Clifford L. Sheckler's 1982 Deposition, Checked Against the Documents

How this check was done

Each claim was taken from the recording's machine transcript and compared with the documents, with the help of AI tools, then given a verdict: supported (the documents bear it out), qualified (true as far as it goes, but the documents add something it leaves out), contradicted (the documents say otherwise), or not in the Library (we hold nothing that settles it). Each verdict links the documents it rests on, so you can read them yourself. Times are times in the video on the recording's page. Where a quotation depends on words the machine transcript may have misheard, it is marked as not yet checked against the tape.

These pages say what the documents show; they do not say that anyone lied. Nothing on this site is legal advice, including these checks.

Results

	Tape 1	Tape 2	Tape 3	Tape 4	Tape 5	Tape 6	All
Supported	9	11	9	23	11	6	69
Qualified	19	8	11	14	11	20	83
Contradicted	5	6	3	1	8	3	26
Not in the Library	1	6	10	1	4	2	24
Claims checked	34	31	33	39	34	31	202

Unlike Kotin, who joined J-M in 1974, Sheckler was there: many of the contradictions come from his own papers.

The strongest findings

"First aware" of the insulators' risk in April 1964 (tape 1, 0:57:39; tape 3, 0:48:21; tape 5). The Asbestos
Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee minutes of June 6, 1963 list Sheckler as attending when the committee
heard of Selikoff's coming report of "a very large incidence of lung cancer" among insulation workers, which
"admittedly it will be damaging to the industry." His own talk at J-M's 1963 managers' meeting gave "possibly
customer liability claims" as a reason for keeping dust records.
The 1964 label (tapes 1, 5 and 6). Not a response to Selikoff: in January 1964 the insulation division was
"about to begin labeling", and in February the stated aim was to "lessen our exposure to claims". The division
wanted it "fully legible, but not conspicuous". The gummed label was dropped because it "created a small furor at
Manville" with labor-relations and compensation risks, not because pieceworkers disliked it, and an October 1964
order directed "no stamping or pasting-on" of old stock. Not all insulation was labeled: his own 1968 memo assumed
"International shipments will not be labeled", and in 1969 only Thermobestos was "presently labelled".
Not aware workers were breathing asbestos, 1952–57; the X-ray program unchanged (tape 2). His 1957 memo on
union dust complaints warns that over-limit counts meant "we have probably forfeited any future legal defense";
his dust tables flag "stations requiring control"; in May 1957, at a meeting he attended, Dr. Smith set up the
X-ray "conference" procedure: "we do not tell the man."
Fiber counting "strictly experimental" (tape 5). His own initialed 1957–59 Manville tables list fiber counts at
hundreds of stations; J-M's 1958 manual set a company standard of 1 million fibers per cubic foot.
The Rutgers degree (tape 2). His "corrected" 1978 answer still described a Rutgers B.S. program; J-M's
counsel recorded in 1982 that he "had never been a student at Rutgers".
Braun-Truan (tape 4). He relied on the published 1958 study's finding of no excess lung cancer; Dr. Smith had
accepted the "deletion of all references to the association of asbestosis and lung cancer" from the report.

Many of his "never saw it before the lawsuits" answers (tapes 3 and 4) are marked qualified, not contradicted: the
documents were in J-M's files, but nothing shows he personally saw them.

Tape 1

He is gathering Manville employee data for a large epidemiological study (0:04:09)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I'm gathering data of employees at the Manville, New Jersey, plant for an epidemiological study"
Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium)
The documents: W. B. Reitze to G. E. Parker on Pneumoconiosis Cases at the Manville Plant Since 1932 (1975) — 1975-11-26 — Reitze reports a "very massive" study of the Manville population under Dr. Jerry Chase, "with Cliff Sheckler," under way. The same memo says Manville pneumoconiosis cases go back to 1932, with men affected after "very few years of exposure."

Safety engineer at Manville 1952–57, supervisor of safety 1957–60, handling compensation cases (0:08:46)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "From 1952 to 1957, I became the safety engineer for the Manville complex."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: Union Complaints and J-M Correspondence on Dust in the Manville Textile "A" Building (1957) — 1957 — names "C. L. Sheckler, J-M's safety engineer at Manville." His compensation role shows in C. L. Sheckler to Dr. Kenneth Smith on the First Transite Pipe X-Ray Conferences (1957), where he counts eight "mixed pneumoconiosis" cases among 109 Transite pipe workers as compensation liabilities. What he left out: his compensation work included recommending "full trials of most O.D. claims" to backlog the courts, done "quietly and with no publicity whatsoever" (C. L. Sheckler to C. H. Grote and L. Hemerda on Trying Manville Occupational Disease Claims (1964), 1964-05-13).

Became manager of the corporate industrial health program in late 1959/early 1960 (0:09:16)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "Late 59, early 60, I became manager of the industrial health program for the corporation."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: H. M. Jackson to William T. Marr of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard on Asbestos Dust Standards (1959) — 1959-06-22 — H. M. Jackson signs as "manager of Johns-Manville's Industrial Health Program." In mid-1960 the respirator decision was still reviewed with "H. M. Jackson, J-M's manager of industrial health" (C. L. Sheckler and Others on a Mandatory Respirator Program at the Manville Plant (1960)). At the December 1960 managers' meeting Sheckler spoke on "Loss Prevention Control" (Johns-Manville Industrial Relations Managers Meeting Minutes on the Industrial Health Program (1960)). He was at General Headquarters by 1961, but the title he gives is Jackson's in the 1959–60 papers.

Became director of occupational health in 1967, "merely a change in title" (0:15:02)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "1967 yes sir ... that was merely a change in title"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Frank H. Zimmerman of National Gypsum to C. L. Sheckler Opposing the Asbestos-Cement Health Safety Booklet (1968) — 1968-04-17 — addresses him as "Johns-Manville's manager of occupational environmental control." His own May 1968 memo comes from J-M's "Environmental Control Department" (C. L. Sheckler to D. B. Wingerter on Caution Labels for Sil-O-Cel and Marinite Insulation Products (1968)). The library has no paper that gives him the title "director of occupational health."

At Manville, J-M controlled dust within the maximum allowable concentration by ventilation, isolation and process change (0:23:17)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "controlled the dust and attempted to control the dust within the maximum allowable concentration by several means"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high (his own memos))
The documents: C. L. Sheckler and Others on a Mandatory Respirator Program at the Manville Plant (1960) — 1960-05-10 — Sheckler's own memo reports that 714 employees worked at 147 stations above the limit. He advised against making respirators mandatory because marking the areas meant "we are legally admitting evidence of exposure involving 714 people," and wrote "under no circumstances should this matter become a union issue." According to the note, his table shows "fewer than half the stations above the limit" brought under control. In 1963 he told plant managers that "many of us have accustomed ourselves to working in plant areas where substandard housekeeping, poorly engineered and maintained mechanical exhaust systems, and generally low grade health standards exist" (Dr. Kenneth W. Smith and C. L. Sheckler at the J-M Industrial Relations Managers' Meeting (1963)). A 1961 request to rebuild the dust control in the Manville shingle building, which had 21 stations over the limit, came back "not approved" (W. F. Fischer on the Rejection of Improved Dust Control for the Manville Rigid Shingles Building (1961)). He says J-M "attempted" control, and the memos show it attempted. They do not show the dust was kept within the limit, and they show J-M chose not to make respirators mandatory to avoid liability.

The Lanza study was the first U.S. epidemiological study of asbestos, published by the Public Health Service (0:25:23)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "the first epidemiological study in conjunction with asbestos that i am aware of ... was the Lanza study ... published by the Public Health Service"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
The documents: Lanza, McConnell and Fehnel, "Effects of the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers" (1935) — 1935-01-04 — published in Public Health Reports, but it was a Metropolitan Life study. The authors say "the asbestos industry had asked Metropolitan Life in 1929" whether asbestos dust was a hazard. Of 126 workers X-rayed, 67 had asbestosis. J-M's attorney reviewed the galley before publication (Vandiver Brown to Dr. A. J. Lanza with Comments on the Galley Proof (1934), 1934-12-10). He presents it as an independent government study, but the industry had asked for it and J-M edited it.

Lanza "recommended a level of asbestos dust that would be a safe working level" (0:28:02)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "He suggested and recommended a level of asbestos dust, a level of asbestos dust that would be a safe working level"
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
The documents: Lanza, McConnell and Fehnel (1935) — 1935 — the study concluded that it was "not practicable as yet" to set a dust standard. Sheckler reads that same conclusion aloud two minutes later (0:30:13: "it is not practicable as yet to establish standards for the asbestos dust content of air"). The note adds that the study warned against assuming asbestos dust was safe at levels above the silica standard.

Lanza's conclusion: asbestosis "appears to be a type milder than silicosis" (0:29:17)

Said by: Sheckler (answering), reading the exhibit
On the recording: "Clinically, from this study, it appears to be a type milder than silicosis, period."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
The documents: Vandiver Brown to Dr. A. J. Lanza with Comments on the Galley Proof (1934) — 1934-12-10 — the galley proof had dropped this sentence. J-M's attorney asked Lanza to put it back because it "presented an aspect of your survey that was favorable to the industry and we should like to see them retained." He read it accurately, but J-M had lobbied for the sentence in the first place.

Lanza's recommendations: dust control, pre-employment X-rays, periodic exams "preferably every year, but at least every two years" (0:31:10)

Said by: Sheckler (answering), reading the exhibit
On the recording: "employees be examined physically, preferably every year, but at least every two years"
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: Lanza, McConnell and Fehnel (1935) — 1935 — recommended that the industry "seriously face the problem of dust control" and that workers be X-rayed "preferably every year, but at least every 2 years."

J-M gave asbestos workers periodic chest X-rays every two years, some annually (0:33:16)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "were provided periodically for employees on a two-year basis except for selected employees, which were examined annually"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
The documents: Deposition of Dr. Edwin D. Merrill on Holding Back Abnormal Chest X-Rays at Manville (1979) — 1979-05-22 — under a "conference" system, abnormal Manville X-rays were held aside for meetings with the safety or compensation department, "chiefly C. L. Sheckler," before any formal report. Deposition of Wilbur L. Ruff in Browner v. Johns-Manville on Not Telling Workers Their Findings (1978) says it was "company policy" for the plant doctor "not to discuss his findings with the employee" until 1970–72. In 1964 Sheckler advised delaying the usual offer of treatment to a worker J-M's doctor had found to have "early asbestosis" (C. L. Sheckler to G. H. Gould on Delaying Help for a Manville Worker with Early Asbestosis (1964)). In 1963 Dr. Smith urged yearly exams for all workers, partly because different schedules would "designate certain ones as hazardous" (1963 IR managers' meeting). The X-rays were taken, but the company controlled the findings and did not routinely tell the workers.

After 1935, J-M sponsored studies of asbestos health effects (0:33:36)

Said by: J-M counsel (question), Sheckler agreed
On the recording: "subsequent to 1935, did JM, among others, sponsor studies with respect to the health effects of asbestos? ... Yes, sir."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium)
The documents: Johns-Manville, "History of Johns-Manville Health Research" (1970) — 1970-08 — J-M's own account begins with its sponsorship, "from 1928," of animal studies at the Saranac Laboratory. The note describes the paper as prepared "for the press and the public."

Dreessen 1938 (PHS Bulletin 241): no definite asbestosis below 5 million particles; new cases "probably would not appear" (0:35:43)

Said by: Sheckler (answering), reading the exhibit
On the recording: "It would seem that if the dust concentration in asbestos factories could be kept below 5 million particles ... New cases of asbestosis probably would not appear."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: Dreessen and Others, A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry (1938) — August 1938 — 541 textile workers in three plants. It proposed 5 million particles "tentatively as the threshold value for asbestos-dust exposure until better data are available," and the note says it was "cautioning that very few workers had long exposure at low levels." He left out that the authors called the limit tentative.

On the basis of Dreessen, ACGIH recommended a 5 million particle TLV (0:37:10)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "On the basis of this report, an organization called the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists recommended a threshold limit value of 5 million particles per cubic foot"
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists Adopts Its 1947 Limits, Including Asbestos (1947) — 1947 — lists asbestos at 5 million particles per cubic foot, "the one suggested" in the 1938 Dreessen study.

A TLV is the level a worker can breathe for a working lifetime "without adverse health effects" (0:38:48)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "a worker can be exposed to a given material for a 40-hour week, 52-week-a-year lifetime working exposure without adverse health effects"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
The documents: ACGIH 1947 limits — 1947 — Fairhall said the values had to balance health against "the effect of attaining this value upon the manufacturing operation." The 1970 ACGIH booklet says limits "should not be used as fine lines between safe and dangerous concentrations" (ACGIH TLVs for 1970). In 1947 the industry's own engineer warned that 5 million particles "does not positively insure" against asbestosis, and he marked J-M's plant as one finding five or six early cases a year (W. C. L. Hemeon, Report of Preliminary Dust Investigation for the Asbestos Textile Institute (1947)). J-M itself added a second limit of one million fibers, an "arbitrarily selected standard" (Jackson to Marr, 1959).

5 mppcf remained the ACGIH figure until 1968, then changed to 12 fibers/cc (2 mppcf); 1970 move to fiber counts (0:43:07)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "remained the recommendation of the ACGIH up to 1968. In 1968 it was changed to 12 fibers per cubic centimeter of air or 2 million particles"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, Threshold Limit Values for 1970, with a Proposed Asbestos Limit of 5 Fibers (1970) — 1970 — in the adopted 1970 list, asbestos "stays at 5 million particles per cubic foot," with a proposed change to 5 fibers per milliliter by the membrane filter method. J-M's own chronology entry reads "ACGIH adopts 12 f/cc Standard." The 12-fiber figure was in use at J-M by 1969 (Sheckler: fiber counts "must be under 12/cc" in Notes of a Discussion with Cliff Sheckler on Dust, Respirators and Disease (1969)). The 1968 figure seems to have been a proposed change, not an adopted one.

OSHA adopted 12 f/cc in 1972, cut to 5 f/cc in 1974 and to 2 f/cc in 1977 (0:44:14)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "in 1972, the Federal Occupational Health and Safety Administration adopted the 12 fibers per cubic centimeter ... 1974, ... to five fibers ... in 1977 ... to two fibers" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
The documents: Standard for Exposure to Asbestos Dust (1972) — 1971–72 — "The 1971 emergency standard set 5 fibers per milliliter," and the June 1972 rule "kept 5 fibers/cc ... set 2 fibers/cc from July 1, 1976." His own testimony at the March 1972 hearing described the limit falling from 5 million particles "to 12 fibers and then 5 fibers within two years" (Insulation Industry Testimony of Sheckler, Royer and Zumwalt at the Labor Department Asbestos Hearing (1972)). He also left out that at that hearing he opposed the 2-fiber limit and asked the Secretary to "Reinstate the Threshold Limit Value for Asbestos Dust at 12 fibres per milliliter" (Statements of Clifford Sheckler, Dr. George W. Wright and Henry B. Moreno ... (1972)).

Insulators' exposure is "intermittent," vastly different from factory workers' continuous exposure (0:47:25)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "An insulation worker's exposure is intermittent. A production worker's exposure, whatever it may be, is continuous."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
The documents: H. M. Jackson to William T. Marr ... (1959) — 1959 — J-M's industrial health manager wrote that on ships part of the insulation work "would be performed in confined spaces which might result in heavy concentrations for short periods of time." In 1944 a government report found asbestosis among Bath Iron Works pipe coverers with only "two and a half to four years' exposure" (W. C. Dreessen and W. E. Fleischer, Asbestosis from Amosite Pipe Covering at Bath Iron Works (1944), a copy in J-M's document review set). Selikoff's 1964 JAMA paper also called insulators' exposure "relatively light, intermittent," and still found lung cancer deaths at about 6.8 times the expected rate (Selikoff, Churg and Hammond (1964)).

The Fleischer-Drinker study was published in 1938/1948 ("46 or 48") (0:52:19)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I believe it was 1938. ... I'm quite sure this study was published in 1948. ... 46 or 48"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
The documents: Fleischer, Viles, Gade and Drinker, "A Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels" (1946) — January 1946 — Journal of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology. The year is 1946. His reading of the conclusions matches the note: 1,074 pipe coverers, three cases, each in a man with more than 20 years, and "is not a dangerous occupation."

He knows of no studies of insulation workers before Fleischer-Drinker (0:52:57)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I know of no studies of insulation workers prior to this Fleischer drinker study"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: W. C. Dreessen and W. E. Fleischer, Asbestosis from Amosite Pipe Covering at Bath Iron Works (1944) — 1944-12-19 — an earlier, unpublished government study found that 12 of 38 pipe coverers showed significant X-ray changes. The Fleischer-Drinker note itself says that study "began because an earlier inspection of one Navy contract yard had found heavy dust and 'a few of the employees' with what looked like asbestosis." The library does not show that Sheckler personally knew of the 1944 report.

In Fleischer-Drinker, asbestos counts were mostly below half the 5 mppcf limit except one band-saw count (0:55:38)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "most of them were below 50% of that figure except for one count at the band saw cutting operation which was slightly above the MAC"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Fleischer-Drinker (1946) — 1946 — J-M's own chronology entry says "'Total dust counts' were above TLV but 'asbestos counts' were within TLV." The note adds that band saw cutting, cement mixing and installation on board "produced total dust well above the 5 million particles," that "few workers wore respirators," and that the authors found it "manifestly impossible to set a threshold" for the trade. J-M's chronology also records that the study was "later criticized due short exposure period of most subjects in spite of recognized latency period."

He first became aware that insulation workers as a group were at risk in 1964 (0:57:39)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I became aware of insulation workers being at risk of an occupational disease as a group in 1964."
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
The documents: Asbestos Textile Institute Air Hygiene and Manufacturing Committee Minutes on Selikoff's Study and British Fiber Counting (1963) — 1963-06-06 — "attended by C. L. Sheckler for Johns-Manville." The committee was told that "a Dr. Sellakoff" would soon read a paper on about 1,500 workers, "largely in asbestos insulation applications, showing a very large incidence of lung cancer," and that it "will be damaging to the industry." J-M's files had more, earlier warnings. A 1955 union letter said "seven of the last nine" Pittsburgh pipe coverers had died of lung disorders, and it was forwarded to J-M's H. M. Jackson (John W. Kane ... (1955)). In a California insulator's asbestosis death claim, J-M Sales was joined as a defendant (Bergit A. Swartout v. Mundet Cork Corp. (1956–1958)). In 1959 Jackson knew of "only two cases of asbestosis" from installing insulation (Jackson to Marr).

The final Selikoff study was presented at the New York Academy of Sciences "December of 64 or November of 64" (0:59:27)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "presented in the fall of 1964 at the New York Academy of Sciences meeting I believe it was held in December of 64 or November of 64"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
The documents: New York Academy of Sciences, Preprinted Abstracts for the Conference on Biological Effects of Asbestos (1964) — 1964-10-19 — the conference was "held October 19 to 21, 1964." The Selikoff papers covered "asbestosis and ... cancer among insulation workers (reporting 307 deaths among 1,522 New York-area insulators)." The insulator paper had already appeared in JAMA on April 6, 1964 (Selikoff, Churg and Hammond (1964)), which may be the "preliminary" study he received in April 1964.

Selikoff concluded there was extensive pulmonary disease among about 1,500 insulators (1:05:40)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "there was extensive occupational pulmonary disease among the cohort of workers, and I believe that cohort was approximately 1,500 workers"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
The documents: Selikoff, Churg and Hammond, "Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia" (1964) — 1964-04-06 — "forty-five died of cancer of the lung or pleura, whereas only 6.6 such deaths were expected." The cohort figure is right (1,522 at the NYAS conference). His summary leaves out the cancer findings, which were the main finding.

On receiving Selikoff's paper he "immediately" took it to his supervisor, the division manager and the president (1:07:07)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I immediately brought it to the attention of my immediate supervisor ... the division manager of the installation divisions and the president of our corporation"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Asbestos Textile Institute Minutes on Selikoff's Conference and a Lawyer's Letter to Selikoff (1964) — 1964-10-08 — with Sheckler attending, the committee said the conference "will have an effect on the entire Industry" and suggested "a Public Relations man with our help would be the quickest way to get accurate publicity to the public." Two weeks after the conference, J-M's medical director told the insulation contractors' convention, in a J-M lawyer's words, things that "basically discounted Dr. Selikoff's findings and gave the impression that insulators were not at risk" (James K. Green to Thomas C. DeLorenzo ... (1978)). Nothing in the library confirms or refutes the internal report he describes.

A decision was made in April 1964 to put a voluntary health label on asbestos thermal insulation (1:08:09)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "A decision was made in April of 1964 to place a voluntary health label on thermal insulation materials containing asbestos."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
The documents: National Insulation Manufacturers Association Board Minutes on J-M's Caution Statement (1964) — 1964-04-14 — reports that J-M was printing "a note pertaining to the dust created by these materials," which fits April 1964. The decision was already under way in January ("about to begin labeling," J. B. Jobe to Kenneth W. Smith ... (1964), 1964-01-02), before the JAMA paper. The stated motive was claims: "we should take advantage of any items which could lessen our exposure to claims for health damage" (J. B. Jobe to D. L. Hinmon ... (1964), 1964-02-25). Dr. Smith testified that he and Jackson had recommended a label on asbestos insulation "about the time of the Lompoc strike in '51, '52," and that management asked "What is it going to cost us" (Deposition of Dr. Kenneth W. Smith in DeRocco (1976)).

He designed the 1964 label, following the Manufacturing Chemists Association's Manual L-1 (1:08:34)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I was requested to design a label ... I used the guidelines provided by the Manufacturing Chemists Association."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Kenneth W. Smith to Lewis J. Cralley of the Public Health Service on Caution Labels (1964) — 1964-01-28 — it was Dr. Smith who sent draft label formats to the Public Health Service, saying he had "followed the format recommended by the Manufacturing Chemists Association." That was three months before the April decision Sheckler describes. The final program "had been reviewed with Dr. K. W. Smith, C. L. Sheckler and A. Pocius" (E. C. Lindstrom to J-M Plant Managers ... (1964)). The MCA format is confirmed. Sheckler had a part in it, but he was not the sole designer.

Text of the 1964–70 label (1:09:50)

Said by: Sheckler (answering), reading Exhibit E
On the recording: "caution. This product contains asbestos fiber. ... Inhalation of asbestos in excessive quantities over long periods of time may be harmful."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: E. C. Lindstrom to J-M Plant Managers on Caution Labels for High Temperature Insulations (1964) — 1964-10-15 — J-M's index quotes the same four sentences, ending "Wear Respirators Approved by the U.S. Bureau of Mines for Pneumoconiosis Producing Dust." The label does not mention asbestosis or cancer. J-M's instruction was that the printing should be "fully legible, but not conspicuous" (W. W. Acher to E. C. Lindstrom ... (1964), 1964-05-11). Compare his own claim of labels "in contrasting colors" (1:20:04).

Stick-on labels failed because workers on incentive pay disliked them; he switched to ink stamps and "immediately notified all locations" to stamp existing stock (1:17:15)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I immediately notified all locations manufacturing thermal insulation products to initiate stamping the label on the cartons and the bags that were in stock" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
The documents: Kenneth W. Smith to E. C. Lindstrom on the Gummed Caution Label at Manville (1964) — 1964-09-14 — the gummed label "created a small furor at Manville and could have had very serious labor relations and workmen's compensation consequences." Smith recommended going back to the plan that "nothing was to be done until the present supply of cartons was exhausted." The division's order of October 15, 1964 then directed "no stamping or pasting-on" of labels by the plants, with the caution going only on new cartons and bags as old stock ran out (E. C. Lindstrom to J-M Plant Managers ... (1964)). The documents confirm the gummed label. The concern they record is labor relations and compensation, not speed, and the outcome was the reverse of a stamping program: old stock went out unlabeled.

From 1964 the label went on J-M's asbestos thermal insulation packages, at all locations (1:16:48)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "in all of the locations manufacturing thermal insulation products by Johns-Manville ... It was an attempt made to label those unlabeled packages and cartons."
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high (his own memo))
The documents: C. L. Sheckler to D. B. Wingerter on Caution Labels for Sil-O-Cel and Marinite Insulation Products (1968) — 1968-05-16 — Sheckler himself wrote: "Consistent with our labeling procedures with other products, I assume that International shipments will not be labeled." In 1965 Dr. Smith advised "it is not necessary to use the Caution label on products containing asbestos in Canada" (W. E. Hodgson to S. Lane and C. H. Jensen to E. C. Lindstrom ... (1965)). By August 1969, of the insulation products to be labeled (including 85% Magnesia and dry cements), only Thermobestos was marked "presently labelled" (E. M. Fenner to D. B. Wingerter on Which Insulation Products to Label (1969)).

The label was revised in 1970 (adds "avoid breathing the dust", "use proper protection") (1:11:42)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "the 1970 voluntary label read as follows caution this product contains asbestos fiber period avoid breathing the dust"
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: M. W. Burleson's Notice to the Industrial Insulations Division on Health Hazard Caution Labels (1970) — 1970-07-01 — new labels L-4955/L-4956 tell the user to "avoid breathing the dust" and warn that breathing it "in excessive quantities over long periods of time may be harmful"; "They do not name asbestosis or cancer." Context: Sheckler's December 1969 drafting memo says the wording came out of "much discussion in conjunction with current litigation" with J-M's attorney (C. L. Sheckler to D. B. Wingerter on Wording Warning Labels ... (1969)).

The voluntary label stayed until the 1972 OSHA label ("Breathing asbestos dust may cause serious bodily harm"), set after the Goldberg hearings (1:12:39)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "caution contains asbestos fiber avoid creating dust breathing asbestos dust may cause serious bodily harm"
Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium)
The documents: Standard for Exposure to Asbestos Dust (1972) — 1972-06-07 — the permanent rule required "warning signs and labels." From at least August 1972 J-M's purchase orders required the label "Contains Asbestos Fibers: Avoid Creating Dust: Breathing Asbestos Dust May Cause Serious Bodily Harm" (Memo to File on Harter v. Johns-Manville ... (1979)). He left out that at those hearings J-M opposed a stronger label: Pundsack called the proposed "May Cause Asbestosis and Cancer" wording "unnecessarily frightening and alarming" (Fred L. Pundsack's Testimony ... (1972)).

NIMA educational program for NICA contractors in 1966–68 (about 1,000 contractors per round); booklet printed in 10,000s and distributed (1:33:20)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "We printed 10,000 of these booklets to begin with, and then we reprinted 10,000 more"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Edward C. Cerny, Jr., Confirming the Seminar on Asbestos Environmental Control (1968) — 1968-05-29 — attaches "two National Insulation Manufacturers Association pamphlets on health safety practices," confirming the booklets existed by 1968. Three years later a J-M branch memo found that "no one in the company had sent out" the NIMA brochures: of fourteen people at a meeting, four had seen them, and only because they had been handed out at a contractors' meeting (J. A. Grimmer on Dust Control at J-M Warehouses and Job Sites, with the NIMA Safety Brochure (1971)). The seminar counts are NOT IN LIBRARY.

He offered the program to the Navy's 12 shipyards via Capt. Rosenwinkel; the Navy declined (1:36:39)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I was advised by Captain Rosenwinkel that the United States Navy would present their own program within the shipyards" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: low)
The documents: no note mentions Rosenwinkel or Barbo outside this transcript. The names may be misheard.

IIHRP sponsors: Mount Sinai, the Heat Frost union, the Public Health Service and J-M; J-M funded it and lent equipment and an industrial hygienist (W. B. Reitze) (1:43:12)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "The sponsors of the program were the Environmental Sciences Laboratory of Mount Sinai, ... Heat Frost and Asbestos Workers International Union, the United States Public Health Service, and Johns-Manville"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Albert E. Hutchinson, From the General President, The Asbestos Worker (August 1968) — 1968-08 — J-M vice president Bert Jobe made "a very generous commitment on behalf of his company" on July 15, 1968, after an industry-wide council failed. J-M then had Hill and Knowlton manage the announcement, describing the problem "in terms of need for knowing more about it rather than a broad, accepted hazard" and keeping speakers off "brake linings, mesothelioma, ambient air" (Carl Thompson of Hill and Knowlton to Bert C. Goss ... (1968)). In May 1971 J-M discussed having its members resign from the IIHRP board over a paper calling the 5-fiber limit too high, and "decided to refuse" Selikoff's request for J-M employees' health records (Johns-Manville Environmental Health Task Force Policy Committee Minutes, May 1971). The library does not document the Reitze secondment or the electron microscope.

Exhibits identified

Exhibit 1 / A (0:26:04), Lanza, McConnell & Fehnel, Public Health Reports 50(1), Jan. 4, 1935: Lanza, McConnell and Fehnel (1935). The transcript's "AJ ones of William J McConnell J William fennel" means A. J. Lanza, William J. McConnell, J. William Fehnel.
(Exhibit B, presumably; 0:35:43), Dreessen et al., PHS Bulletin No. 241, Aug. 1938: Dreessen and Others (1938). The transcript spells the name "Dreesen."
Exhibit C (0:51:03), Fleischer & Drinker shipyard pipe-covering study: Fleischer, Viles, Gade and Drinker (1946)
Exhibit D (0:58:36), Selikoff et al., insulation-worker asbestosis paper from the Oct. 1964 NYAS conference (pp. 141–142 quoted; Annals NYAS vol. 132). The paper has no library note of its own. The closest are NYAS Preprinted Abstracts (1964) and the proceedings page /library/research/biological-effects-of-asbestos (linked from Reading Castleman). The "preliminary" April 1964 paper is probably Selikoff, Churg and Hammond, JAMA (1964).
Exhibit E (1:08:52, unlettered on tape), typed copy of the 1964–70, 1970 and OSHA label texts. Sources: Lindstrom Oct. 1964, Burleson July 1970, OSHA 1972 standard.
Exhibit F (1:15:18), J-M purchase specifications for insulation packaging with the label imprint. Not in the library.
Exhibit G (1:20:17), five photographs of Thermobestos pipe insulation cartons (1970 voluntary label and OSHA label). Not in the library. No Thermobestos carton is in Artifacts.
Exhibit H (1:34:49), NIMA booklet "Recommended Health Safety Practices for Handling and Applying Thermal Insulation Products Containing Asbestos." There is no standalone note. It is enclosed with Grimmer 1971 and attached to Cerny 1968. The asbestos-cement sister booklet is in Sheckler to Zimmerman, May 1968.
Exhibit I (1:40:43), agenda of the May 14, 1968 New York Academy of Sciences meeting that began the IIHRP. Not in the library.
Exhibit J (1:44:54), IIHRP "green sheets" (insulation hygiene progress reports) printed in The Asbestos Worker. Not found as notes. The 1964–77 journal issues are held back from publication. The May 1971 J-M minutes refer to "the progress reports of the Insulation Industry Hygiene Research Program."

Tape 2

J-M prepared health booklets for buyers; Exhibits L and M named (0:01:05)

Said by: J-M counsel (question); Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "Exhibit L is a booklet entitled, What You Should Know About Asbestos and Health. Exhibit number M is a booklet entitled, Recommended Safety Practices for Handling Asbestos Fiber."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: W. A. Cooper to Dr. Paul Kotin on the History of J-M's Employee Education About Asbestos (1977) — 1977-02-11 — Both titles are attachments to this memo: "What You Should Know About Asbestos and Health (1975)" and the leaflet "Recommended Safety Practices for Handling Asbestos Fiber". Cooper dates J-M's educational booklets to 1973 onward and says "Prior to 1973, employee education about asbestos and health concerns was erratic." The booklets are real, but late (mid-1970s), which the direct testimony leaves out. Earlier, in 1968, an industry health booklet for asbestos-cement that Sheckler championed was opposed by National Gypsum, which "strongly oppose[d] the publication and distribution of the booklet" (Frank H. Zimmerman of National Gypsum to C. L. Sheckler Opposing the Asbestos-Cement Health Safety Booklet (1968), 1968-04-17; Sheckler's reply, 1968-05-08).

The IIHRP was a cooperative labor-industry-science program (Exhibit N, Selikoff 1970) (0:03:12)

Said by: J-M counsel (question); Sheckler (A, reading)
On the recording: "the nation's first cooperative effort by an international labor union, industry, medical science, and government to conduct a preventative hygiene research program for insulation workers"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Carl Thompson of Hill and Knowlton to Bert C. Goss on the Johns-Manville Project on the Selikoff Program (1968) — 1968-09-19 — The IIHRP existed and J-M co-funded it, but the "cooperative effort" framing was J-M's PR plan: its firm was to help Mount Sinai make "a major news story" of it, emphasizing it as "an outstanding and trail blazing example of industry-union scientist-government cooperative effort," with the chronology noting "the tone is to downplay the asbestos health risk." Also listed among current projects in Johns-Manville, "History of Johns-Manville Health Research" (1970). The Selikoff Industrial Medicine article itself is not in the library.

J-M and IIHRP research produced disposable respirators for asbestos (0:05:57)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "Improved respirators were developed as a result of two research programs, one specifically sponsored by Johns-Manville and the other through the IIHRP."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: low)
The documents: Johns-Manville Employee Relations Department Health Research Report, July 1971 (1971) — 1971-07-01 — J-M's own report records respirator research at McGill: "McGill University is conducting a study to determine the effectiveness of various types of respirators, including disposable respirators." Nothing in the library documents the outcome he describes. Context on J-M's in-plant respirator practice: in 1969 Sheckler himself said "Respirators are not as efficient as we thought they were" (Notes of a Discussion with Cliff Sheckler on Dust, Respirators and Disease (1969), 1969-09-16), and in 1960 he recommended keeping respirators voluntary at Manville (see entry at 1:34:58).

Industrial Health Foundation did the Quebec miners and millers study with QAMA (0:07:53)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "The Industrial Health Foundation conducted work, epidemiological study of miners and millers in the province of Quebec, Canada in conjunction with the Quebec Asbestos Mining Association."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
The documents: Industrial Hygiene Foundation, An Epidemiological Study of Lung Cancer in Asbestos Miners, Report to the Quebec Asbestos Mining Association (1957) — 1957-09 — Done by Braun and Truan of the then "Industrial Hygiene Foundation of America," paid for by QAMA. Missing context: J-M's own chronology says "It was Dr. Kenneth Smith and Dr. Paul Cartier who proposed this study to the QAMA," and J-M's Smith and Jackson reviewed a condensed version from which references to asbestosis and lung cancer were removed (Dr. Kenneth Smith to Ivan Sabourin on the Condensed Industrial Hygiene Foundation Survey (1957), 1957-12-30).

Quebec study published 1958 (Exhibit O) (0:09:06)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "When was it published? I believe it was published in 1958."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: Daniel C. Braun and T. David Truan, An Epidemiological Study of Lung Cancer in Asbestos Miners (1958) — 1958-06 — A.M.A. Archives of Industrial Health, June 1958, "made possible by 'a grant from the Quebec Asbestos Mining Association.'"

Conclusion of the Quebec study on lung cancer (0:09:12)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "The conclusions of the study, evidence of an increased, an increase of lung cancer [...] among the miners and millers in the asbestos mines above or beyond that of the general population." (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
Verdict: Contradicted as transcribed (probably a transcription gap) (confidence: medium)
The documents: Daniel C. Braun and T. David Truan (1958) — 1958-06 — The published study concluded the miners "do not have a significantly higher death rate from lung cancer than do comparable segments of the general population." The 20-second gap (0:09:12 to 0:09:32) probably hides "no evidence of". Either way, what the published version left out matters more: the 1957 report to QAMA found "a miner who develops the disease asbestosis does have a greater likelihood of developing cancer of the lung" and that asbestosis was under-recorded, findings dropped before publication after J-M's review (full 1957 report).

Sheckler personally took part in J-M's 1964 decision on which insulation products to label (0:10:18)

Said by: Raybestos counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "Did you personally participate in Johns-Manville's decision as to what asbestos-containing thermal insulation products would be labeled in 1964? Yes, sir."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: E. C. Lindstrom to J-M Plant Managers on Caution Labels for High Temperature Insulations (1964) — 1964-10-15 — The labeling program "has been reviewed by Dr. K.W. Smith, C.L. Sheckler and A. Pocius." Note the date: the program was announced in October 1964 (he later says "April 1964"), and labels went on new cartons only as old stock ran out, with "no stamping or pasting-on."

Asbestos textile cloth was not labeled in 1964 (0:10:56)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "That material was not labeled in 1964."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium)
The documents: E. C. Lindstrom ... Caution Labels for High Temperature Insulations (1964) — 1964-10-15 — The product list covers the Industrial Insulations high-temperature line ("insulating and asbestos cements, 85% magnesia, Superex and Thermobestos"), not textiles. Even within insulation, coverage stayed narrow: in 1969 Fenner marked only Thermobestos as "presently labelled" among products he said should carry a label (E. M. Fenner to D. B. Wingerter on Which Insulation Products to Label (1969), 1969-08-07).

Not labeling cloth was not "primarily" because cloth gave off little loose fiber; later agrees it was because use stayed under the 5 mppcf TLV (0:13:09)

Said by: Sheckler (answering), then Raybestos counsel (question, Sheckler agreed at 0:21:55)
On the recording: "no that was not the primary reason for not labeling asbestos cloth in 1964" ... later "Yes, I would agree to that statement."
Verdict: Qualified (inconsistent with his own prior testimony read in) (confidence: high)
The documents: Self-contradiction on the tape: his Arsenault (July 1981) testimony read at 0:16:01 says cloth "was not a material that readily gave off loose asbestos in the use of the material"; his Moran (April 1981) testimony at 0:25:57 gives the same reason ("asbestos cloth had a lower priority because it doesn't give off the loose asbestos"). He first denies, then at 0:21:22 calls the Directo testimony "very accurate" and agrees. No library document records J-M's 1964 reasoning on cloth or any measurement of dust from cloth in use. The 5 mppcf figure is right for the period: Johns-Manville Manual of Standard Practices, Appendix II - Threshold Limit Values for 1958 (1958-09-05) lists "5 million particles per cubic foot for asbestos," with J-M's own fiber standard of "1 million fibres per cubic foot."

Process changes (oil spray, wet weaving) begun in 1964 made cloth dust-free enough not to need a label (0:17:01)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "the process changes of going to oil and wet weaving were done between 1964 and sometime in the later 1960s they were begun in 64 as part of the research program"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Oil spraying and wet weaving were not new in 1964: the Asbestos Textile Institute air hygiene committee discussed "spraying oil on asbestos fiber to hold down dust" in 1955 (ATI Minutes on Fiber Conditioning and the 1956 Program (1955), 1955-12-07) and "wet weaving" in 1959 with J-M's Jackson present (ATI Minutes on Dust Sampling and the 5 Million Particle Limit (1959)). In J-M's own Manville textile plant in June 1969 lining looms still read "up to 32.9" fibers/cc and spinning frames averaged 21.1, above J-M's 12 f/cc limit (H. M. Jackson, Manville Textile Plant Survey by the New Fiber-Count Method (1969), 1969-06-13). These are in-plant counts, not counts from customers' use of cloth.

J-M's first label on cloth was the 1972 OSHA label (0:28:39)

Said by: Raybestos counsel (question, read-in from Moran; Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "the warning label that was first placed on john mansfield asbestos containing cloth that was the osha label that was developed in 1972, was it not? Answer, yes, sir."
Verdict: Not in the Library (for J-M) (confidence: medium)
The documents: No J-M document on cloth labeling found. For comparison, a Raybestos-Manhattan memo shows the OSHA label requirement applied to textiles in 1972: "many of R-M's textile products are being shipped to customers without proper labelling as dictated by OSHA regulations" (F. S. Daly to I. H. Weaver on OSHA Labeling of Textile Products (1972), 1972-07-31).

Sheckler testifies at J-M's request and is paid $400 a day (formerly $350) (0:36:08)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "For time consumed in testimony and inconvenience of traveling, I am paid at the rate of $400 a day, plus expenses."
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: medium)
The documents: No fee records. The Markusson memo (1982) (1982-06-03) confirms he was a regular J-M witness, J-M lawyers defended him personally in New Jersey and Louisiana, and J-M decided to "delist" him five months after this deposition.

Since 1972 he has collected and collated data on Manville employees, billed to Dr. Jerry Chase (0:39:47)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed); Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "in approximately 1972 you began a project for Johns-Manville wherein you began to collect and collate data on employees at the Manville facility? Yes, sir" ... "Dr. Jerry Chase."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: W. B. Reitze to G. E. Parker on Pneumoconiosis Cases at the Manville Plant Since 1932 (1975) — 1975-11-26 — Reitze reports a "very massive" study of the Manville population under Dr. Jerry Chase, with Cliff Sheckler, would take three to four years to finish. The same memo traces diagnosed pneumoconiosis at Manville to 1932.

Litigation bills go to Dennis Markusson, J-M corporate legal (0:45:14)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "To Mr. Dennis Markeson. And Mr. Markeson is corporate legal at World Headquarters? Yes, sir."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: Dennis H. Markusson to R. B. Von Wald on Clifford Sheckler's False Testimony About Rutgers (1982) — 1982-06-03 — Markusson, J-M's associate general counsel, managed Sheckler as a witness and decided to delist him.

First testimony for J-M was a Beaumont, Texas case around 1971–72 (0:45:58)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "it was a Beaumont Texas case ... sometime in approximately 1971 or 72"
Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium)
The documents: Markusson memo (1982) — 1982-06-03 — says he had testified "as early as the Borel case"; Borel was tried in the "US District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont Division" (The Borel v. Fibreboard Case File (1969-1972)).

He testified to a Rutgers B.S. on one occasion and then corrected it (0:48:52)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I testified to that fact at least on one occasion, but I certainly don't agree with your testimony of three occasions." ... "I did that and corrected that testimony, yes, sir."
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
The documents: Dennis H. Markusson to R. B. Von Wald on Clifford Sheckler's False Testimony About Rutgers (1982) — 1982-06-03 — J-M confirmed he "had never been a student at Rutgers University"; he had testified as early as Borel that he was an engineering graduate and, "after correcting that in 1978, had testified many times that he attended Rutgers for three years." His only tie was "some Extension courses" at the Middlesex County Vocational School. On this same tape (0:53:59–0:54:03) he concedes at least two prior occasions plus the Kentucky one, so his own words also contradict "one occasion."

The "correction": second day in Louisville he still said he attended Rutgers, in the B.S. program, finishing in 1940 (0:58:37)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (read-in of Damewood deposition, Aug. 25, 1978, examined by Lively Wilson)
On the recording: "I attended Rutgers University construction engineering I was in the Bachelor of Science program I finished school in 1940"
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
The documents: Markusson memo (1982) — 1982-06-03 — J-M's own investigation found he never attended; Motley was "bragging about his proof that Sheckler had never set foot on the Rutgers campus," Sheckler "refused to sign a release for his records," and the truth came through "contacts of David Gross's office with a trustee of Rutgers." The "corrected" 1978 answer, given to J-M's own lawyer after Sheckler told him of the error that morning, was itself false.

He never received a diploma or certificate from Rutgers (0:54:37)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "you did not receive any kind of a written document, whether it be a certificate, diploma, or anything else from Rutgers University ... That's correct."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: Markusson memo (1982) — 1982-06-03 — his involvement with Rutgers, "if any, was limited to some extension courses."

He wrote to attorneys to correct the earlier degree testimony (0:51:46)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "after I realized the import of the error, I went back and attempted to correct it by writing to the various attorneys correcting it."
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: medium)
The documents: No such letters in the library. The Markusson memo records that J-M learned of the problem from Motley in 1982 and that Sheckler went on testifying to three years at Rutgers after 1978, which does not fit a full correction.

1936–52 he knew only that asbestos was "toxic" (1:02:25)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "my knowledge of asbestos fiber in those days as I recall was that asbestos fiber was a toxic material"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: No library document shows what Sheckler personally knew before 1952. J-M's Manville files of the time held much more: an X-ray survey of the Manville plant in 1932 (W. B. Reitze ... Since 1932 (1975) notes "in 1932 four cases were diagnosed"), and by 1950 a list of 84 Manville "industrial hygiene cases" singled out for X-ray follow-up (M. F. Naylor to J. P. Woodard on X-Ray Follow-Up of 84 Manville Industrial Hygiene Cases (1950), 1950-10-10).

As safety engineer (1952) his duties included helping handle workmen's compensation (1:11:30)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "three, to assist my immediate supervisor in the handling of workman's compensation as designated by him."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: Castleman cites "Minutes of the Johns-Manville Compensation Committee Meetings, Manville, N.J., 1957-1958. Authenticated in depositions of C. Sheckler, a member of the Committee" (Reading Castleman, Chapter 3). Compensation strategy runs through his own memos, e.g. in 1960: "we have been successful in establishing the last day worked rather than the first xray change as a 'date of accident'" (C. L. Sheckler and Others on a Mandatory Respirator Program at the Manville Plant (1960), 1960-05-10).

Mr. Stanton was supervisor of safety at Manville 1952–57 (1:12:20)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "Mr. Stanton was supervisor of safety at that time, yes."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium)
The documents: B. F. Stanton to M. F. Naylor on Tampering with Dust Sampling at the Manville Plant (1956) — 1956-03-05 — Stanton handled Manville dust sampling "because of repeated complaints by the Stamping Press operator and other employees" in the brake lining area. The note does not give his title.

In 1952 he was not aware Manville employees were inhaling asbestos fibers, and did not learn it by 1957 (1:17:29)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "were you aware in 1952 ... that many of the employees at the Manville facility were inhaling asbestos fibers in their work i was not aware of that no sir did you find that out sometime between 1952 and 1957 no sir"
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
The documents: His own 1957 papers. Union Complaints and J-M Correspondence on Dust in the Manville Textile "A" Building (1957) — 1957-01-15 — the union said workers "know that they are eating more dust today than before," and Sheckler warned in a confidential memo that if counts were over the limit "we have probably forfeited any future legal defense." C. L. Sheckler to Dr. Kenneth Smith on the First Transite Pipe X-Ray Conferences (1957) — 1957-09-06 — Sheckler reported eight cases of "mixed pneumoconiosis of various stages" among 109 Transite pipe workers. His Summary of Atmospheric Hygiene Studies (1957–1959) flags "Stations requiring control" from June 1957. By 1960 he counted "714 employees" at stations above the limit (1960 respirator memos).

The 1952 safety program was not designed to protect all employees from inhaling asbestos (then reverses) (1:18:42)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "designed to protect all employees from the inhalation of asbestos fibers is that true no sir that's not true" ... (1:20:17) "Yes, sir." (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
Verdict: Qualified (self-contradictory on the tape) (confidence: medium)
The documents: He denies at 1:18:49 and then at 1:20:17 says the 1952 program did have a part directed at protecting employees from diseases from inhaling asbestos. Documents show that by 1957–60 the program's dust work was partial: his 1960 memo recommends that respirator "area designations should not be made" because marking areas meant "legally admitting evidence of exposure involving 714 people" (1960 respirator memos).

He is a named defendant in New Jersey; J-M provides counsel (Gross) and indemnity (1:19:08)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "Mr. Gross's law firm represents Johns-Manville as well, yes, sir."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: Markusson memo (1982) — 1982-06-03 — weighs "the ethical duties of the lawyers defending Sheckler personally in New Jersey and Louisiana" and refers to "contacts of David Gross's office."

Manville gave all employees a chest X-ray every two years as part of the physical (1:24:08)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "the chest x-ray program was such at that time 1952 that as a general matter all employees received a chest x-ray every two years that's correct"
Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium)
The documents: M. F. Naylor to J. P. Woodard on X-Ray Follow-Up of 84 Manville Industrial Hygiene Cases (1950) — 1950-10-10 — even the 84 men on J-M's special list were to be covered only "within a 2 year period"; the plant doctor would not agree to yearly X-rays for them.

The physical examination program stayed the same "in its entirety" 1952–59 (1:29:25)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "The physical examination program remained the same. In its entirety? In its entirety."
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: medium)
The documents: Transcript of a J-M Medical Meeting at Manville on Conferences before Recording X-Ray Diagnoses (1957) — 1957-05-01 — With Sheckler present, Dr. Smith changed how X-ray findings were handled: nothing in the file until a "conference," notes "removed and destroyed," and "we do not tell the man anything about that." Sheckler's own memo reports results of the "new 'conference procedure'" (Sheckler to Smith, 1957, 1957-09-06). From 1958 returning workers' records were stamped "Contact C. L. Sheckler regarding work area prior to return to work" (Dr. E. D. Merrill to C. L. Sheckler (1958), 1958-01-24). The two-year interval may have held, but the program did not stay the same.

Plant managers and key staff got a yearly physical and X-ray (1:29:54)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "plant managers key staff personnel received a physical examination once a year this included a chest x-ray"
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: medium)
The documents: No document found on yearly exams for managers at Manville. (Mr. O'Brien, whom he names as Industrial Division plant manager, appears as H. J. O'Brien on the copy list of the 1956 Stanton memo.)

In 1946 respirators were provided to all construction department employees (1:34:58)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "Respirators were provided to all of the employees in the construction department regardless of their function."
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: low)
The documents: Nothing on the 1946–52 construction department. Later practice at the same plant: Sheckler recommended in 1960 that respirators stay voluntary ("under no circumstances should this matter become a union issue"), and in 1963 an auditor found men "have not worn respirators in areas of high dust content" (C. L. Sheckler and Others on a Mandatory Respirator Program at the Manville Plant (1960); K. H. Slater on an Internal Audit and Mandatory Respirators at the Manville Plant (1963), 1963-05-10).

Masons tore out and reapplied asbestos insulation (J-M products); he had them wet it down (1:33:50)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "Masons and mason helpers, yes, sir." ... "the asbestos-containing insulating materials used by your construction department from 1946 to 1952 were manufactured by Johns-Manville? Yes, sir."
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: medium)
The documents: No document on the Manville construction department or its masons. These are admissions against interest; nothing contradicts them.

Mixing asbestos cement: "you can see dust" but he won't call it a "dusty job" (1:45:32)

Said by: Sheckler (answering); impeached with Damewood deposition, Aug. 25, 1978, p. 121
On the recording: "Well, yes, you can see dust when you mix cement." ... (1978 read-in) "Mixing cements was a dusty job."
Verdict: Contradicted (by his own prior testimony) (confidence: high)
The documents: The impeachment is on the tape (1:47:36–1:48:13); the 1978 deposition is not in the library. J-M's 1964 label covered "insulating and asbestos cements" (Lindstrom memo, 1964), and Fenner's 1969 list put "dry cements" among products that "generate asbestos fiber ... in potentially harmful quantities" (Fenner, 1969).

Exhibits identified

Exhibit J (mentioned only in passing; the Thermal Insulation Manufacturers Association booklet was discussed before this tape): not identified.
Exhibit K — "Spraying of Thermal Insulation" (Sprayed Insulation Manufacturers Association booklet): not in library. Closest related: Reitze, Nicholson, Holaday and Selikoff, Application of Sprayed Inorganic Fiber Containing Asbestos (1972), which is not the booklet.
Exhibit L — "What You Should Know About Asbestos and Health": attachment 3 (1975 J-M booklet) to W. A. Cooper to Dr. Paul Kotin (1977).
Exhibit M — "Recommended Safety Practices for Handling Asbestos Fiber": attachment 4 (J-M leaflet, "with Before You Begin cover") to the same Cooper note.
Exhibit N — Selikoff, "Partnership for Prevention: The Insulation Industry Hygiene Research Program," Industrial Medicine 39(4), April 1970: not in library.
Exhibit O — Quebec miners and millers study, 1958: Daniel C. Braun and T. David Truan, An Epidemiological Study of Lung Cancer in Asbestos Miners (1958); the unpublished full 1957 report is here.
IIHRP newsletter vol. 1 no. 4, "Cigarettes, Asbestos Don't Mix" by Selikoff (0:00:14): not in library.
Prior testimony read in: Directo v. J-M (LA, July 21, 1981, p. 4603); Arsenault v. J-M (LA, July 22, 1981, p. 4468); Moran v. J-M Sales (N.D. Ohio, April 28, 1981); St. Jacques v. J-M (deposition Jan. 4, 1982, pp. 56–57); Damewood v. J-M Sales (E.D. Tenn., deposition in Louisville Aug. 25, 1978, pp. 10–11 and 121–122). None is in the library.

Tape 3

Source transcript: sheckler-3-part1.txt (whisper, unchecked). Film note: Videotaped Deposition of Clifford L. Sheckler (1982)

Outside contractors' insulators at Manville (1936–42) wore no respirators and did not mix cement wet (0:00:08)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "No, sir, I don't recall seeing any of them with respirators."
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: medium)
The documents: Nothing in the Library describes contractor insulators at the Manville works in 1936–42. For context, J-M's own safety engineer called respirators "a 'last resort' for protection" in 1948 (H. M. Jackson to J. E. Morrison on Respirators (1948) — 1948-12-08). In 1960 Sheckler himself recommended keeping respirators voluntary at the Manville plant: "area designations should not be made" (C. L. Sheckler and Others on a Mandatory Respirator Program at the Manville Plant (1960) — 1960-05-10).

He gave purchasers' rip-out exposure "no thought" in 1946–52 (0:07:57)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I don't think in that time period, Mr. O'Reilly, that I really gave the purchasers of Johns-Manville materials any thought."
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: medium)
The documents: This is his own state of mind; no Library document shows Sheckler dealing with users before 1960. At company level, the insulators' union reported lung deaths to the industry in 1955, and the report was passed to J-M's industrial health manager (see 1:53:58 below).

Since 1972 his only output on the Manville employee project has been computer tapes; no written reports either way (0:08:11)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "And from 1972 until today, that's the only thing you've sent Johns-Manville on this project other than your bill ... Yes, sir."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: W. B. Reitze to G. E. Parker on Pneumoconiosis Cases at the Manville Plant Since 1932 (1975) — 1975-11-26 — confirms the project. Reitze writes that a "very massive" study of the Manville population under Dr. Jerry Chase, with Cliff Sheckler, was under way. The same memo lists Manville pneumoconiosis cases by year back to 1932. Nothing in the Library confirms or refutes his claim that he wrote no reports.

He joined NIMA's Health and Safety Committee about 1962–63, chaired it from about 1965, and NIMA became TIMA about 1964–65 (0:14:37)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "The change in name, I believe, came about 1964-65."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: He did chair the committee. At the 1972 Labor Department hearing he was "chairman of the Safety and Health Committee of the National Insulation Manufacturers Association (NIMA)" (Insulation Industry Testimony of Sheckler, Royer and Zumwalt at the Labor Department Asbestos Hearing (1972) — 1972-03-16). But the group was still called NIMA in 1971–72 (Statements of Clifford Sheckler, Dr. George W. Wright and Henry B. Moreno ... (1972)), so his date for the name change is too early. His answer at 0:18:51, which ties the change to 1979, fits better. Before he joined, NIMA's board had decided in May 1960 that a NIMA health "Safety Program ... should be dropped" (NIMA Board Minutes Dropping a Health Program (May 1960) — 1960-05-06).

The Industrial Health (Hygiene) Foundation, where he was a director 1974/75–80, is industry-funded and J-M is a member (0:20:36)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "that is an organization that is funded by industry it's it yes sir and Johns-Manville is a member of that organization yes sir"
Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium)
The documents: John W. Kane of the Asbestos Workers Union and the Industrial Hygiene Foundation on Insulation Hazards (1955) — 1955-08-26 — calls the IHF "the industry-supported foundation." Its managing director reported a union inquiry to J-M's H. M. Jackson. His directorship dates are not in the Library.

The Lanza study (Exhibit A) was one he read and relied on; first read after he went to New York in 1960 (0:24:58)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I did the study for the first time sometime after I went into New York in 1960."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: low)
The documents: Exhibit A is Lanza, McConnell and Fehnel, "Effects of the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers" (1935). He gives two dates for his first reading: "after I went into New York in 1960" here, and at 1:26:46 "59 late 59 early 60." The Library does not date his reading. The study's sponsors reviewed its text before publication (M. F. Judd to Vandiver Brown on Approving the Lanza Report (1935)).

In 1960 he became manager of J-M's Industrial Health Program at New York headquarters, succeeding Hugh Jackson, over about 50 plants (U.S. and Canada) and about 20,000 employees (0:25:40)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "The predecessor in your job ... was Mr. Hugh Jackson. Is that true? Yes, sir. That's correct."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high (role and predecessor); the counts are NOT IN LIBRARY)
The documents: H. M. Jackson to the Los Angeles Division of Occupational Health on Marinite, Colorlith, Asbestocite and Transite (1960) — 1960-07-11 — still has Jackson as "manager of J-M's Industrial Health Program" in July 1960, so Sheckler's handover came later that year. By December 1960 Sheckler was speaking at the industrial relations managers' meeting on "Loss Prevention Control" (Johns-Manville Industrial Relations Managers Meeting Minutes on the Industrial Health Program (1960) — 1960-12-04).

He took a course at Rutgers University in psychology in the late 1950s (0:27:39)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "i took a course at Rutgers University in psychology"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
The documents: Dennis H. Markusson to R. B. Von Wald on Clifford Sheckler's False Testimony About Rutgers (1982) — 1982-06-03 — J-M confirmed that Sheckler "had never been a student at Rutgers University." His only connection was "some Extension courses" at the Middlesex County Vocational School. The modest claim here, one evening extension course, is close to what J-M found. Five months later J-M dropped him as a witness over his earlier claim to have attended Rutgers for three years.

Dr. Kenneth Smith chose the literature he read; he did not have "a lot of reading" on asbestos disease (0:30:58)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "he chose selected literature for me to review as I had time"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Sheckler did not depend only on reading. In June 1961 he attended the Asbestos Textile Institute meeting called "specifically to hear Dr. Kenneth Smith of Johns-Manville report" on asbestosis and cancer. There Smith reported British and South African findings and Mancuso's 19 lung cancers among 31 asbestos cases (Leon B. Horowitz's Report to A. W. Spedding on Dr. Kenneth Smith's Asbestosis and Cancer Talk ... (June 1961) — 1961-06-12).

Jackson spent little time briefing him; Jackson's Saranac and pneumoconiosis correspondence was never turned over; Smith gave him mainly report formats (0:31:58)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "Not a great deal, no, sir, because he, too, was earning a new job." / "Primarily format information." (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Sheckler had worked directly with Jackson and Smith on Manville disease cases since the mid-1950s. Jackson wrote to him in 1956 about X-ray films for a compensation hearing (H. M. Jackson to C. L. Sheckler on X-Ray Films of Talcosis (1956) — 1956-11-26). Jackson and Sheckler both attended Smith's May 1957 meeting, which set up X-ray "conferences" so "we will have nothing in our records as to a diagnosis" (Transcript of a J-M Medical Meeting at Manville ... (1957) — 1957-05-01). Jackson stayed at J-M and was copied on Sheckler's memos into the 1970s (for example the 1971 cancer-reporting memo). Jackson's files held the Saranac correspondence, for example H. M. Jackson to Arthur J. Vorwald Asking for a Fiber Count Standard (1951). The Library has nothing on which files were handed over.

As safety engineer (1952–57) he had no responsibility for workmen's compensation; as supervisor of safety (1957–59) he administered comp claims and estimated their value (0:35:43)

Said by: Sheckler (answering) / plaintiffs' counsel (question, agreed)
On the recording: "1957 until 1959 when you were supervisor of safety you did have responsibility for workman's compensation claims ... for the administration of workman's compensation yes sir"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Before 1957 he was already preparing compensation cases. In November 1956 Jackson sent him talcosis X-ray films, and Sheckler wrote that they were to go to a doctor for review "prior to his testimony" (H. M. Jackson to C. L. Sheckler on X-Ray Films of Talcosis (1956) — 1956-11-26). In early 1957 he told headquarters that New Jersey's reading of its occupational disease law "is becoming more liberal rapidly" (J-M Correspondence on Funding a Cardio-Pulmonary Laboratory at Middlesex General Hospital (1957) — 1957-02-06).

Among the 1957–59 claims were asbestos-related occupational disease claims, some from production and some from maintenance workers (0:38:25)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "There were occupational disease cases among the claims, yes, sir. ... some of the occupational disease cases were asbestos-related. Yes, sir."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: His own memo of September 1957 reports X-ray reviews of 109 Transite pipe workers that found "mixed pneumoconiosis of various stages" in eight and two other "potentially compensable" cases (C. L. Sheckler to Dr. Kenneth Smith on the First Transite Pipe X-Ray Conferences (1957) — 1957-09-06). In 1981 J-M's lawyers feared the compensation files would show disease in employees "either indirectly exposed to asbestos or exposed to low levels of dust" (Kenneth G. Gulley to Robert S. Venning on Why J-M Fought Discovery of Plant Workers' Compensation Files (1981) — 1981-12-18).

He saw no lung cancer or other occupational cancer claims from Manville employees before he left for headquarters in 1960 (0:39:45)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I don't recall claims in that time frame where lung cancer as an occupational disease was alleged."
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: medium)
The documents: No Library document records a Manville cancer claim in 1957–59. J-M's medical director was getting outside pathology findings of "metastatic adenocarcinoma" together with asbestosis in 1957 (Dr. Paul Gross to Dr. Kenneth W. Smith on Lung Slides Showing Asbestosis and Cancer (1957) — 1957-06-10; the patient is not named). In 1981 J-M's lawyers listed as a reason to block discovery that the comp files might show J-M accepted the asbestos–cancer link "at a date earlier than we generally admit" (Gulley to Venning, 1981, above).

Saranac made no diagnosis of asbestos-related cancer in a Manville comp claim, 1957–60 (0:41:47)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "To the best of my knowledge, no. ... Not at Manville location."
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: low)
The documents: No Library note covers Saranac diagnoses in Manville claims of 1957–60. His qualifier "Not at Manville location" leaves room for other plants. Saranac's file on the Waukegan worker Dominic Bertogliat (P-48-415) and its correspondence with Jackson about the 1950 lung-cancer death of Waukegan's Vernon Hall are cited in Reading Castleman, Chapter 10 ("correspondence between Vorwald and Dr. Samuel Keller ... and Hugh Jackson regarding possible compensation claim over the death in 1950 of Vernon Hall (lung cancer)").

From 1960 to 1967 he administered comp for all of J-M's self-insured plants (Manville, Waukegan, Nashua and others) (0:43:31)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "you did have responsibility for administering the workman's compensation program at all of john's manville's self-insured facilities"
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: C. L. Sheckler to C. H. Grote and L. Hemerda on Trying Manville Occupational Disease Claims (1964) — 1964-05-13 — shows him directing Manville claim strategy from headquarters. He proposed "full trials of most O.D. claims that are filed," done "quietly and with no publicity whatsoever."

He recalls only one Manville asbestos-related lung cancer claim, 1960–67, about 1966 (0:45:33)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "In that time frame, Mr. O'Reilly, I remember just one claim." / "I think we're talking sometime in the 66 time frame."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: In November 1966 Sheckler met Travelers Insurance about "claims that cancer allegedly is caused by exposure to asbestos." He "expressed grave concern that a large number of such claims could now be anticipated" (George W. Hatch of Travelers Insurance to Jack C. Else ... (1966) — 1966-12-21). That claim (Sullivan, an insulator) was not a Manville employee's. By 1971 Sheckler was asking the Manville plant to report "all cases with a possible involvement of any type of cancer, including mesothelioma" (C. L. Sheckler to J. D. Anderson and L. H. Hemerda on Reporting Cancer Cases at Manville (1971) — 1971-05-12). The Library does not count Manville cancer claims for 1960–67.

He first knew of Selikoff's findings in April 1964; before then he knew only that Selikoff was surveying insulators, and had heard of no findings or conclusions (0:48:21)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "April of 1964 is the first knowledge I had of the preliminary reports" / "I had not heard of any conclusions, no, sir."
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
The documents: Asbestos Textile Institute Air Hygiene and Manufacturing Committee Minutes on Selikoff's Study and British Fiber Counting (1963) — 1963-06-06. The minutes record Sheckler as present for J-M. The committee was told that "a Dr. Sellakoff" would soon read a paper on about 1,500 workers, "largely in asbestos insulation applications, showing a very large incidence of lung cancer," and that "it will be damaging to the industry." Selikoff presented the paper eleven days later, on June 17, 1963. JAMA published it on April 6, 1964 (Selikoff, Churg and Hammond, "Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia" (1964)). So April 1964 is when the paper was published, not when he first heard its findings. He does concede "there was conversation, discussion about it."

Before April 1964 he had no knowledge of how much asbestos exposure would raise lung cancer risk (0:50:27)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "did you personally have any opinion or knowledge as to how much asbestos fibers were required to induce or increase the risk of pulmonary cancer no sir"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: No one had a dose figure. But in June 1961, at a meeting Sheckler attended, Smith reported that "the British and South Africans had associated lung cancer and asbestosis since 1935" (Horowitz report, June 1961 — 1961-06-12). Two days earlier the same ATI committee, with Sheckler listed among the J-M men, had backed a government study meant to establish "whether there is a connection between Asbestosis and Cancer" (ATI Air Hygiene Committee Minutes on a Public Health Service Cancer Survey (1961) — 1961-06-08).

In 1958–59 headquarters had him contact Dr. Borow (Bound Brook, N.J.), who had a list of about 18–20 suspected mesothelioma patients; Sheckler found 8–10 had worked at Manville and told Borow (0:52:13)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "He had a list of patients who he assumed had mesothelioma." / "did you personally discover that approximately eight to ten of the people on the list were employed at the Manville complex ... Yes, sir, that's correct." (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: medium)
The documents: The Library has no J-M document on the Borow inquiry. Its only Borow item is the published result: Reading Castleman, Chapter 7, note 48: "Borow, M., et al., 'Mesothelioma and Its Association with Asbestos,' J.A.M.A. 201:587-591 (1967)." By this testimony, J-M learned in 1958–59 that about half of a local doctor's suspected mesothelioma patients had worked at Manville. That is a year or two before Wagner's 1960 paper, and his 1982 account is the only record we hold of it.

The Manville records of these people (employed 1912–1920s) gave no job descriptions (0:59:01)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "These people were employed in the very early years of the Manville plan ... between 1912 and the 1920s, and the records merely indicated their employment."
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: low)
The documents: Not documented. J-M's records did trace diagnosed pneumoconiosis at Manville back to 1932 by year and length of service (Reitze to Parker (1975)).

Production workers moved to maintenance for better pay, not because of their lungs (1:01:26)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "were they transferred because of the condition of their lungs ... no sir they were transferred because maintenance was a choice ... job as far as pay"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: The question was about production-to-maintenance moves; the Library does not cover those. But J-M did move men because of lung disease, and Sheckler ran the procedure. In January 1958 the Manville medical department adopted his system of stamping reports for returning workers to be restricted to areas "where dust counts are within acceptable safe limits," with the note "Contact C. L. Sheckler regarding work area prior to return to work" (Dr. E. D. Merrill to C. L. Sheckler on Work Restrictions for Returning Employees (1958) — 1958-01-24). In 1960 Smith told managers: "We have had employees develop asbestosis or silicosis in our Transite Pipe plant," and they were moved to other departments (IR Managers Meeting Minutes (1960)). In 1957 the plant had 367 people on its "No Dust List" (Middlesex laboratory correspondence (1957)).

Borow never told him he wanted to study Manville employees and mesothelioma; Sheckler never suggested J-M research on mesothelioma (1:02:05)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "No, sir. Dr. Borow never advised me of that."
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: low)
The documents: Borow did publish on mesothelioma and asbestos in JAMA in 1967 (Castleman ch. 7, note 48, above). Nothing in the Library shows Borow asking J-M for a study, or J-M taking up mesothelioma research before the late 1960s.

He learned of two Wagner studies some time after going to headquarters; the second came out after the first (1:02:19)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "i was made aware of dr wagner's studies and i i make that plural because there were two studies done"
Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium)
The documents: J. C. Wagner, C. A. Sleggs and Paul Marchand, Diffuse Pleural Mesothelioma and Asbestos Exposure in the North Western Cape Province (1960) — 1960 — is in J-M's own chronology. The follow-up paper, Sleggs, Marchand and Wagner, "Diffuse Pleural Mesotheliomas in South Africa," S. Afr. Med. J. (1961), is cited in Reading Castleman, Chapter 7, note 63. So the second paper did come later.

His impression of Wagner's first study: the mesothelioma victims worked at the mines ("the entire families worked at the mines") (1:06:43)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "my impression of chris wagner's first study was that these people worked at the mines so the entire families worked at the mines"
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
The documents: Wagner, Sleggs and Marchand (1960). Many of the 33 patients had never worked in the mines: "housewives, domestic servants, cattle herders, farmers, a water bailiff, an insurance agent, and an accountant," along with children who played on mine dumps and a woman who lived on the fields only until she was five. J-M's own chronology summary reads: "Found downwind mesothelioma." On January 5, 1982 (read in at 1:08:15) he said he did not know whether they were "all employees or partially employees." He also concedes that the first study found cases among people who lived there.

Wagner's second study found no mesothelioma in the Transvaal under the same conditions (1:04:44)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "in the Transvaal area he could find no mesothelioma so of course this left a tremendous void in the in the scientific knowledge"
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: low)
The documents: The Library's notes on the Wagner papers do not discuss the Transvaal. The 1960 paper's own finding was a crocidolite link: "In all but one case the patient had a probable exposure to crocidolite." In 1969 Sheckler himself spoke of a "new possible relationship" between crocidolite and lung cancer, and said mesothelioma was "not related to the amount of pneumoconiosis" (Notes of a Discussion with Cliff Sheckler on Dust, Respirators and Disease (1969) — 1969-09-16).

About 200 (or "several hundred") workmen's compensation claims alleging asbestos lung disease were filed at Manville in 1957–59 (1:14:07)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question); Sheckler now says he can't say how many were asbestos-related; his 1978 Damewood testimony, read in, said "couple several hundred would be reasonable"
On the recording: "there probably was that many occupational disease claims filed but i can't say there was that many asbestos related occupational disease claims filed"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: K. G. Gulley Memo on Workers' Compensation Occupational Disease Files in Commercial Union v. Johns-Manville (1981) — 1981-12-25. J-M's lawyer counted "approximately 175 Workers' Compensation claims filed at the Manville facility ... related to asbestos exposures" before 1965, with only one before 1952. A count of several hundred asbestos claims in 1957–59 alone would be well above J-M's own total, so his 1982 hedge fits the records better than his 1978 answer. The Gulley memo also says the claim files were incomplete.

Occupational disease claims (with reopenings) rose at Manville between 1952 and 1959; in the 1981 Director trial he agreed asbestos-related disease increased there, but now says "I can't answer" (1:18:51)

Said by: Sheckler (answering), and Director transcript read in
On the recording: "the two types of claims did increase between 1952 and 1959" / "I can't answer that question mr. O'Reilly" / (Director, 1981) "I think that's a fair statement. Yes, sir."
Verdict: Supported (increase); his 1982 "I can't answer" is CONTRADICTED by his own records (confidence: high)
The documents: His own 1957 memo counted eight cases of pneumoconiosis among 109 Transite pipe workers (Sheckler to Smith (1957) — 1957-09-06). In 1957 the plant doctor reported 164 people with X-ray changes "which might be considered compatible with a work exposure" (Middlesex laboratory correspondence (1957)). J-M's president spoke in 1960 of "the increasing number of claims in plants where it was believed no hazard existed" (C. B. Burnett, President of Johns-Manville, on Industrial Hygiene (1960) — 1960-07-19). In 1963 Smith told managers of "an increasing number of unfortunate occupational disease cases because of the dirty working conditions of several years ago," at the meeting where Sheckler also spoke (Smith and Sheckler at the IR Managers' Meeting (1963) — 1963-04-29).

At Manville in 1952–59 some employees worked with fiber all day, others had intermittent exposure; claimants' exposures varied (1:24:50)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "there were some Manville employees who worked directly with asbestos fibers eight hours a day, five days a week? Yes, sir."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: In 1960 Sheckler reported "714 employees worked at 147 sampling stations above the maximum allowable dust concentration" at Manville (Sheckler and Others on a Mandatory Respirator Program (1960) — 1960-05-10).

Before reading Selikoff in April 1964 he had no information indicating any risk to the users or consuming public of J-M asbestos insulation (1:27:06)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "there were no studies that indicated any potential injury to users of insulation materials ... that I was aware of before 1964." / "No, sir."
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
The documents: Three documents from before April 1964 contradict him. (1) In June 1963 he was at the ATI meeting told of Selikoff's coming report of "a very large incidence of lung cancer" among workers "largely in asbestos insulation applications" (ATI minutes, June 1963). (2) In April–May 1963 his own talk to J-M managers gave as a purpose of plant dust surveys "bona fide records for litigation purposes including Workmen's Compensation, common-law third party, or possibly customer liability claims" (Smith and Sheckler at the IR Managers' Meeting (1963)). (3) In June 1961, at a meeting he attended, Smith warned that writing on asbestos and cancer would raise compensation costs and that "the more costly customer liability cases in common law court would be involved" (Horowitz report, June 1961). At company level, Jackson, as industrial health manager in July 1960, was telling a Los Angeles health agency that asbestos and silica in Marinite and Transite "are potentially hazardous" to those working with them (Jackson to the LA Division (1960)).

Before April 1964 (and in fact before 1980) he never knew of or saw Jackson's August 13, 1948 letter to Vorwald on Bertogliat's slight exposure, or Vorwald's August 19, 1948 reply ("anticipate others with similar exposures to be similarly affected"); Jackson never told him (1:32:10)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "at any time prior to 1980 no sir" / "No, sir." (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: medium)
The documents: Neither letter is in the Library. The underlying case file is: Reading Castleman, Chapter 3, note 111, cites "Dominic Bertogliat file (P-48-415), Vorwald archives." That matches the reference "P-48-415" on Exhibit 1A. J-M's side of the case is in J. P. Woodard to E. F. Day on the Bertogliat Death Claim (1948) (1948-01-30): copied to Jackson, Travelers paid "the death claim insurance of $5,000" to the widow of the Waukegan worker. The Library has nothing on whether Sheckler saw these papers.

Hugh Jackson was J-M's headquarters safety engineer in 1948 (1:38:46)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "Mr. Jackson, as safety engineer at corporate headquarters in 1948"
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: H. M. Jackson to J. E. Morrison on Respirators (1948) — 1948-12-08 — describes "H. M. Jackson, Johns-Manville's safety engineer in New York."

He learned of "individual susceptibility" some time after 1957 and understood it as differences in how well people clear dust from their lungs (1:45:59)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "Sometime after 1957, I would say." / "some people's garbage collection system works much more efficiently than other people"
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: low)
The documents: This concerns his own understanding. The Vorwald letter that raises susceptibility ("individual susceptibility will affect some selection," as counsel quotes it) is not in the Library.

The August 1955 letters: a union corresponding secretary (Kane) wrote that 7 of 9 pipe coverers had died of lung disease, and Dr. Walmer sent it to Jackson. Jackson never told him, and he never saw either letter before 1980 (1:53:58)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question); Sheckler (answering) denied knowledge
On the recording: "did Mr. Jackson advise you that he had received correspondence in 1955 from a corresponding secretary of a union indicating that 7 out of 9 of that union's pipe coverers had died from lung disease? No, sir." (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
Verdict: Supported (the letters' content as counsel describes it); his lack of knowledge is NOT IN LIBRARY (confidence: high)
The documents: John W. Kane of the Asbestos Workers Union and the Industrial Hygiene Foundation on Insulation Hazards (1955) — 1955-08-13 and 1955-08-26. Kane, corresponding secretary of Local No. 2 (Pittsburgh), wrote that "seven of the last nine of the members of our Union, the Asbestos Workers, (pipe covers) have died of lung disorders." Dr. C. Richard Walmer of the Industrial Hygiene Foundation sent the letter to H. M. Jackson, writing: "We did not feel that we could reply in correspondence to Mr. Kane." So a report of insulators dying of lung disease was in J-M's industrial health files in 1955, five years before Sheckler took over that office. The same year Dr. Smith's chapter said the term "asbestos worker" was used "too freely" for union insulators (Kenneth W. Smith, "Asbestosis," Chapter 2 of The Pneumoconioses (1955)).

Exhibits identified

Exhibit A, the Lanza study: Lanza, McConnell and Fehnel, "Effects of the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers" (1935).
Exhibit 1A (Exhibit 1 is its blow-up), H. M. Jackson to Dr. Arthur J. Vorwald, Saranac Laboratory, about August 13, 1948, re Dominic Bertogliat, P-48-415: not in the Library. The source file is cited in Reading Castleman, Chapter 3, note 111. The related J-M memo is J. P. Woodard to E. F. Day on the Bertogliat Death Claim (1948). This is a high-value addition if a copy can be found (Vorwald archives, AFIP).
Exhibits 2C–2D (2A–2B are the blow-ups), Vorwald to Jackson, August 19, 1948, two pages, re Bertogliat, addressed to Jackson as safety engineer at 22 East 40th Street: not in the Library. Same source.
Exhibit 3A (3 is the blow-up), John W. Kane, corresponding secretary, Local 2 of the Asbestos Workers, August 13, 1955: John W. Kane of the Asbestos Workers Union and the Industrial Hygiene Foundation on Insulation Hazards (1955), first file.
Exhibit 4A (4 is the blow-up), Dr. C. Richard Walmer to H. M. Jackson, Industrial Health Program, J-M, August 1955, enclosing 3A: the same note, second file (letter of August 26, 1955).
Read-in testimony with no Library note: Sheckler's deposition in St. Jacques v. Johns-Manville (January 5, 1982, vol. 2, pp. 213–214); his deposition in Damewood v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (Louisville, August 25, 1978, pp. 93–95); and his trial testimony in Director v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. (No. C-259023, July 22, 1981, vol. 29, p. 4634).

Tape 4

Exhibit 5C/5D: Braun to Jackson, December 6, 1956 (0:00:13)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question)
On the recording: "a copy of a two-page letter dated December 6, 1956, from Daniel C. Braun, M.D., Medical Director, to Mr. Hugh Jackson, Manager of the Industrial Health Program, Johns-Manville Corporation."
Verdict: Supported, high confidence
The documents: Dr. Daniel C. Braun to H. M. Jackson Sending Lung Cancer Literature for the Asbestos Textile Industry (1956), 1956-12-06. The note describes "A two-page letter of December 6, 1956, from Dr. Daniel C. Braun, medical director of the Industrial Hygiene Foundation, to Hugh M. Jackson, manager of J-M's industrial health program."

Jackson never told him of Braun's 1956 literature summary, and he never saw the letter before 1977 (0:01:12)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler denied)
On the recording: "did Mr. Jackson advise you or inform you that he had received correspondence from Dr. Braun in 1956 ... No, sir."
Verdict: Qualified, medium confidence. Nothing in the Library shows Sheckler saw it. But the letter was in the files of the job he took over: Jackson had asked Braun for the literature. Sheckler was also working directly with Jackson in these years, on X-ray films in November 1956 and at the May 1957 Manville meeting with Smith, Jackson, DuBow and Merrill.
The documents: Braun to Jackson (1956), 1956-12-06: "Pursuant to Jackson's request, Dr. Braun sent Jackson information available in the literature on asbestos and cancer." H. M. Jackson to C. L. Sheckler on X-Ray Films of Talcosis (1956), 1956-11-26: a memo "from H. M. Jackson at J-M headquarters to C. L. Sheckler at the Manville plant."

Braun headed the Industrial Hygiene Foundation (later Industrial Health Foundation), an industry-sponsored body with J-M as a member (0:01:40)

Said by: Sheckler (answering), plaintiffs' counsel (question)
On the recording: "the industrial health foundation is another name for the industrial hygiene foundation ... The Industrial Health Foundation is sponsored by industry. And Johns-Manville was and is a member"
Verdict: Supported, high confidence
The documents: Air Hygiene Foundation Begins the Industrial Hygiene Digest (1937), 1937 (from a 1984 J-M memo). The foundation "began in 1935 as the Air Hygiene Foundation of America, became the Industrial Hygiene Foundation of America in 1941, and the Industrial Health Foundation in 1969"; J-M's chronology adds: "Copies of these materials was provided to J-M as a member of the IHF."

Hinshaw and Garland, Diseases of the Chest: exposure in fabricating plants "and among those who install insulating materials" (0:02:27)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler denied being told by Jackson, or knowing it before April 1964)
On the recording: "exposure occurs in industrial plants where asbestos products are fabricated and among those who install insulating materials."
Verdict: Qualified, high confidence. Counsel quoted the text correctly, and it was in Jackson's 1956 letter. Sheckler's denial that he personally knew is not contradicted by anything in the Library.
The documents: Braun to Jackson (1956), 1956-12-06. J-M's chronology entry reads: Hinshaw and Garland "state that 'exposure occurs in industrial plants where asbestos products are fabricated and among those who install insulating materials.'"

1950s literature naming pipe coverers and insulators with asbestosis and lung cancer (0:02:54)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler denied Jackson told him)
On the recording: "medical articles in the 50s that indicated pipe coverers and laggers as suffering from asbestosis lung cancer. No sir."
Verdict: Qualified, high confidence. The premise is supported, since Braun's letter to Jackson reported pipe-coverer cases. The denial that he personally knew is unrebutted.
The documents: Braun to Jackson (1956): "The occupation of most of the 20 cases studied was asbestos textile worker, except for 4 pipe coverers (insulation workers)." Braun to Jackson (1957) also lists "pipe coverers."

Isselbacher, Klaus and Hardy, "Asbestosis and Bronchogenic Carcinoma," American Journal of Medicine, November 1953 (0:07:34)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler: "No, sir, I was not aware of that")
On the recording: "in November 1953 doctors Isselbacher, Klaus, and Hardy published an article entitled Asbestosis and Bronchogenic Carcinoma"
Verdict: Supported as to the article. J-M had a copy, because Braun enclosed it in his 1956 letter to Jackson. High confidence.
The documents: Braun to Jackson (1956). The enclosures are "Isselbacher, Klaus and Hardy, American Journal of Medicine, November 1953, and Richard Doll, British Journal of Industrial Medicine, April 1955."

Doll, "Mortality from Lung Cancer in Asbestos Workers," 1950s (0:10:04)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler: "No, sir, I don't believe so")
On the recording: "Dr. Doll published an article entitled Mortality from Lung Cancer in Asbestos Workers Sometime in the Fifties."
Verdict: Supported as to the article (1955). J-M's industrial health manager had a copy by December 1956. High confidence.
The documents: Braun to Jackson (1956). The letter covers "Richard Doll's 1955 study of 18 lung cancers among 105 autopsies of asbestos workers," and the enclosure is "Doll, 'Mortality from Lung Cancer in Asbestos Workers' (1955)."

JAMA editorial linking lung cancer to asbestosis and predicting more compensation claims (0:12:37)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler denied awareness)
On the recording: "occurrence of cancer of the lung was related to pulmonary asbestosis ... claims for compensation will become of increasing frequency due to the general increase of carcinoma of the lung"
Verdict: Qualified, medium confidence. The words appear in Braun's 1956 letter, but as L. W. Smith's 1949 article quoting a JAMA editorial. The second sentence ("claims for compensation...") may be L. W. Smith's own words rather than the editorial's.
The documents: Braun to Jackson (1956): "Smith quotes a recent editorial in the JAMA: 'As the available evidence shows that the occurrence of cancer of the lung is related to pulmonary asbestosis...' and states that 'claims for compensation will become of increasing frequency...'"

Exhibit 6C/6D: Braun to Jackson, August 23, 1957, and Jackson never passed it on (0:16:04)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler denied ever seeing it or being told of it)
On the recording: "a two-page letter from Dr. Braun to Mr. Hugh Jackson, dated August 23rd, 1957."
Verdict: Supported as to the document. The denial is unrebutted. High confidence.
The documents: Dr. Daniel C. Braun to Hugh M. Jackson on Lung Cancer in Asbestos Factory Workers (1957), 1957-08-23: "A two-page letter of August 23, 1957, from Dr. Daniel C. Braun ... to Hugh M. Jackson, manager of J-M's Industrial Health Program," written for the September Asbestos Textile Institute meeting.

Of 99 asbestosis/lung cancer cases reported to 1955, 80 were in workers other than miners (0:19:31)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question; question withdrawn and reframed)
On the recording: "of 99 asbestosis lung cancer cases that were reported in the literature up to 1955, 80 appeared to have occurred in asbestos workers other than miners"
Verdict: Supported, high confidence
The documents: Braun to Jackson (1957), 1957-08-23: "of 99 cases reported up to 1955, at least 80 appeared to be in asbestos workers other than miners, such as weavers, carders, baggers and pipe coverers."

Cases reported in women and in weavers, carders, mattress makers, laggers, baggers, pipe coverers, spinners (0:22:35)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler: "No sir")
On the recording: "a number occurred in women and in occupations such as weaving carding mattress making lagging bagging pipe covering spinning"
Verdict: Qualified, medium confidence. Braun's August 1957 letter lists those occupations ("weavers, carders, spinners, mattress makers, baggers, pipe coverers"). The note does not mention women or laggers.
The documents: Braun to Jackson (1957): "80 appear to have occurred in asbestos workers, such as weavers, carders, spinners, mattress makers, baggers, pipe coverers, rather than in miners."

Braun noted that the English cases could not be miners because asbestos is not mined in England (0:24:13)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler denied awareness)
On the recording: "cases reported in the literature of asbestosis, lung cancer in England, and wherein he felt there was no mining of asbestos in England."
Verdict: Supported as to Braun's letter, high confidence
The documents: Braun to Jackson (1957): "Braun notes that the English cases must all have been textile or similar workers, since asbestos is not mined in England."

The Industrial Hygiene Digest was quarterly (Sheckler), not monthly (0:28:11)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "as my memory serves me it it was published quarterly I may be wrong"
Verdict: Contradicted (an honest memory lapse, not his own papers), high confidence. Counsel is right that it was monthly. Counsel's inference from "volume 21, number 6, June" also matches.
The documents: Industrial Hygiene Digest, June 1957 ..., 1957-06: "The June 1957 issue (vol. 21, no. 6) of the Industrial Hygiene Digest, the Industrial Hygiene Foundation's monthly collection of literature abstracts." Air Hygiene Foundation Begins the Industrial Hygiene Digest (1937): "In 1937 the IHF began publication of the monthly Industrial Hygiene Digest."

Dr. Smith screened the Digest and passed pertinent items to Sheckler (0:27:43)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "Dr. Smith examined the digest and would bring to my attention any articles in the digest that he felt were pertinent to my specific function."
Verdict: Not in the Library, low confidence. J-M received the Digest as an IHF member, but the foundation "kept no record of who inside each member company read its copies."
The documents: Air Hygiene Foundation Begins the Industrial Hygiene Digest (1937): the Digest "was sent regularly to all member companies."

Exhibit 7 series: the June 1957 Digest, extract 761 "Asbestosis with pleural calcification," a Danish study (Frost, Georg, Moller) of insulators, not shipyards (0:35:33)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question); Sheckler corrected the "shipyard" framing
On the recording: "I don't see any reference to a shipyard study in this digest." / "That's why I call it the Frost-George article."
Verdict: Supported, high confidence. Sheckler's correction holds: the abstract concerns insulation workers, and the note does not mention shipyards. J-M had a copy of this issue.
The documents: Industrial Hygiene Digest, June 1957 ...: "Abstract 761 summarized 'Asbestosis with Pleural Calcification among Insulation Workers' by J. Frost, J. Georg and P. F. Moller (Danish Medical Bulletin, November 1956). Of 31 Danish insulation workers with more than 20 years' exposure, 22 had abnormalities"; "this copy comes from Johns-Manville's files."

He never saw the Danish insulator study and did not know of it before April 1964 (0:41:16)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler denied)
On the recording: "at any time prior to april 1964 were you aware that there was a danish study published in 1957 that disclosed the incidence of asbestosis among insulators no sir"
Verdict: Qualified, medium confidence. The personal denial is unrebutted, but the abstract (published 1956, abstracted June 1957) was in J-M's files.
The documents: Industrial Hygiene Digest, June 1957 ...: the finding "definitely points to an occupational origin."

Braun's study for the Quebec Asbestos Mining Association became the Braun-Truan study, which Sheckler relied on (0:47:12)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "became known as the Braun-Truan study when it was published? Yes, sir." / "the same Braun-Truan study that you relied on ... Yes, sir."
Verdict: Supported, high confidence
The documents: Daniel C. Braun and T. David Truan, An Epidemiological Study of Lung Cancer in Asbestos Miners (1958), 1958-06: made possible by "a grant from the Quebec Asbestos Mining Association."

Sheckler read Braun-Truan as showing no more lung cancer in Quebec miners than in the general population (0:48:54)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "the asbestos miners in quebec did not show an incidence of asbestos of lung cancer higher than the general population of quebec ... yes sir"
Verdict: Qualified, high confidence. That is what the published article concluded. But the article was edited before publication: the full September 1957 report had also found that miners with asbestosis were more likely to get lung cancer, and that finding was dropped. Sheckler relied on the cleaned version.
The documents: Braun and Truan (1958): they "do not have a significantly higher death rate from lung cancer than do comparable segments of the general population." IHF report to QAMA (1957), 1957-09: "a miner who develops the disease asbestosis does have a greater likelihood of developing cancer of the lung."

Exhibit 8C/8D: Smith to Sabourin, December 30, 1957. Smith and Jackson reviewed a condensation and suggested changes before publication (0:45:36)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler denied knowing before April 1964, or ever seeing it before 1977)
On the recording: "Dr. Kenneth Smith ... wrote a letter to Mr. Sabourin of the Quebec Asbestos Mining Association suggesting certain changes or modifications in the Braun-Truan study before it was published."
Verdict: Supported as to the document, high confidence. The letter shows more than counsel put to him: Smith and Jackson accepted the deletion of all references to asbestosis and lung cancer. Sheckler's denial that he knew is unrebutted.
The documents: Dr. Kenneth Smith to Ivan Sabourin on the Condensed Industrial Hygiene Foundation Survey (1957), 1957-12-30: Smith and Jackson "noted deletion of all references to the association of asbestosis and lung cancer in this condensation," and agreed "with the deletion of the reference to smoking and lung cancer."

Smith wrote that the report would be criticized because all other authors correlated lung cancer with asbestosis (0:52:07)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question)
On the recording: "the Braun-Truan report would be subjected to criticism when it was published because all other authors at that time correlated lung cancer with cases of asbestosis."
Verdict: Supported, high confidence
The documents: Smith to Sabourin (1957): the report would be criticized "because all other authors today correlate lung cancer and cases of asbestosis."

Smith proposed the wording "the hypothesis that asbestos miners do not have a higher mortality ... cannot be rejected" (0:53:33)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler: "I was not aware of this letter")
On the recording: "having found just 12 cases, we are not above this level and therefore the hypotheses that asbestos miners do not have a higher mortality from lung cancer than does the general population cannot be rejected" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
Verdict: Supported, medium confidence. The note quotes the closing clause; the "12 cases" lead-in is not quoted in the note, so it needs the PDF.
The documents: Smith to Sabourin (1957): one proposed change stressed that "the hypothesis that asbestos miners do not have a higher mortality from lung cancer than does the general population cannot be rejected."

Braun wrote to Jackson that miners were not the right group for studying asbestosis and lung cancer (0:52:51)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler: "I know of no such letters")
On the recording: "Dr. Braun had written letters to Mr. Jackson in the 50s suggesting that asbestos miners was not an appropriate group for a study to determine the connection between asbestosis and lung cancer?"
Verdict: Supported as to the premise, in substance, medium confidence. Braun said the link was "much more likely" in factories than mines and urged research there. The note does not say in so many words that miners were an inappropriate group.
The documents: Braun to Jackson (1957): "the possibility of an association between lung cancer and asbestosis is much more likely to exist in asbestos factories than in mining operations"; J-M's chronology: "Advocates research focus on asbestos factories."

He did not know in 1960 that J-M's Canadian mill workers were at risk; he formed that view about 1965–66 (0:57:25)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "were at risk of contracting asbestos-related lung disease from their occupation no sir not ... Not necessarily in 1960." / "I would say sometime 65, 66 period."
Verdict: Qualified, medium confidence. His dating fits his own April 1965 letter to the Advocate Mine, the earliest Library paper of his saying asbestos dust "will cause" disease at a mine/mill. But J-M's medical director, his superior from 1960, had surveyed 708 Canadian J-M mill workers in 1949 and found almost none normal. The J-M Advocate letter is a mine site, not the Quebec mills.
The documents: C. L. Sheckler's Industrial Hygiene Survey Letters ... (1965–1966), 1965-04-25: to Advocate he wrote that "prolonged exposure to atmosphere contaminated with asbestos dust will cause occupational pulmonary diseases." Dr. Kenneth W. Smith, Industrial Hygiene Survey of 708 Canadian Johns-Manville Mill Workers (1949): "Only 4 men had normal X-rays; 475 showed early fibrosis, 52 advanced fibrosis ... and 7 early asbestosis."

He could not remember whether he believed before 1964 that miners at Asbestos, Quebec had asbestos lung disease (0:57:05)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I can't answer that question. I don't remember."
Verdict: Qualified, low confidence. No Sheckler paper on the Jeffrey mine before 1964 was found. He did attend the June 1965 ATI meeting at Thetford Mines with Smith.
The documents: Asbestos Textile Institute General Meeting Minutes at Thetford Mines ... (1965), 1965-06-04: "Those present included J-M's Dr. Kenneth W. Smith and C. L. Sheckler."

In 1960 he knew that J-M's insulation-plant workers were at risk, and that airborne fibres caused the disease (1:01:28)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "were at risk of contracting asbestos-related lung disease? ... Yes, sir."
Verdict: Supported, high confidence. His own 1957 memo counted pneumoconiosis among Manville Transite pipe workers, and Smith's December 1960 talk, given in the same session as Sheckler's, described asbestosis cases in that plant.
The documents: C. L. Sheckler to Dr. Kenneth Smith on the First Transite Pipe X-Ray Conferences (1957), 1957-09-06: the review "found eight cases of 'mixed pneumoconiosis of various stages'" among 109 workers. Industrial Relations Managers Meeting Minutes (1960): "We have had employees develop asbestosis or silicosis in our Transite Pipe plant."

In 1960 he did not believe that users of pipe covering, block and cement were at risk, and had "no responsibility or reason to think about the users" (1:04:29)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "at that particular time i had no responsibility or reason to think about the users of those products."
Verdict: Qualified, medium confidence; leaning CONTRADICTED for the years soon after. Within three years his own talk to plant managers listed "customer liability claims" as a reason for keeping dust records. In October 1964 the insulation caution-label program was "reviewed with Dr. K. W. Smith, C. L. Sheckler." In 1960 J-M was also telling customers and health officials that its products were "potentially hazardous." The Hinshaw-Garland passage about installers was in Jackson's files from 1956.
The documents: Dr. Kenneth W. Smith and C. L. Sheckler at the J-M Industrial Relations Managers' Meeting (1963), 1963-04-29: dust survey records serve "litigation purposes including Workmen's Compensation, common-law third party, or possibly customer liability claims." E. C. Lindstrom to J-M Plant Managers on Caution Labels for High Temperature Insulations (1964), 1964-10-15: "The program had been reviewed with Dr. K. W. Smith, C. L. Sheckler and A. Pocius." H. M. Jackson to the Los Angeles Division of Occupational Health ... (1960), 1960-07-11: "Both silica and asbestos fibres are potentially hazardous..."

The Lanza report says the industry approached Metropolitan Life in 1929 to learn whether asbestos dust was a hazard (1:06:25)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed he read it)
On the recording: "in 1929 the metropolitan life insurance company was approached by officials representing the asbestos industry"
Verdict: Supported, high confidence
The documents: Lanza, McConnell and Fehnel (1935), 1935-01-04: "The authors say the asbestos industry had asked Metropolitan Life in 1929 whether asbestos dust was a hazard."

The Lanza study covered "basically textile plants" (1:10:37)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "It was my impression he covered textile plants and basically textile plants."
Verdict: Qualified, high confidence. The study covered five fabricating plants, including J-M's own (Plant A, with an insulating department) and Raybestos's Bridgeport brake and clutch plant (Plant D). The passage counsel read refers to "the insulating departments of Plant A" and "the molded, brake lining, and clutch division of Plant D."
The documents: Lanza (1935): "They took dust counts in five U.S. fabricating plants." M. F. Judd to G. R. Weber Identifying the Plants in the Metropolitan Life Study (1935), 1935-02-11: "'D' was Bridgeport and Stratford ... 'We believe "A" is Johns-Manville and "E" is Russell.'"

Lanza: experience "does not warrant an attempt to define a standard of dustiness" (1:20:37)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler: "I read it yes")
On the recording: "the experience so far does not warrant an attempt to define a standard of dustiness for asbestos dust"
Verdict: Supported in substance, medium confidence. The note paraphrases rather than quotes the exact sentence.
The documents: Lanza (1935): it found it "'not practicable as yet' to set a dust standard."

Lanza X-ray results: of 126 films, 4 second stage, 63 first stage, 39 doubtful, 20 negative, rising with years of exposure (1:24:26)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "four were diagnosed as second-degree asbestosis, 63 as first-degree, 39 as doubtful, and 20 as negative."
Verdict: Supported, high confidence (4 + 63 = 67 with asbestosis)
The documents: Lanza (1935): "X-rayed 126 workers: 67 were found to have asbestosis (4 in the second stage) and 39 more were 'doubtful,' with the share rising with years of exposure."

Lanza noted an unusual incidence of heart enlargement (1:26:51)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "these films indicated a very unusual incidence of enlargement of the heart."
Verdict: Supported, high confidence
The documents: Lanza (1935): "It also reported frequent heart enlargement in workers with asbestosis."

A J-M attorney suggested Lanza's sentence "clinically ... a type milder than silicosis," and no one told Sheckler (1:28:13)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler denied being told)
On the recording: "an attorney employed by jm in 1934 wrote a letter to dr lanza suggesting that dr lanza used that language ... milder than silicosis"
Verdict: Supported as to the premise, high confidence. Strictly, Brown asked that the sentence be kept: the galley proof had dropped it, and he wanted it restored. The personal denial is unrebutted.
The documents: Vandiver Brown to Dr. A. J. Lanza with Comments on the Galley Proof (1934), 1934-12-10: the proof "had dropped the sentence 'Clinically, from this study it appeared to be of a type milder than silicosis' ... both observations 'presented an aspect of your survey that was favorable to the industry and we should like to see them retained.'"

Exhibits 9A and 9B: Vandiver Brown to M. F. Judd, December 18, 1934, and to Dr. Lanza, December 21, 1934 (unsigned, typed name) (1:29:23)

Said by: other defense counsel (Luckey, describing them); plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler never saw them before retirement)
On the recording: "there's a december 18 1934 letter addressed to apparently mr mf judd ray bestest manhattan ... 9b letter under date of december 21 1934 ... Dr. A.J. Lanza" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
Verdict: Supported, high confidence. Counsel later misstates the dates as "December 19" and "December 23", and the witness corrects the second to December 21.
The documents: Vandiver Brown to M. F. Judd Sending the Galley Proof of the Metropolitan Life Study (1934), 1934-12-18: "I am inclined to believe he will accede to most of our requests." Vandiver Brown to Dr. A. J. Lanza Returning the Galley Proof with Hobart's Comments (1934), 1934-12-21: "All we ask is that all of the favorable aspects of the survey be included and that none of the unfavorable be unintentionally pictured in darker tones."

Lanza adopted almost all of the changes J-M suggested (1:32:02)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler denied being told)
On the recording: "Dr. Lanza had adopted almost all of the recommendations or suggestions for changes in his report that were made by Johns-Manville employees?"
Verdict: Qualified, medium confidence. Brown expected Lanza to "accede to most of our requests," and the published report does contain the "milder" sentence. The Library has no line-by-line comparison showing that "almost all" were adopted.
The documents: Brown to Judd, Dec. 18, 1934. Lanza (1935): it concluded that the fibrosis was "different from silicosis" and, it appeared, "milder."

The Hobart letter on the Lanza study, which he saw only in litigation (1:33:14)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question); Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "a letter from an attorney by the name of Hobart to mr. Brown that was dated sometime in the 30s that dealt with the Lanza study"
Verdict: Supported as to the document, high confidence. No Library evidence that he saw it earlier.
The documents: George S. Hobart to Vandiver Brown on the Metropolitan Life Galley Proof (1934), 1934-12-15: J-M's defense was that knowledge "has been insufficient until a very recent period to place upon the owners of plants or factories the burden or duty of taking special precautions."

He read the Dreessen report (about 1938) after moving to headquarters in 1959–60 (1:35:13)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "a report by a dr dreesen published in approximately 1938 yes sir ... sometime subsequent to 1960"
Verdict: Supported as to the date of the report (August 1938, Public Health Bulletin 241). When he read it is not checkable. High confidence.
The documents: Dreessen and Others, A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry (1938), 1938-08: "Public Health Bulletin No. 241, published by the U.S. Public Health Service in August 1938."

Dreessen: about 150 workers were replaced before the study, leaving a young group with short exposure (only 18.8% over 10 years) (1:50:02)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed the report says so)
On the recording: "approximately 150 workers in the asbestos textile factories that were to undergo the study were replaced by workers with little or no previous asbestos exposure"
Verdict: Qualified, medium confidence. The notes confirm the low-tenure caveat and that discharged and laid-off workers mattered, but do not quote the 150 or 18.8% figures.
The documents: Dreessen (1938): the authors cautioned "that very few workers had long exposure at low levels." A. S. Rossiter to Sumner Simpson ... JAMA Review of the Dreessen Study (1939): "Counting workers who had been discharged or laid off, it reported, '27.5 per cent were found to have asbestosis.'"

He learned of a latency period in the 1950s, from Dr. Smith and the plant physicians (DuBow, Merrill), not from the 1930s–40s literature (1:39:41)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "primarily that knowledge was derived from my association with the medical director and the two plant physicians dr. Kenneth Smith ... dr. David DuBois dr. Edwin Merrill" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
Verdict: Supported in substance (the names DuBois/DuBow are a transcription issue), medium confidence. He was meeting with Smith, DuBow and Merrill on X-ray diagnoses in 1957. That year Smith publicly stated that asbestosis takes many years to develop. His own 1957 memo lists men with 6 to 24 years' service.
The documents: Transcript of a J-M Medical Meeting at Manville ... (1957), 1957-05-01: a meeting "with Dr. D. T. DuBow, Dr. E. D. Merrill, H. M. Jackson and C. L. Sheckler." Smith and Jackson (1957): "Its conclusions say asbestosis takes many years to develop."

Smith told him a minimum latency of about 10 years, up to 15–20 years (1:45:12)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "the minimum latency period associated with asbestos disease was 10 years and it could go up beyond that to 15 to 20 years true yes sir"
Verdict: Qualified, low confidence. No Smith statement of a 10-year minimum was found. The Lanza report he relied on gives "5 to 15 and even 20 or 25 years." Sabourin told the 1955 ATI committee, which Jackson chaired, that new cases came only after "twenty or more years exposure."
The documents: ATI Air Hygiene Committee Minutes on the Quebec Mining Association's Report (1955), 1955-09-07: "practically no new cases of asbestosis other than those with twenty or more years exposure."

Exhibits identified

5A/5B (blow-ups), 5C/5D: Braun to Jackson, December 6, 1956. Library note
6A/6B (blow-ups), 6C/6D: Braun to Jackson, August 23, 1957. Library note
7 series (7A face sheet; 7B/7E index; 7C/7F extract 761): Industrial Hygiene Digest, vol. 21 no. 6, June 1957 (Motley 1000 no. 99). Library note. Counsel misspeaks "1967" at 0:35:33.
8C/8D: Dr. Kenneth Smith to Ivan Sabourin, December 30, 1957, re the IHF survey. Library note
9A: Vandiver Brown to M. F. Judd (Raybestos-Manhattan), December 18, 1934. Library note
9B: Vandiver Brown to Dr. A. J. Lanza, December 21, 1934 (unsigned copy). Library note
Exhibit A (defense): Lanza, McConnell and Fehnel, Public Health Reports, January 4, 1935. Library note
Exhibit B (defense): Dreessen et al., Public Health Bulletin 241, 1938. Library note
Hobart letter (referred to, not marked here): Hobart to Brown, December 15, 1934. Library note
Sheckler's testimony in the "Bumgardner" case, November 16, 1977 (shown to refresh recollection): not in the Library. The Baumgardner hits in the Library are a 1944 Owens-Corning matter, not this.
The papers counsel put to him without separate exhibit numbers (Hinshaw and Garland, Isselbacher, Doll, the JAMA editorial) are all summarized in or enclosed with Exhibit 5. Isselbacher and Doll are attached as files to the 1956 Braun note.

Tape 5

He read and relied on Dreessen's "tentative" 5 million particle limit when he read the report around 1960 (0:08:11)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "5 million particles per cubic foot may be regarded tentatively as the dust threshold value for asbestos dust exposure until better data are available"
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: Dreessen and Others, A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry (1938) — August 1938 — Public Health Bulletin 241 proposes the limit in the words counsel read: "5 million particles per cubic foot may be regarded tentatively as the threshold value for asbestos-dust exposure until better data are available." The note also records the authors "cautioning that very few workers had long exposure at low levels," the caveat counsel read at 0:07:04.

Counsel's readings of Dreessen pp. 90–95 (8% of 378 workers, 29.2% of carders, the 150 discharged workers, the fatal American cases) (0:25:13)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed the report says so and that he "assumed" he read it)
On the recording: "Eight percent of the 378 workers employed at the time of the study had asbestosis"
Verdict: Supported (confidence: low (the report is in the library, but these page figures were not checked against the 134-page PDF))
The documents: Dreessen and Others, A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry (1938) — 1938 — The note confirms the study of three plants and 541 workers, and that "asbestosis increased with the dust level." The per-page percentages are not in the note.

Dreessen's limit stood for 30 years, and "others certainly must have had the same opinions" (0:09:08)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "Dreesen's recommendations of threshold limits for asbestos dust existed for 30 years after he published this paper. And not only I, but others certainly must have had the same opinions."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
The documents: W. C. L. Hemeon, Report of Preliminary Dust Investigation for the Asbestos Textile Institute (1947) — June 18, 1947 — The textile industry's own engineer (copied to J-M) noted Dreessen had "abnormally few" long-exposed workers and wrote the data "does not permit complete assurance that five million is thoroughly safe." Within J-M, H. M. Jackson called the limit "a carry over from the quartz industry" (ATI Air Hygiene and Manufacturing Committee Minutes on Dust Sampling and the 5 Million Particle Limit (1959)). J-M's 1958 manual said the limits "should not be regarded as fine lines between safe and dangerous concentrations" (J-M Manual of Standard Practices, Appendix II (1958)).

He suggested no further study, because ACGIH had carried the limit "from 1938 to 1960 with continuous review" (0:10:59)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "no sir I did not when I read Dreesen study in 19 early 1960 the American Conference of governmental industrial hygienists had already accepted as recommendations and carried them through from 1938 to 1960"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists Adopts Its 1947 Limits, Including Asbestos (1947) — April 1947 — ACGIH's table "lists asbestos under mineral dusts at 5 million particles per cubic foot of air"; ACGIH did not exist as the source in 1938, when it was the Public Health Service's suggestion. ACGIH's chairman called the values "not permanent values." His admission that he recommended no further study stands.

Selikoff's 1964 study said little about dust counts; Selikoff believed insulators' exposures were below 5 mppcf (0:13:17)

Said by: Sheckler (answering), agreeing with plaintiffs' counsel
On the recording: "Dr. Selikoff study in 1964 to the best of my knowledge, had very little reference to dust counts. Dr. Selikoff had opinions of what the dust levels were in the insulating tray."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium)
The documents: Selikoff, Churg and Hammond, "Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia" (1964) — April 6, 1964 — The paper describes the insulators' exposure as "relatively light, intermittent" rather than giving counts. ("insulating tray" is probably "insulating trade.")

J-M stayed with the 5 million particle standard until about 1967–68, when it adopted a new collection and analysis method on his recommendation (0:16:21)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "we remained with the five million particle per cubic foot of air standard until approximately 1967 or 68 when we developed a an entirely different method of dust collection and analysis"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
The documents: E. M. Fenner to All Plant, Mill and Mine Managers on the Membrane Filter Technique (1969) — February 10, 1969 — "Until 1969 J-M measured asbestos dust with the impinger," and the membrane method was "a truer method than our present technique," which "The British asbestos industry has used this method for many years." The switch came in 1969, after he says he had concluded (by about 1965) that disease occurred below 5 mppcf. The first results were worse than the old counts had shown (Swallow, Environmental Control Subcommittee, May 1969).

He kept recommending 5 mppcf as a safe level after Selikoff, relying on an ACGIH review published in 1964 and New Jersey's 5 mppcf law (0:17:47)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "that was my recommendation based on ACGIH and again based, ACGIH had reviewed that standard in 1964 and published that review and that and of course the state law in New Jersey"
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: medium (for the 1964 ACGIH review))
The documents: ATI Hygiene Committee Minutes on Fiber Sampling and Two Standards (June 1953) — June 10, 1953 — Confirms that "most state codes set the limit for asbestos dust at five million particles per cubic foot," but the same committee had agreed to follow "our self imposed standard based on experimental and clinical evidence" as well. No 1964 ACGIH review is in the library.

J-M counted total dust, not just asbestos, against 5 mppcf, which gave a "built-in safety factor"; he recommended this in 1960 (0:18:48)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "Instead of counting just asbestos dust, we counted total dust within the 5 million particles per cubic foot of air range. That gave us a building safety factor at all times." (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: ATI Hygiene Committee Minutes on Fiber Sampling and Two Standards (June 1953) — June 1953 — With J-M's Jackson chairing, the committee recorded that surveys measuring only dust particles "are practically without value," because the long fibers cause disease. A total-particle count was not a safety factor for fibers. J-M's rule for mixed dusts (25% toxic content takes its own limit) is in H. M. Jackson to All Industrial Relations Managers on Threshold Limit Values for Mixed Dusts (1958). His 1960 recommendation itself is not in the library.

Fiber counting at J-M before 1964 was only "strictly an experimental program" under Jackson (0:20:55)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "The fiber counting was used on an experimental basis during the time Mr. Jackson was manager of the industrial health program ... it was strictly an experimental program"
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
The documents: C. L. Sheckler, Summary of Atmospheric Hygiene Studies at the Manville Plant (1957–1959) — 1957–59 — His own initialed tables, "1,778 counts at 649 stations from June 1957 to December 1958," list "particle counts, asbestos fiber counts" for each station. J-M's 1958 manual made fiber counting a company standard: "J-M standard applied to asbestos exposure is 1 million fibres per cubic foot" (Manual, Appendix II (1958)). Jackson told the Navy J-M "applied limits of five million dust particles and one million fibers per cubic foot" (Jackson to Marr (1959)).

Neither Jackson nor Dr. Smith told him in the 1950s–60s that fiber counting better measured risk; "that knowledge was not available" (0:22:05)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler denied)
On the recording: "that knowledge was was not available no"
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
The documents: ATI Air Hygiene Committee Minutes on Fiber Counts and Dr. Kenneth Smith's Talk (March 1953) — March 11, 1953 — With Jackson in the chair and Smith as guest, the committee recorded that "asbestos dust per se is relatively innocuous; it is the long fibre (10 to 50 microns) that are the fibrosis producing elements." In June 1953 they called particle-only surveys "practically without value" (June 1953 minutes). At a meeting Sheckler himself attended, Dr. Cralley reported that in England "dust was counted as fibers only rather than as total particles" (ATI minutes, June 6, 1963).

The Selikoff symposium was in "November or December" / "December 1964" (0:22:46)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question), echoed in the exchange
On the recording: "it was November or December the symposium was December December 1964"
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
The documents: ATI Air Hygiene Committee on Rebutting the Biological Effects of Asbestos Conference (1964) — October 8, 1964 — The "Biological Effects of Asbestos" conference was "in New York, October 19 to 21" 1964. The 14A–F minutes read at 1:27:38 give the same dates.

He did not read Dreessen's annotated medical bibliography (0:35:30)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "to the best of my knowledge i did not necessarily read the bibliography in 1960"
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: low)
The documents: Nothing in the library shows what he read. The bulletin itself is in the library (134 pages).

Fleischer-Drinker opens with a contract yard where a few employees had apparent asbestosis (0:38:09)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "dustiness from miscellaneous pipe covering operations was considerable and that a few of the employees had what appeared to be asbestosis" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: Fleischer, Viles, Gade and Drinker, "A Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels" (1946) — January 1946 — The study began because an earlier inspection "had found heavy dust and 'a few of the employees' with what looked like asbestosis."

Three cases among 1,074 pipe coverers, all with more than 20 years; authors concluded pipe covering "is not a dangerous occupation" (0:43:01)

Said by: Sheckler (answering), reading the conclusions
On the recording: "since each of the three cases of asbestosis had worked with asbestos pipe covering in the shipyards for more than 20 years, it may be concluded that such pipe covering is not a dangerous occupation"
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: Fleischer-Drinker (1946) — 1946 — "three cases of asbestosis, each in a man who had done the work for more than 20 years," and they concluded it "is not a dangerous occupation." The note adds: "Most of the men had worked fewer than ten years." The figure of 51 men with 10+ years (Table 5) is not in the note.

He accepted the authors' conclusion; the 10-year latency did not make the report questionable to him (0:48:58)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I accepted that conclusion of the author yes sir" / (0:59:20) "No, sir."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Fleischer-Drinker (1946) — J-M's own chronology entry: "Study later criticized due short exposure period of most subjects in spite of recognized latency period," and "'Total dust counts' were above TLV." The authors themselves wrote it was "manifestly impossible to set a threshold" for the trade. In 1959 his predecessor Jackson told the Navy that little was known about "short duration massive exposures" on ships (Jackson to Marr (1959)).

The report did not cover rip-out or tear-out aboard ship, which he knew from 1946–52 made visible dust (0:40:20)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "did you note that the report did not refer to or address rip-out or tear-out operations aboard ship? I did notice that, yes, sir."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: low)
The documents: Fleischer-Drinker (1946) — 1946 — The note names the operations measured (band saw cutting, cement mixing, "installation on board ship") and says nothing of tear-out. Not checked against the article text.

Before April 1964 he had not seen or heard of any Selikoff findings; he knew only of one study started in 1963, with no analysis (1:00:19)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "I know that he was doing only one study which he started in 1963 and I knew of no analysis that was made of that up to 1964."
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
The documents: ATI Air Hygiene and Manufacturing Committee Minutes on Selikoff's Study and British Fiber Counting (1963) — June 6, 1963 — "attended by C. L. Sheckler for Johns-Manville," the meeting was told of a paper on about 1,500 workers "largely in asbestos insulation applications, showing a very large incidence of lung cancer." He concedes this at 1:12:21–1:16:43. The paper was read June 17, 1963 and covered deaths "through the end of 1962" (Selikoff et al. (1964)). By October 1963 it was "already mailed to the members" of his committee (ATI minutes, Oct. 3, 1963). His superior had an outline of Selikoff's planned study in 1961 (Dr. Joseph A. Smith to Dr. Kenneth W. Smith (1961)).

He made no label recommendation after the June 1963 minutes because Selikoff's study "only started in 1963" and had no analysis (1:18:01)

Said by: Sheckler (answering) (answer struck as non-responsive)
On the recording: "I made no such recommendation on the basis of the notes by Mr. Mitchell because Dr. Solikov's study only started in 1963, and to the best of my knowledge, there was no analysis."
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
The documents: ATI minutes, June 6, 1963 — The minutes he received describe findings already made: "a very large incidence of lung cancer," and "admittedly it will be damaging to the industry." The study's results had been read before the American College of Chest Physicians "on June 17, 1963" (Selikoff et al. (1964)).

June 6, 1963 minutes (Exh. 12A–B) show him attending; the "Asbestos-Related Lung Cancer Study" paragraph as read (1:12:21)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "How scientific this study has been in selecting the group and the full depth of the study remains to be determined, but admittedly it will be damaging to the industry."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: ATI minutes, June 6, 1963 — Signed by J. L. Mitchell (H. K. Porter); quotes "remains to be determined, but admittedly it will be damaging to the industry." The original spells it "a Dr. Sellakoff."

He passed the 1963 news to Dr. Smith and no one else; Smith got his copy of every set of ATI minutes (1:16:43)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I advise dr. Smith yes I advise dr. Smith did you advise anyone else no sir"
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: medium)
The documents: No transmittal is in the library. Smith already had Selikoff's study outline from August 1961 (Dr. Joseph A. Smith to Dr. Kenneth W. Smith (1961)): "The letter shows that J-M's medical director was told of Selikoff's planned work in 1961."

He began attending ATI meetings for J-M around 1961–62 and sat on the Air Hygiene and Manufacturing Committee for "probably more than five years" (1:02:23)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "probably sometime in the early 60s 1961 or 62 somewhere between 60 and then"
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: ATI Air Hygiene Committee Minutes on a Public Health Service Cancer Survey (1961) — June 8, 1961 — attended by J-M men "(including C. L. Sheckler)." He is also recorded at the September 1961 meeting (Horowitz report), October 8, 1964 (ATI minutes) and the June 1965 general meeting (Thetford Mines minutes).

He recalls the ATI committee discussing sending a PR man to Selikoff's October 1964 conference; it was "never carried out" (1:28:11)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I recall the subject being discussed it was never carried out. The PR man was never sent? No, sir."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: ATI Minutes on Selikoff's Conference and a Lawyer's Letter to Selikoff (1964) — October 8, 1964 — "with W. C. Atkinson and C. L. Sheckler attending for Johns-Manville," the committee suggested "a Public Relations man with our help would be the quickest way to get accurate publicity to the public." The same day the Board of Governors had its lawyers draft a letter to Selikoff urging "caution"; the minutes "do not show that it was sent." Whether a PR man went is not in the library. Counsel read this from the October 7, 1965 packet (Exh. 14), but the wording matches the October 1964 minutes.

Feb. 4, 1971 ATI general meeting: Goodman called Selikoff "dangerous"; Sheckler, as chairman of ATI's Environmental Health Committee, said Selikoff would be "around indefinitely" (1:37:49)

Said by: Sheckler (answering), reading Exh. 15
On the recording: "Mr. C.L. Sheckler, chairman of the ATI's Environmental Health Committee, commented that Dr. Selikoff was going to be around indefinitely and we might as well resign ourselves to that fact"
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: high)
The documents: Only the adjacent ATI Board of Governors Minutes on Board Changes (1971) is held: page 1 of the board meeting "February 3, 1971, at the Red Carpet Inn in Charlotte," the day before. The general-meeting minutes are not in the library. Goodman was Raybestos-Manhattan's medical consultant (Goodman to Simpson (1972)).

Right after reading Selikoff in April 1964, and because of it, he began devising J-M's insulation warning label (1:01:02)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "And was your participation in response to your recognition of the danger as disclosed in Dr. Selikoff's preliminary study that you read in April 1964? Yes, sir."
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high (as to when the label started and why; his own role is not documented before October 1964))
The documents: J. B. Jobe to Kenneth W. Smith on Labeling Industrial Insulations Division Products (1964) — January 2, 1964 — "As a result of many discussions," the division was "about to begin labeling Cements, Millboard, molded insulations and boards." On January 28 Smith sent the Public Health Service draft labels "to use on asbestos-containing products which, when handled, cut or machined, may liberate some fiber in the air" (Smith to Cralley (1964)). The reason given on February 25 was the Asbestos Workers Union and the chance to "lessen our exposure to claims for health damage" (Jobe to Hinmon (1964)). All of this came before the April 6, 1964 JAMA paper.

He designed the label and wrote the language himself, without help, in April–May 1964 (1:42:37)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "Was to design the label with the wording, yes, sir." / (1:48:53) "My recollection is that I wrote the language myself."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: National Insulation Manufacturers Association Board Minutes on J-M's Caution Statement (1964) — April 14, 1964 — The final wording was already being reported to competitors, eight days after the JAMA paper. Smith's January drafts "followed the format recommended by the Manufacturing Chemists Association" (Smith to Cralley). The division's memo fixing the wording came from W. W. Acher (Acher to Lindstrom (1964)). The only record of Sheckler's part is that the program "had been reviewed with Dr. K. W. Smith, C. L. Sheckler and A. Pocius" (Lindstrom memo, Oct. 15, 1964).

He recommended a conspicuous place, on both sides of the carton; the side placement the division chose fit that recommendation (1:44:27)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "my recommendation was that the warning label be placed in a conspicuous place on the carton bag or package that decision as to what was the conspicuous place was one made by the insulation division"
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: medium (as to the division's intent; his own recommendation is not documented))
The documents: W. W. Acher to E. C. Lindstrom on Caution Wording for High-Temperature Insulations (1964) — May 11, 1964 — The insulation division's instruction was that the caution be printed rather than labeled and "It should be fully legible, but not conspicuous." Lindstrom's rollout allowed "no stamping or pasting-on," with labels appearing only as old stock ran out (Lindstrom (1964)).

He knew in 1964 that Selikoff also found lung cancer, mesothelioma and colon cancer (1:43:04)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "Dr. Selikoff also found incidences of lung cancer, mesothelioma, and cancer of the colon. I was aware of that, yes, sir."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: Selikoff et al. (1964) — April 6, 1964 — "forty-five died of cancer of the lung or pleura, whereas only 6.6 such deaths were expected," four died of mesothelioma, and the authors "reported more stomach and colon cancer than expected."

Knowing that, he never recommended mentioning cancer on the label, and no one told him not to (1:45:35)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "did you ever make any recommendation or suggestion ... that cancer, the risk of cancer, be referred to in any of the warning labels? I did not, no, sir."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high (that the label omitted cancer); who decided is NOT IN LIBRARY)
The documents: E. C. Lindstrom to J-M Plant Managers (1964) — October 15, 1964 — The full text warns only that "Inhalation of Asbestos in Excessive Quantities Over Long Periods of Time May Be Harmful"; there is no word of cancer. Six months earlier J-M's own medical director privately allowed that "there may be an association of the chrysotile fiber to lung cancer" (Smith to Hite, Oct. 1964).

He cannot say whether he noticed that Selikoff warned other crafts working beside insulators were at risk (1:43:57)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I can't say that I did or did not."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
The documents: Selikoff et al. (1964) — 1964 — The paper he read warned that trades beside insulators, "electricians, plumbers, sheet-metal workers, steamfitters," might share the exposure. The label was addressed only to the person handling the product.

The label text as read: "Caution: this product contains asbestos fiber ... excessive quantities over long periods of time may be harmful ... respirators approved by the US Bureau of Mines" (1:54:16)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "caution this product contains asbestos fiber inhalation of asbestos and excessive quantities over long periods of time may be harmful"
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: NIMA Board Minutes on J-M's Caution Statement (1964) — April 14, 1964 — J-M's chronology quotes the identical wording: "Inhalation of asbestos in excessive quantities over long periods of time may be harmful. If dust is created when this product is handled, avoid breathing the dust."

In 1964 the label went on all the insulation products, with the same wording and size (1:53:28)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "it went on all of the insulation products in 1964 I can't to name all of the insulation products"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
The documents: Acher to Lindstrom (1964) — May 1964 — The label was limited to products where "the fiber can be liberated when the product is handled, machined, etc."; Insulkote and Fibrous Adhesive were left off. It appeared only as old cartons ran out (Lindstrom (1964)). In 1968 Sheckler himself was still drafting labels for the Marinites and wrote: "Consistent with our labeling procedures with other products, I assume that International shipments will not be labeled" (Sheckler to Wingerter (1968)).

"Long periods of time" was used because, under the Manufacturing Chemists' guidance, asbestos was not a poison (1:57:57)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "the reason long periods of time was introduced into this label was the fact that asbestos dust was not a a poison which again described in the manufacturing chemist recommendations"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Smith to Cralley (1964) — January 28, 1964 — Supports the MCA source: the drafts "followed the format recommended by the Manufacturing Chemists Association." The phrase itself goes back to J-M's 1952 Celite labels: inhaling silica dust "over long periods may be harmful" (H. M. Jackson on Caution Labels for Celite (1952)).

This was "the first voluntary health label" ever placed on any material (struck on motion) (1:59:08)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "this was the first voluntary health label that I know was ever placed on any materials"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: H. M. Jackson to All Plant Managers on Caution Labels for Celite (1952) — May 14, 1952 — J-M had put health caution labels on Celite bags twelve years earlier, though "The labeling followed the state laws." In 1958 J-M drafted an asbestos caution for Marinite and decided against it, partly over competition (J-M Memos on a Caution Label for Marinite (1958)).

He could not have written "avoid breathing any dust" from asbestos products (2:00:01)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "could you have placed a warning on there that stated, avoid breathing any dust created from the use of asbestos-containing products? No, sir."
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: medium)
The documents: J-M Memos on a Caution Label for Marinite (1958) — 1958 — Dr. Smith's draft read: "Inhalation of dust produced in sawing, drilling or trimming this board may be harmful. Avoid breathing this dust." The 1964 label itself said "avoid breathing the dust." In 1969 Sheckler proposed that "avoid breathing the dust" go into all three labels, and questioned "precisely what we mean by 'handled'" (Sheckler to Wingerter (1969)).

Exhibits identified

Dreessen report (Public Health Bulletin 241, cited by page 90–95 and annotated bibliography p. ~118): Dreessen and Others, A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry (1938).
Exhibit CC, Fleischer-Drinker report, "Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels": Fleischer, Viles, Gade and Drinker (1946).
Exhibit D, Selikoff, Churg, Hammond, "The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers in the United States": this is the 1965 New York Academy of Sciences conference paper, which is not in the library under that title. The April 1964 "preliminary report" he refers to is Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia (1964).
Plaintiffs' 10A–B, ATI Air Hygiene and Manufacturing Committee minutes, September 1961: the meeting is covered by Leon B. Horowitz's Report to A. W. Spedding on the ATI Meeting of September 1961, Keasbey & Mattison's report of the Sept. 7–8 meeting. It is not the ATI minutes themselves.
Plaintiffs' 11A–C, minutes of March 8, 1962: not in library.
Plaintiffs' 12A–B, minutes of June 6, 1963: ATI Air Hygiene and Manufacturing Committee Minutes on Selikoff's Study and British Fiber Counting (1963).
Plaintiffs' 13A–B, minutes of October 3, 1963 (Sheckler not an attendee): ATI Air Hygiene Committee on Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia (1963) (Motley 341).
Plaintiffs' 14A–F, minutes of October 7, 1965, Buck Hill Falls, Pa. (Scientific American "Dangerous Dust," Dec. 1964; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 12, 1965): not in library. The PR-man passage read from it matches the October 8, 1964 minutes: ATI Minutes on Selikoff's Conference and a Lawyer's Letter to Selikoff (1964) and Motley 342.
Plaintiffs' 15A–D (later called 15A–F), ATI general meeting notes of February 4, 1971 (Goodman on Selikoff): not in library. Only the Board of Governors minutes of Feb. 3, 1971, page 1 (Motley 347) is held.
Exhibit EE, the label language, plus a "cautionary printing details, exact size shown" sheet and an 85% Magnesia/Superex spec sheet issued 11-14-66 ("page 404 ... 9-10-64"): the wording is that of E. C. Lindstrom to J-M Plant Managers on Caution Labels (1964) and the NIMA minutes (1964). The printing-detail and spec sheets themselves are not in the library.

Tape 6

Advising users to avoid inhaling any dust would not have made them safer (1964) (0:00:07)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler denied)
On the recording: "terminology that would have advised the user to avoid inhaling any dust created in the use of asbestos-containing products would have given the user more safety? No, sir." (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: C. L. Sheckler to D. B. Wingerter on Wording Warning Labels for Industrial Insulations Products (1969) — 1969-12-18 — Five years later Sheckler himself found the 1964 trigger word unclear, writing of "a real question in my mind as to precisely what we mean by 'handled'," and proposed "machined, installed, or dismantled" with "avoid breathing the dust" in all three labels. The 1964 wording spoke of harm only from "excessive quantities over long periods of time" (E. C. Lindstrom to J-M Plant Managers on Caution Labels for High Temperature Insulations (1964), 1964-10-15).

The label would warn nearby trades, who would read the box just as the user would (0:00:36)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "If they were working in the area where the material was used, they would read the label on the box just as the user would read it."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: W. W. Acher to E. C. Lindstrom on Caution Wording for High-Temperature Insulations (1964) — 1964-05-11 — The division's instruction for the caution was that it "should be fully legible, but not conspicuous." Lindstrom's October 1964 memo (above) also accepted "mixed shipments" of labeled and unlabeled containers while old stock ran out, and Canadian and export shipments went out unlabeled (W. E. Hodgson to S. Lane and C. H. Jensen to E. C. Lindstrom on Leaving Caution Labels Off Shipments to Canada (1965): "Dr. K.W. Smith has advised that it is not necessary to use the Caution label on products containing asbestos in Canada,").

He expected anyone working with or near the material, in warehouses or in transit, to see the label (0:01:43)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "anyone who was working the material or adjacent to where the material was being used in the warehouse where the material was being stored or in route"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: C. H. Jensen to E. C. Lindstrom on a Customer's Alarm at the Superex Caution Label (1965) — 1965-02-09 — When a large customer did read the printed Superex caution it "has never been aware of the potential hazard of the continuous contact with the dust from this product and therefore has become exceedingly alarmed." Shows the label could reach users, but the company's own placement direction was "not conspicuous" (Acher, above). Warehouse visits (Houston) are not in the library.

Nobody at J-M told him not to put the label on the front of the box (0:04:07)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler denied)
On the recording: "did anybody at Johns-Manville advise you or tell you that they did not want this warning label placed on the front of the box where people could see it? No one told me such a thing"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: W. W. Acher to E. C. Lindstrom on Caution Wording for High-Temperature Insulations (1964) — 1964-05-11 — The division's written direction was that the caution be printed on the bag or carton and "should be fully legible, but not conspicuous." The memo was copied to Burleson and Pocius, not to Sheckler, so it does not prove anyone told him; but it is the company's stated preference on prominence, issued in the very month he says he designed the placement. In 1968 a division man wrote of "warning the public with the smallest possible label" (P. F. Coggins to R. H. North on a Small Caution Label for Marine Marinite (1968)).

It was a voluntary label; there was no necessity to put any label on the boxes (0:04:29)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "this was a voluntary health warning label and there would not have been any necessity to put any label on the boxes"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Kenneth W. Smith to Lewis J. Cralley of the Public Health Service on Caution Labels (1964) — 1964-01-28 — J-M's medical director sent the draft labels to the Public Health Service knowing "that this may not conform to the federal or some state labeling acts." The insulation division's own stated motive was legal, not voluntary goodwill: "we should take advantage of any items which could lessen our exposure to claims for health damage" (J. B. Jobe to D. L. Hinmon on Labeling Asbestos Products to Lessen Claims (1964), 1964-02-25). In 1969 J-M's Environmental Control director said "many State and Federal codes require the labeling of potentially hazardous products" (E. M. Fenner to E. R. Bettinardi on Warning Labels for Superex and Thermobestos (1969)).

Side panels were chosen because pallets are stacked fronts-to-backs with the sides showing (0:04:50)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "the boxes are normally stored with the fronts and backs together and the sides open"
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: medium)
The documents: No J-M document in the library states a reason for side-panel placement. The only contemporaneous direction on prominence is Acher's "fully legible, but not conspicuous" (W. W. Acher to E. C. Lindstrom on Caution Wording for High-Temperature Insulations (1964), 1964-05-11). The carton photographs he described on direct (Exhibit G, tape 1) show the logo front/back and caution on the sides.

Label size was adequate under the Manufacturing Chemists Association recommendations (0:05:41)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I felt the size of the warning label was adequate in accord with the recommendations of the Manufacturing Chemists Association."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Kenneth W. Smith to Lewis J. Cralley of the Public Health Service on Caution Labels (1964) — 1964-01-28 — Confirms the MCA format was the model, but it was Dr. Smith who drafted labels in that format and sent "two formats of possible labels" in January 1964, months before the April–May design Sheckler claims as his own. The caution wording was already reported to the trade association on April 14, 1964 (National Insulation Manufacturers Association Board Minutes on J-M's Caution Statement (1964)). Nothing in the library addresses the label's size in 1964.

Products giving off loose asbestos were labeled; products with the fiber locked in were not (0:08:09)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "those products which the loose asbestos or would get up and give off loose asbestos were labeled those products where the asbestos fiber was locked in were not labeled"
Verdict: Supported (as the stated 1964 rule) (confidence: high)
The documents: W. W. Acher to E. C. Lindstrom on Caution Wording for High-Temperature Insulations (1964) — 1964-05-11 — The caution was for products in which "the fiber can be liberated when the product is handled, machined, etc."; Insulkote and Fibrous Adhesive were left off since "the fiber cannot become air-borne." Smith's January letter likewise excluded putty or floor tile, "from which the fiber cannot be liberated" (Smith to Cralley, above). But the rule was applied narrowly: boards that plainly release fiber when sawn (Marinite, Transite, Flexboard) were not labeled for years (see 0:12:29).

Insulation products were the first priority; the labeling ran on possibly into January 1965 (0:09:20)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "the labeling program began in 1964 and continued on thereafter and the asbestos insulation products were the first priority for labeling. Now it's possible ... that labeling may have gone over to January 1, 1965."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
The documents: E. C. Lindstrom to J-M Plant Managers on Caution Labels for High Temperature Insulations (1964) — 1964-10-15 — The program was only fixed in October 1964 (an earlier September 2 program letter was rescinded), and labels were to go on new cartons and bags only as old stock ran out. Smith's September memo confirms "nothing was to be done until the present supply of cartons was exhausted" (Kenneth W. Smith to E. C. Lindstrom on the Gummed Caution Label at Manville (1964)). Some insulation products were not labeled until 1970 (see 0:12:29).

Thermobestos pipe covering and block carried his label in 1964 (0:10:08)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "the thermovest's pipe covering in black at any time in 1964 contained any warning label that was designed by you? Yes, sir."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: E. M. Fenner to D. B. Wingerter on Which Insulation Products to Label (1969) — 1969-08-07 — Thermobestos is the one product on Fenner's list marked "presently labelled," and Fenner later said Superex and Thermobestos had carried labels "for a number of years" (Fenner to Bettinardi, above). But in 1964 new cartons came only as old stock was used up ("no stamping or pasting-on" — Lindstrom, above), so "at any time in 1964" depends on when each plant's carton stock ran out. Smith's September 1964 memo shows no printed Thermobestos cartons yet existed then.

85% magnesia pipe covering and block were earmarked for the label in 1964 (0:10:18)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "And was 85 percent magnesia pipe covering in black earmarked for a warning label in 1964? Yes, sir. As I recall, it was."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: W. W. Acher to E. C. Lindstrom on Caution Wording for High-Temperature Insulations (1964) — 1964-05-11 — 85% Magnesia P/I and blocks head Acher's list, and Lindstrom's October list includes them ("insulating and asbestos cements, 85% magnesia, Superex and Thermobestos block and pipe insulation"). "Earmarked" is supported. But in August 1969 Fenner listed 85% Magnesia among products still "to be labelled," marking only Thermobestos "presently labelled" (Fenner to Wingerter, above), which raises doubt about whether magnesia cartons actually carried the label in 1964–69.

The 1964 label was put on existing cartons with a black rubber ink stamp (0:12:07)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "as I testified before on direct examination the warning label was put on these cartons with a black rubber ink stamp"
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
The documents: E. C. Lindstrom to J-M Plant Managers on Caution Labels for High Temperature Insulations (1964) — 1964-10-15 — The program "reviewed with Dr. K. W. Smith, C. L. Sheckler and A. Pocius" provided for "no stamping or pasting-on" of labels by the plants; old cartons were to be used up unlabeled, with mixed labeled/unlabeled shipments accepted (original memo, p. 2: "There will be no stamping or pasting-on precautionary labels on any of the products by the plants"). On direct (tape 1) he said he replaced a stick-on label with ink stamps because workers on piece rates disliked it and "immediately notified all locations" to stamp stock. Smith gives a different reason for dropping the gummed label: it "created a small furor at Manville and could have had very serious labor relations and workmen's compensation consequences," and he asked that "nothing was to be done until the present supply of cartons was exhausted" (Kenneth W. Smith to E. C. Lindstrom on the Gummed Caution Label at Manville (1964), 1964-09-14).

All of the insulation materials were labeled with printed cartons sometime in 1964–1965 (0:12:29)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "all of the insulation materials sometime in 1964 1965 yes sir"
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
The documents: C. L. Sheckler to D. B. Wingerter on Caution Labels for Sil-O-Cel and Marinite Insulation Products (1968) — 1968-05-16 — Sheckler's own memo was still drafting a first asbestos caution for the Marinite insulation boards in 1968, and added: "Consistent with our labeling procedures with other products, I assume that International shipments will not be labeled." Fenner's August 1969 list still had Marinite, Transite, Flexboard, dry cements and 85% Magnesia "to be labelled," with millboard, asbestos felt, asbestos paper and Min-K in a "grey" area (E. M. Fenner to D. B. Wingerter on Which Insulation Products to Label (1969)); Sheckler was still corresponding on labeling asbestos paper and millboard in April 1969 (C. L. Sheckler to F. W. Matthews on Labeling Asbestos Paper and Millboard (1969)); the division-wide order covering Marinite, Min-K, papers and millboard came only on July 1, 1970 (M. W. Burleson's Notice to the Industrial Insulations Division on Health Hazard Caution Labels (1970)). In January 1964 the division had said it was "about to begin labeling Cements, Millboard, molded insulations and boards" (J. B. Jobe to Kenneth W. Smith on Labeling Industrial Insulations Division Products (1964)).

Products with carton-printed labels: Superex/magnesia, Thermobestos block and pipe, cement sacks (301, 302, 0352, 304, 400, 85% magnesia, 500, 450, 319, 678, Superex) (0:12:55)

Said by: Sheckler (answering), reading purchase specifications
On the recording: "cartons for magnesium super x pipe insulation ... Paper sacks for insulating cements ... 301, 302, 302, 0352, 0352, 304, 400. Eighty-five percent magnesia cement."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: E. C. Lindstrom to J-M Plant Managers on Caution Labels for High Temperature Insulations (1964) — 1964-10-15 — The memo's product/spec list (original p. 2) matches his list almost item for item: #500 and #450 insulating cements, #301, #302, #0352, #304, #400 asbestos cements, #319 and #678, 85% Magnesia Cement, Superex Cement, Magnesia & Superex P/I and Block, and cartons for Thermobestos block and pipe. The note says it lists "insulating and asbestos cements, 85% magnesia, Superex and Thermobestos block and pipe insulation." On the original, the "(For Export)" versions of #500, #450, #301 and #302 are struck through — export bags were left unlabeled. The specs he read are probably these purchase-spec numbers.

The spec sheets before him may not be the total group of products labeled (0:16:13)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "That does not necessarily indicate that that's the total group of products."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: W. W. Acher to E. C. Lindstrom on Caution Wording for High-Temperature Insulations (1964) — 1964-05-11 — Acher's nine-product list adds Asbestos Roll Fire Felt, Fibrofil and J-Spray to what he recited. Beyond the high-temperature line, the record points the other way: Fenner's 1969 list shows most other insulation products still unlabeled (see 0:12:29).

He could not say how many other J-M asbestos products (floor tile, brake linings, clutch facings) went unlabeled (0:17:27)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I can't say it's fair to say there was any number. I wouldn't know. There's no way I would know."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: D. B. Wingerter to H. M. Jackson on Caution Labels for the Old Packing and Friction Materials Line (1972) — 1972-06-26 — J-M's own answer for its whole packing and friction line: "we have not labeled any products from the old P&FM line since most products firmly bound the asbestos fibers within the matrix." Smith's 1964 letter excluded putty and floor tile outright (Smith to Cralley, above). The library has no product count, but the categories left unlabeled until the 1972 OSHA rule are clear.

Asbestos textile cloth was not labeled in 1964–65 (0:17:51)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "They didn't label asbestos cloth or textile cloth, did they, 64, 65? Asbestos textile cloth was not labeled, no, sir."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: D. B. Wingerter to H. M. Jackson on Caution Labels for the Old Packing and Friction Materials Line (1972) — 1972-06-26 — No products of the old packing and friction line were labeled before the OSHA deadline, though "There are notable exceptions in asbestos textiles" (i.e., textiles were dusty exceptions to the bound-fiber rationale). Supports his earlier tape-1 admission that the first cloth label was the 1972 OSHA label.

He worked for J-M with instructions to do certain things for Dr. Selikoff under the IIHRP (0:18:31)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I work for Johns-Manville with instructions to do certain things for Dr. Selikoff under the IIHRP."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Johns-Manville Environmental Health Task Force Policy Committee Minutes, May 1971 (1971) — 1971-05-21 — J-M's members on the IIHRP board were Jobe, Pundsack and Dr. George W. Wright, and the committee discussed their resigning because J-M "cannot afford to let its name be associated" with an IIHRP article on the fiber limit. J-M's role in the program was corporate and arm's-length; its PR firm was asked to help make the program "a major news story" while keeping the hazard described as "need for knowing more about it rather than a broad, accepted hazard" (Carl Thompson of Hill and Knowlton to Bert C. Goss on the Johns-Manville Project on the Selikoff Program (1968), 1968-09-19). Sheckler's own instructions are not documented.

The IIHRP's initial meeting was in May–June 1968 (0:18:51)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "mid-year, June of, May of 1968, I think, was the date of the initial meeting."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium)
The documents: Albert E. Hutchinson, From the General President, The Asbestos Worker (August 1968) — 1968-08 — The union president recounts a year of meetings and that on July 15, 1968, J-M's Bert Jobe made "a very generous commitment on behalf of his company" to fund the research. Castleman's sources cite Selikoff's April 12, 1968 invitation to a "Working Group on Insulation Industry Hygiene" (Reading Castleman, Chapter 9 - Company Knowledge, p. 598 citation list). Consistent with his direct-exam date of May 14, 1968 for the agenda.

At C. B. Burnett's direction he drew up the attendee list and helped set the agenda for the organizing meeting (0:19:20)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I initiated the list of attendees to organize the IIHRP at the direction of our President Mr. Burnett and presented that data to Dr. Selikoff"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: low)
The documents: Reading Castleman, Chapter 9 - Company Knowledge — Castleman's citation (p. 598) is a "New York Academy of Sciences letter from Selikoff inviting executives to a 'Working Group on Insulation Industry Hygiene' (Apr. 12, 1968)" — i.e., the invitations went out over Selikoff's name. Burnett was J-M's president in 1968 (Johns-Manville Environmental Health Task Force Policy Committee Minutes, December 1968 (1968) refers to "president C. B. Burnett"). No document shows Sheckler compiling the list.

He served on an IIHRP respirator improvement committee and briefly on a shipboard insulation committee headed by Dr. Duncan (0:20:09)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I worked on a respirator improvement program with Dr. Solikov, which was being done under the auspices of IIHRP, and served on that committee." (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: medium)
The documents: No library note documents these committees or a Dr. Duncan. In September 1969 Sheckler privately conceded "Respirators are not as efficient as we thought they were" (Notes of a Discussion with Cliff Sheckler on Dust, Respirators and Disease (1969), 1969-09-16), which fits the timing of a respirator-improvement effort.

He visited no job sites under the IIHRP; W. B. Reitze did, and Reitze was the man J-M provided (0:21:26)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "I did not, no, sir. Mr. Reitze did that. ... It was, yes, sir."
Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
The documents: W. B. Reitze to D. Markusson on Exposures from Mixing Insulating Cements (1976) — 1976-11-05 — Reitze writes of "considerable experience during my Selikoff days taking samples on various job sites where cement mixing was in progress," finding 30–40 f/cc for trough mixing and up to 80 f/cc for pail mixing. Note what J-M thus knew from its own man: job-site exposures from the labeled cements far exceeded any limit.

Selikoff's insulation-worker study (Exhibit D) was one he read and relied on as manager of the Industrial Health Program (0:21:47)

Said by: plaintiffs' counsel (question, Sheckler agreed)
On the recording: "this is a study that you read and relied upon as part of your duties as a manager of the industrial health program for john manville isn't it mr sheckler yes sir"
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Asbestos Textile Institute Air Hygiene and Manufacturing Committee Minutes on Selikoff's Study and British Fiber Counting (1963) — 1963-06-06 — Sheckler attended for J-M when the committee heard that "a Dr. Sellakoff" would report "a very large incidence of lung cancer" among insulation workers, and that it "will be damaging to the industry." He also attended the October 8, 1964 ATI meeting that planned a response to Selikoff's conference (Asbestos Textile Institute Minutes on Selikoff's Conference and a Lawyer's Letter to Selikoff (1964)). The study itself, Selikoff, Churg and Hammond, Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 132:139–155 (1965), is listed in the catalog (The occurrence of asbestosis among insulation workers in the United States) but no vault note holds its text, so the passages counsel read (pp. 140–141) could not be checked. J-M's medical director publicly "basically discounted Dr. Selikoff's findings and gave the impression that insulators were not at risk" two weeks after the conference (James K. Green to Thomas C. DeLorenzo on NICA Records and Dr. Kenneth Smith's 1964 Talk to Insulation Contractors (1978)).

NIMA presenters to NICA members in 1967–68: Barnhart (NIMA), Messler (Ruberoid/GAF), an Owens-Corning VP, Horowitz (CertainTeed), NICA's president Brody, and Sheckler (0:30:15)

Said by: Sheckler (answering), on questions from Owens-Corning's counsel
On the recording: "Mr. John Barnhart, executive director of NIMA. Mr. Harry Messler ... Ruberoid ... Mr. Leon Horowitz ... of CertainTeed Products Corporation." (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: National Insulation Manufacturers Association Board Minutes on J-M's Caution Statement (1964) — 1964-04-14 — Minutes authored by J. M. Barnhart for NIMA, confirming his NIMA role. Castleman's sources place Leon Horowitz in the CertainTeed file, including a "'Private and Confidential' May 4, 1964 letter (Horowitz to Cliff Sheckler, Johns-Manville)", and file Ruberoid under GAF (Reading Castleman, Chapter 9 - Company Knowledge, pp. 582–584, 595). In 1961 Horowitz was at Keasbey & Mattison and reported on Smith's cancer talk that Sheckler attended (Leon B. Horowitz's Report to A. W. Spedding on Dr. Kenneth Smith's Asbestosis and Cancer Talk at the Asbestos Textile Institute (June 1961)). Sheckler later chaired NIMA's Safety and Health Committee (Insulation Industry Testimony of Sheckler, Royer and Zumwalt at the Labor Department Asbestos Hearing (1972)). The 1967–68 presentations themselves, Messler, the Owens-Corning VP ("Viverberg"), and Brody are not in the library.

1952–57: his job was accident prevention at Manville, mainly traumatic injuries (0:32:42)

Said by: Sheckler (answering), on redirect
On the recording: "Primary focus of my job at that time was to administer the accident prevention or injury prevention program at the Mando, New Jersey location, primarily in the area of traumatic injuries."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: C. L. Sheckler, Summary of Atmospheric Hygiene Studies at the Manville Plant (1957–1959) — 1957–1959 — By mid-1957 Sheckler's Safety Department was running dust surveys: the note describes "1,778 counts at 649 stations from June 1957 to December 1958," and the summary is initialed by him. The same year he reported on the first Transite pipe X-ray conferences to Dr. Smith (C. L. Sheckler to Dr. Kenneth Smith on the First Transite Pipe X-Ray Conferences (1957)). Accurate for 1952–56 as far as the library shows; by 1957 his work was dust disease as well.

Before 1964 he had no responsibility for the sale or customers' use of J-M products (0:33:28)

Said by: Sheckler (answering), on redirect
On the recording: "No, sir. I had no responsibility in that area. ... I had no responsibility for that. ... I had no responsibility."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Dr. Kenneth W. Smith and C. L. Sheckler at the J-M Industrial Relations Managers' Meeting (1963) — 1963-04-29 — Formal responsibility aside, in 1963 Sheckler himself told J-M managers the dust surveys were "bona fide records for litigation purposes including Workmen's Compensation, common-law third party, or possibly customer liability claims." In 1961 he sat in when Smith warned of "the more costly Customer Liability cases in Common Law Court" (Horowitz June 1961 report, above). His department, the corporate Industrial Health Program, answered customer health inquiries before 1964 (see 0:36:29).

No indication that the Manville workers trimming and sawing insulation were above the TLV (0:35:02)

Said by: Sheckler (answering), on redirect
On the recording: "Was there any indication at that time that the workmen who were doing the trimming and the sewing were exposed to concentrations above the threshold limit value? There was not."
Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: medium)
The documents: C. L. Sheckler, Summary of Atmospheric Hygiene Studies at the Manville Plant (1957–1959) — 1957–1959 — His own initialed tables mark "Stations requiring control"; the note says "some saws and mills, were flagged as needing control," and J-M's chronology says "Some third-party type tasks measure average counts above 5 mppcf." The original's Thermobestos page (Dec. 1958–June 1959) asterisks the #2 Twin Leg Trimmer take-off (avg 32.08 mppcf), #1 Bandsaw (9.82, 13.69), #3 Do-All Bandsaw (24.56) and Yates bandsaw (6.84). Caveat: these are total-particle counts in a product with roughly 10–15% asbestos, and J-M's medical director then applied the limit pro rata by asbestos content (Dr. Kenneth Smith to Detroit Edison Company on Thermobestos, Mineral Wool and Asbestos (1959)); but the tables themselves flag those stations for control, so "no indication" is wrong.

The TLV then was 5 million particles per cubic foot of asbestos dust (0:35:08)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "At that time, the threshold limit value was 5 million particles per cubic foot of air for asbestos dust."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
The documents: Johns-Manville Manual of Standard Practices, Appendix II - Threshold Limit Values for 1958 — 1958-09-05 — Confirms the ACGIH figure of 5 mppcf, but J-M's own manual added: "J-M standard applied to asbestos exposure is 1 million fibres per cubic foot," and said the limits "should not be regarded as fine lines between safe and dangerous concentrations." His Thermobestos fiber counts also show the #2 Twin Leg Trimmer take-off flagged against that fiber standard (avg 1.00).

He first became involved with customers' use of J-M products in 1964, with the labeling (0:35:34)

Said by: Sheckler (answering)
On the recording: "When did you first become involved with the use of the company's products by its customers? 1964."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: Kenneth W. Smith to E. C. Lindstrom on the Gummed Caution Label at Manville (1964) — 1964-09-14 — Supports a 1964 start of labeling, and Smith then proposed a meeting to "evaluate whether or not a health hazard might exist for those using the product" for J-M's other asbestos products. By 1970 all customer health inquiries were routed to him (M. W. Burleson to W. D. Gaches and Others on Routing Customer Health Inquiries to C. L. Sheckler (1970): inquiries "from customers or others concerning the health hazards involved with cutting, machining or using our products containing asbestos and/or silica"). But see 0:33:28 on his awareness of customer liability by 1961–63.

Before 1964, responsibility for users of J-M's insulation lay with Johns-Manville Sales Corporation (0:36:29)

Said by: Sheckler (answering), on recross
On the recording: "It was the Johns-Manville Sales Corporation responsibility."
Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
The documents: H. M. Jackson to the Los Angeles Division of Occupational Health on Marinite, Colorlith, Asbestocite and Transite (1960) — 1960-07-11 — Product-health questions from outsiders were answered by the corporate health staff: "H. M. Jackson, manager of J-M's Industrial Health Program" (the program Sheckler joined in 1960) advised on Marinite and Transite dust. Dr. Smith, Sheckler's superior, answered customers on Thermobestos and asbestos hazards in 1957 and 1959 (Dr. Kenneth W. Smith to F. M. Stumpf of Columbia Acoustics and Fireproofing on Asbestos Hazards (1957); Dr. Kenneth Smith to Detroit Edison Company on Thermobestos, Mineral Wool and Asbestos (1959)). The sales side did run the insulation business: M. W. Burleson chaired NIMA in 1964 "of Johns-Manville Sales Corp." (NIMA minutes, above), and Smith testified the insulation division heads were "knowledgeable, quite definitely" about the hazard and had been offered a label in 1951–52 (Deposition of Dr. Kenneth W. Smith in DeRocco v. Forty-Eight Insulation on Caution Labels for Celite and Insulation (1976)).

At the parent corporation, the person responsible for users was the president, Mr. Burnett (0:37:51)

Said by: Sheckler (answering), on recross
On the recording: "anybody there had that responsibility mr. Quinton Burnett president of the corporation" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
Verdict: Supported (Burnett was president) (confidence: medium)
The documents: C. B. Burnett, President of Johns-Manville, on Industrial Hygiene (1960) — 1960-07-19 — Burnett (Clinton B. Burnett; "Quinton" is a mishearing) was J-M's president in 1960 and told managers "it is obvious that our control efforts are not satisfactory." His 1960 talk concerns plant dust and compensation costs, not product users. In 1958 Smith said a Marinite label should be "a policy decision made by our Senior Officers," but the division decided against a label without sending it up (Johns-Manville Memos on a Caution Label for Marinite (1958)). No document shows Burnett personally acting on user safety before 1964.

Exhibits identified

Purchase specifications for labeled cartons and bags (read at 0:11:44–0:16:18, apparently the specs he produced on direct): their product/spec list matches the second page of E. C. Lindstrom to J-M Plant Managers on Caution Labels for High Temperature Insulations (1964) (cement numbers 500, 450, 301, 302, 0352, 304, 400, 319, 678, 85% Magnesia Cement, Superex Cement; Magnesia & Superex P/I and block; Thermobestos block and pipe cartons). The specs themselves are not separately in the library.
Exhibit D — Selikoff, Churg and Hammond, "The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers in the United States" (Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 132:139–155, 1965), pp. 140–141 read into the record: catalog entry The occurrence of asbestosis among insulation workers in the United States; no vault note with its text.
The 1964 caution label "you designed" (referred to throughout; typed copy and Exhibit G photos were on tape 1): wording as in National Insulation Manufacturers Association Board Minutes on J-M's Caution Statement (1964), W. W. Acher to E. C. Lindstrom on Caution Wording for High-Temperature Insulations (1964) and the Lindstrom memo.

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