver Brown on Approving the Lanza Report (1935) — 1935-01-02 — "Both Mr. Simpson and myself feel quite safe in leaving the approval of the report in your hands."

What J-M "in fact told Dr. Lanza": no one wants you to alter "one jot or tittle" (0:11:50)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "no one in our organization is suggesting for a moment that you alter by one jot or tittle any of the scientific facts or inevitable conclusions"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Vandiver Brown to Dr. A. J. Lanza Returning the Galley Proof with Hobart's Comments (1934) — 1934-12-21 — the quotation is accurate but stops short. The letter goes on: "All we ask is that all of the favorable aspects of the survey be included and that none of the unfavorable be unintentionally pictured in darker tones than the circumstances justify," and closes, "I feel confident we can depend upon you and Dr. McConnell to give us this 'break'." It sent Hobart's list of points he "considers undesirable from the industry viewpoint."

Compare Lanza's draft with the published report: "nothing was changed by one jot or tittle" (0:12:27)

The report was published "after peer group review" (0:12:31)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "what was published by the United States Public Health Service after I might add peer group review"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Vandiver Brown to M. F. Judd on Changes to the Metropolitan Life Report (1934) — 1934-12-24 — the only pre-publication review the documents show is by J-M's lawyers, rushed because Dr. Sayers said that unless the proof came back with changes by Monday "it would be printed as it stood." The library holds no record of any other review.

Simpson: "the less said about asbestos the better off we are"; Brown, two days later: "minimum of publicity" (1935) (0:13:07)

  • Said by: Presenter (reading the letters)
  • On the recording: "Sumner Simpson of Raybestos says quote the less said about asbestos the better off we are unquote two days later Vandiver Brown of Manville replies"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Sumner Simpson to Vandiver Brown on Asbestos Magazine's Request (1935) — 1935-10-01 — "I think the less said about asbestos, the better off we are." Vandiver Brown to Sumner Simpson on Giving Asbestosis "the Minimum of Publicity" (1935) — 1935-10-03 — "I quite agree with you that our interests are best served by having asbestosis receive the minimum of publicity." Two days later, as the film says. The film's longer readings (0:13:45–0:14:40) match the letters, including "use American data on the subject rather than English."

Read in context, the letters are "more ado about nothing" (0:14:45)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "These letters always seem to be a source of inquiry and there is there's nothing perhaps that represents more ado about nothing"
  • Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Asbestos Magazine to Sumner Simpson on Publishing about Asbestosis (1935) — 1935-09-25 — the letter that started the exchange, which the film never shows, says the trade magazine had kept asbestosis out of print at Simpson's request: "Always you have requested that for certain obvious reasons we publish nothing." Simpson thanked the magazine for "not re-printing the English articles." Brown proposed that anything printed later rely on the milder American picture. A handwritten note of October 8 records that someone would see Stover, the publisher, about publicity (Brown's letter).

Context offered by the film: "say nothing about it until our survey is complete" (0:13:45)

  • Said by: Presenter (reading Simpson's letter)
  • On the recording: "we would be just as well off to say nothing about it until our survey is complete."
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Minutes of a J-M and Raybestos-Manhattan Meeting on the Asbestos Dust Hazard (1933) — 1933-12-29 — waiting on the survey was the companies' standing policy: "our past policy of keeping this matter confidential is to be pursued" until the second Metropolitan report was available "for their analysis."

The rest of the Simpson papers is about sponsored medical research, its funding, and "pressing to get research results" (0:15:11)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "the other inch and 15-16ths, I guess, relate primarily to medical research that's being sponsored by the companies, the funding of that research, and pressing to get research results"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Vandiver Brown to the Saranac Sponsors (1949) — 1949 — the research was funded under a 1936 agreement that results would be "the property of those who are advancing the required funds," who decided "whether and how they were made public." The sponsors then cut the tumor findings. The funded research and the companies' control over it are the same story.

January 4, 1934 minutes: each company sought "the best practice possible for the elimination of dust and protection of employees" (0:15:55)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "there was a meeting held on January 4, 1934, between Johns-Manville and Raybestos-Manhattan ... to obtain each for itself the best practice possible for the elimination of dust and protection of employees"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium (the minutes' own words are not in the note; J-M's chronology summary matches the purpose))
  • The documents: Vandiver Brown to M. F. Judd Enclosing Minutes of the January 4 Dust Meeting (1934) — 1934-01-05 — J-M's chronology says the meeting was "to discuss ways of eliminating dust and protecting the health of employees." The same meeting was told of the "relatively better position" the companies would be in "in event of litigation" with an outside expert. The December 29, 1933 minutes that planned it, held a week earlier, agreed to keep the matter confidential.

The letters came 10 months after the Lanza study was published (Jan 1935), so a cover-up "doesn't make sense" (0:17:02)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "Those letters are dated in the autumn of 1935. It was in January of 1935 that the Lanza study ... was published"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Lanza, McConnell and Fehnel (1935) — 1935-01-04 — the dates are right, about nine months apart. But the published study is the one J-M's lawyers had reviewed and asked to soften before publication (see 0:12:27), and in October the companies were still keeping the subject out of the trade press. The "five-year" study fits the 1929 start: the authors "say the asbestos industry had asked Metropolitan Life in 1929."

The charge: testimony of a former medical director, a plant manager and another official describes a "hush-hush policy" of not telling workers they had asbestosis (0:17:51)

  • Said by: Presenter / TV clip (Motley)
  • On the recording: "practice what was called by the plant manager not by the lawyers a hush-hush policy where they would not tell the workers"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Deposition of Wilbur L. Ruff in Browner v. Johns-Manville (1978) — 1978-02-14 — the plant manager is Wilbur Ruff of Pittsburg, California. He testified that it was "company policy" for the plant doctor "not to discuss his findings with the employee," agreed that he had called it "hush-hush," and said it changed "between 1970 and 1972." Dr. Kenneth W. Smith, Industrial Hygiene Survey of 708 Canadian J-M Mill Workers (1949) — 1949 — the medical director's own report: "They have not been told of this diagnosis."

"There never has been such a policy at Manville" (0:18:19)

The plant manager gave different accounts in three or four depositions, finally said "I really don't know what the policy was," and the industrial relations manager says the policy was to tell (0:18:41)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "The individual involved has been deposed perhaps three or four times, and he said something different every time. The last time he was deposed, he said, I really don't know what the policy was"
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: low)
  • The documents: Only Ruff's February 1978 deposition is in the library (Deposition of Wilbur L. Ruff (1978)), and in it he is specific: the change came "between 1970 and 1972." His later depositions and the industrial relations manager's testimony are not in the library. Ruff's account fits A. C. Pennewell's Pittsburg Plant Memo (1971), in which the same plant was told "to disregard informing any former employees of any hazardous conditions they might have been exposed to."

Written policies of 1949 (doctors "should advise with employee") and 1955 (plant doctors must discuss results under the AMA code of ethics) (0:19:11)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "as early as 1949 there was a written policy that said doctors should advise with employee ... 1955 company policy our plant doctors are required by the American Medical Association code of ethics to discuss the results"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high that practice differed (the policy texts themselves: NOT IN LIBRARY))
  • The documents: The library holds neither written policy. What J-M doctors did in those same years is in the library. Smith's 708-man survey — 1949 — "They have not been told of this diagnosis." Smith to Gervais — July 1955 — the men should not be informed. R. C. Smith's Waukegan notes (1956) — 1956 — the doctor "will tell possible pneumoconiosis cases of their conditions, if they ask him." Smith did state the ethical duty in his 1954 memo to Boyd Mulder ("a moral and legal responsibility"), but Davison's 1963 memo shows 24 Waukegan cases still untold.

A 1937 disclosure to a plant employee, and a 1947 California compensation claimant told by the company doctor (0:19:51)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "As early as 1937, there is a record of disclosure to an employee in a plant. 1947, in a workers' compensation claim in California"
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: low)
  • The documents: No note found for either instance.

The only exception: doctors sometimes withheld findings in early years on their own medical judgment (0:20:28)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "times in early years where based on a doctor's medical judgment an employee was not advised at a particular point in time because in the physicians judgment that was the best thing to do"
  • Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Transcript of Dr. Kenneth W. Smith's Taped Message to Kent Wise (1975) — 1975-09-12 — J-M's former medical director: "The final decision of informing an employee of his health status - bad or good - rested with non-medical authorities in the New York office in Industrial Relations and the Legal Department." Deposition of Dr. Edwin D. Merrill (1979) — 1979 — abnormal X-rays were held for meetings with the safety and compensation department before any formal report. Kenneth G. Gulley to Robert S. Venning (1981) — 1981-12-18 — Markusson himself had said there were undeposed plant physicians "who claim that they were told not to tell J-M employees of changes in their respiratory condition."

TV clip: Dr. Kenneth Smith testified that he recommended warning labels and was turned down because they "would hurt profits" (0:21:01)

  • Said by: TV clip (Motley)
  • On the recording: "he recommended to Johns-Manville that they They placed warning labels on their asbestos products and that they turned him down on the grounds that it would hurt profits" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Deposition of Dr. Kenneth W. Smith in DeRocco v. Forty-Eight Insulation (1976) — 1976-01-13 — Smith testified that around 1951–52 he and Jackson recommended labels for asbestos fiber bags and insulation. In what he called his interpretation, the response was: "Yes, we recognize the hazard. What is it going to cost us to do this and what are the potential hazards of assuming a label in workmen's compensation or public liability." The substance (cost and liability) is right, but "profits" is Motley's word, not Smith's.

Smith was medical director 1944–1950 and 1952–1966 (0:21:11)

  • Said by: TV clip (Motley)
  • On the recording: "he served as medical director of Johns-Manville Corporation from 1944 to 1950 and then again from 1952 to 1966"
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: low)
  • The documents: None of the notes read states his tenure. The JM Knowledge Chronology holds Smith letters from 1944 to his January 1966 "Health Projects" talk, which fits, and Ruff's deposition (1978) refers to "Smith's dismissal." The exact dates are not confirmed.

Smith gave the testimony in 1976, about events 20–25 years earlier and 10 years after he left (0:21:35)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "There's no question that Dr. Smith gave the testimony that Mr. Motley describes in 1976."
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Deposition of Dr. Kenneth W. Smith in DeRocco (1976) — taken January 13, 1976, about "the time of the Lompoc strike in '51, '52."

There is "not one single piece of corroboration" that Smith ever recommended labels for asbestos products (0:22:25)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "there is not one single piece of corroboration that Dr. Smith ever made that recommendation to the company regarding asbestos containing products"
  • Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Johns-Manville Memos on a Caution Label for Marinite (1958) — 1958 — J-M's own files show Smith drafting a caution label for Marinite, an asbestos board: "Inhalation of dust produced in sawing, drilling or trimming this board may be harmful. Avoid breathing this dust." He also said that labeling Marinite meant labeling Transite, Flexboard and pipe coverings too, which should be "a policy decision made by our Senior Officers." The division declined for sales reasons. Labeling Bags of Asbestos Fiber Under the Illinois Rules (1952) — 1952 — an asbestos fiber label was drafted in the same early-1950s window Smith described. Gulley to Venning (1981) — 1981 — J-M's lawyers fought discovery partly to keep back "smoking gun documents" such as letters from Dr. Kenneth Smith (in J-M's chronology summary: letters "which would confirm portions of his deposition testimony" and "documents relating to the need for labeling").

Smith was "simply confused" with mid-1950s label discussions about non-asbestos products (0:22:48)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "there were other things concerning labels in the mid-1950s, non-asbestos products, in all probability Dr. Smith was simply confused"
  • Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Deposition of Dr. Kenneth W. Smith in DeRocco (1976) — 1976 — Smith kept the two apart himself: the Celite (diatomaceous earth) label went on in 1952, and "at about the same time" a separate recommendation for asbestos fiber bags and insulation went to Hite and the division vice presidents. The label debate he described was confirmed for asbestos products in the 1958 Marinite memos. Robert W. Neirynck to Robert Batson (1982) — 1982 — it was J-M's own witness, Hugh Jackson, who misdated the Celite label (1957 instead of 1952).

J-M isn't at fault; juries agreed about half the time; about half the cases come from WWII shipyard insulators, and the government refused responsibility (0:24:59)

  • Said by: Markusson / Presenter
  • On the recording: "juries have agreed about half the time and we've won about half the lawsuits we've tried. Of those cases against Johns-Manville, about half are filed by insulation workers from World War II shipyards"
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: low)
  • The documents: No note gives J-M's trial record or the share of shipyard claimants. Charles H. Roemer's Affidavit and Testimony (1942) confirms only that J-M sued the United States in the Claims Court (deposition of 1984).

Manville filed for Chapter 11 on August 26, 1982, because of the burden of present and future asbestos suits (0:25:49)

  • Said by: Presenter
  • On the recording: "On August 26, 1982, In 1982, Manville filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. The reason? The overwhelming burden of asbestos lawsuits"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high (date); the stated reason is the company's own)
  • The documents: Today: "125 Proud Years" (Manville, 1983) — 1983 — "On August 26, 1982, the weight of current and future asbestos-health lawsuits forced the company to file for reorganization under Chapter 11." Draft Manville Letter to Richard Schweiker (1982) — 1982-10-04 — Manville named the Epidemiological Resources projection of future disease as "an important factor in my company's decision to file under Chapter 11." It was also asking the government to discredit the Selikoff work behind those projections.

17,000 lawsuits pending; future-claim reserves would have meant a slow death; Chapter 11 is "fair to everyone" (0:26:54)

  • Said by: Markusson
  • On the recording: "With 17,000 lawsuits pending ... the result is a stranglehold on the company so that it would slowly bleed to death" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: low)
  • The documents: No note gives the count of pending suits or the reserve figures. The Schweiker draft (above) shows that projections of future claims drove the filing, and that Manville was attacking the science behind them at the same time.

Cite this page

“Manville's "The Asbestos Issue" (1983), Checked Against the Documents.” AsbestosClaims.Law Library. https://asbestosclaims.law/library/history/the-asbestos-issue-fact-check.

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