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Dr. Paul Kotin's 1979 Deposition, Checked Against the Documents

Dr. Paul Kotin, Johns-Manville's senior vice president for health, safety and environment from 1974, gave this videotaped deposition in the South Carolina asbestos cases in 1979, cross-examined by Ronald Motley. We checked what was said on both tapes, claim by claim, against the documents in this Library: Johns-Manville's own knowledge chronology, the Sumner Simpson Papers, the Motley 1000 set, and the books and studies of the period. The deposition itself, with both tapes, is on its own page: Videotaped Deposition of Dr. Paul Kotin in the South Carolina Asbestos Cases (1979).

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How this check was done

Each claim was taken from the recording's machine transcript and compared with the documents, with the help of AI tools, then given a verdict: supported (the documents bear it out), qualified (true as far as it goes, but the documents add something it leaves out), contradicted (the documents say otherwise), or not in the Library (we hold nothing that settles it). Each verdict links the documents it rests on, so you can read them yourself. Times are times in the video on the recording's page. Where a quotation depends on words the machine transcript may have misheard, it is marked as not yet checked against the tape.

These pages say what the documents show; they do not say that anyone lied. Nothing on this site is legal advice, including these checks.

Results

Tape 1, 0:00–1:25 Tape 1, 1:25–2:57 Tape 1, 2:57–4:18 Tape 2 All
Supported 21 18 27 4 70
Qualified 5 12 7 10 34
Contradicted 2 1 2 8 13
Not in the Library 4 6 3 6 19
Claims checked 32 37 38* 28 135

* One claim on tape 1 (Thermobestos) is both supported (composition) and qualified (testing), so its verdicts add
to 39.

Most of Motley's cross-examination is supported: he was reading the same documents we hold. Several of his exhibits
are notes in the Library (below). The contradictions cluster where Kotin, or J-M's own counsel on redirect, gives the
company's account.

The strongest findings

  1. "No data to challenge" the 5 million particle limit (tape 2, 0:05:23; tape 1, 2:50:54). J-M's own files hold
    Hemeon's 1947 report to the Asbestos Textile Institute, which J-M's chronology calls the "First significant
    challenge to TLV" and notes was "Copied to J-M". In 1959 J-M's H. M. Jackson called the limit "a carry over from
    the quartz industry". In the same year J-M's medical director told Detroit Edison that Thermobestos dust near 50
    million particles "would not contain an excessive amount of asbestos fibre", reading the limit as asbestos only.
  2. No warnings because insulation work was thought safe (tape 2, 0:23:40). Dr. Kenneth Smith testified in 1976
    that he recommended caution labels about 1951–52 and that the insulation managers were "knowledgeable, quite
    definitely"; a 1958 Marinite label was dropped because it "would make our selling efforts most difficult"; and in
    1958 J-M swore it "had no reason to issue any warnings" outside its plants.
  3. Insulators' asbestosis known only since 1963–64 (tape 1, 4:15:08). Contradicted by Drinker's 1942 remarks to
    shipbuilders, the 1944–46 Fleischer-Drinker work, and Frost's 1956 Danish study, which reached J-M in the 1957
    Industrial Hygiene Digest.
  4. No insulation company tested its products before sale (tape 1, 3:56:04). Owens-Illinois asked Saranac in 1943
    to test Kaylo, including the risk to "applicators or erectors"; Saranac found asbestosis in the animals by 1948;
    J-M's chronology says Kaylo was the same composition as Thermobestos.
  5. The "independent" Montreal institute (tape 2, 0:37:08). The Library shows it was set up by the Quebec
    Asbestos Mining Association, chaired by a J-M medical adviser, and turned down two of Selikoff's proposals.
  6. What J-M's files held while Kotin said he had not read it: Hueper's warnings were in J-M's files from 1946;
    Vorwald's 1951 "astounded" letter on Waukegan; the Asbestos Textile Institute's 1956 funding of work "designed to
    refute the work of Dr. Hueper". These are qualified, not contradicted: he spoke for himself.

Smaller corrections to the record, on both sides: the Selikoff conference was October 19–21, 1964, not October 26
(which bears on Kotin's reason for missing it); Angrist's 1942 cases were pipe coverers, not shipyard workers; the
first Saranac symposium was 1935, not the 1920s; Dreessen's 1938 study covered three plants, not four; the 5 million
particle limit was proposed in 1938 and adopted by the ACGIH in 1947.

Tape 1, 0:00 to 1:25

Slice: Motley's cross on Hueper's 1942 book (K-11), the limits of Kotin's own asbestos work before 1974, Dreessen and Fleischer, Selikoff and the 1964 New York Academy of Sciences conference, then a long run of exhibits (K-14 to K-23) on how early industrial medicine was taught and organised. The education exhibits are almost entirely outside the library; the asbestos-knowledge claims are well covered.

Lanza's 1938 book discusses 1930s lawsuits by workers claiming asbestosis (0:00:11)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin "I don't recall")
  • On the recording: "Do you recall in Dr. Lanza's book, also, K-10, Exhibit K-10, that he talks about lawsuits being filed against the asbestos industry in the 1930s by workers claiming to have asbestosis?"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium (we have no note for the book itself, but the suits are well documented))
  • The documents: Reading Castleman, Chapter 3: Castleman (p. 144) quotes Lanza's 1938 book, Silicosis and Asbestosis, on "the damage suit situation." Johns-Manville Board of Directors Minutes on Asbestosis Suits (1933–1970), 1933-04-24: the board "authorized the president to settle eleven asbestosis suits brought by former employees"; in June 1933 the settlement was $35,000. See also DeMuro v. Johns-Manville (1930).

Hueper was head of the environmental cancer section at the National Cancer Institute (0:00:58)

  • Said by: Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "Dr. Hueper was chief of the, I guess they call it the environmental cancer section at the National Cancer Institute at that time."
  • Verdict: Supported (that he was at the NCI) (confidence: medium; the library has no source for his exact title)
  • The documents: ATI Air Hygiene Committee Minutes on Autopsy and Heart Studies (1954), 1954-12-01: calls him "Dr. W. C. Hueper of the National Cancer Institute". The 1956 ATI minutes describe him as "of the U.S. Public Health Service" (the NCI's parent body).

Hueper, Occupational Tumors and Allied Diseases (1942), discusses asbestos on pp. 399–405 (0:01:31)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed)
  • On the recording: "it's entitled occupational tumors and allied diseases by wc Hueper dated 1942 is that correct that is correct"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium (we have the citation, not the book))
  • The documents: Reading Castleman, Chapter 2 - Cancer: Castleman's note 24 cites "Hueper, W.C., Occupational Tumors and Allied Diseases, Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1942, pp. 399-405", and his note 129 cites p. 405, the "first warning" passage read at 0:08:16. The library has no note for the book itself.

Hueper received the first Percival Pott Award (1974) (0:05:07)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed)
  • On the recording: "And did Dr. Hueper not receive their first award? Yes, sir, he did. And was it not called the Percival Pott Award? Yes, sir." (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: high)
  • The documents: The library has nothing on the award. The only Pott material is a journal abstract that cites Pott's 1775 description of scrotal cancer in chimney sweeps. The society is misheard as "SIOEH" (probably the Society for Occupational and Environmental Health).

The first case reports of asbestosis with lung cancer appeared in 1935 (0:07:37)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed)
  • On the recording: "the first case reports in which people talked about asbestosis and lung cancer occurred in this country way back in 1935 yes sir"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Gloyne, "Two Cases of Squamous Carcinoma of the Lung Occurring in Asbestosis" (1935), 1935-10: notes a case "reported the same year in the United States by Kenneth Lynch and W. A. Smith in the American Journal of Cancer"; J-M's chronology records "Gloyne and Lynch case histories of asbestosis and lung cancer." Enterline (1978, below) gives Gloyne credit from 1934.

Case reports kept appearing from 1935 to 1964 (0:07:45)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed)
  • On the recording: "the case report continued to be reported in the literature from 1935 all the way up to 1964. yes sir"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Philip E. Enterline, Asbestos and Cancer: The First Thirty Years (1978), 1978-11-29: an industry-funded review of the literature from 1934 to 1964. It found that "many writers were convinced of a relationship long before epidemiological and experimental evidence was available." See also Stoll, Bass and Angrist (1951).

/ [0:12:34] Angrist reported asbestosis and lung cancer in "shipyard workers" in 1942 (0:07:53)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed both times)
  • On the recording: "do you agree that in 1942, Dr. Angrist reported two cases in this particular journal of asbestosis and lung cancer in shipyard workers? Yes, sir."
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Holleb and Angrist, "Bronchogenic Carcinoma in Association with Pulmonary Asbestosis" (1942). The journal (American Journal of Pathology) and the count of two cases are right. But Holleb is the first author, and the men were not described as shipyard workers: both "had worked about 25 years as pipe coverers, covering steam and water pipes with asbestos." They were "the first insulation workers in the table." So "insulation workers" is accurate and "shipyard" is not supported. In 1978 Angrist told Motley he "was convinced even after that first case, these two cases, that there was an association" (Angrist deposition (1978)).

By 1950, Germany and Great Britain treated lung cancer with asbestosis as compensable (0:09:58)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed)
  • On the recording: "by 1950 the countries of great britain and germany recognized lung cancer in association with asbestosis as a compensable disease yes sir"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium. The library confirms Germany but not Britain.)
  • The documents: Germany: Enterline (1978) says the German question "seemed to have been settled by the early 1940's" (journal abstracts in the library give a 1943 German decree). J-M's own files: ATI Air Hygiene Committee Meeting with Company Doctors and Dr. Schepers (1954), 1954-10-06: with J-M's Dr. Kenneth Smith present, Schepers "reported that the West German government had recognized lung cancer caused by asbestos in 1951." Britain: the library has the 1949 Chief Inspector of Factories figures (CIF Report for 1947 (1949): 13.2% of asbestosis deaths had lung cancer) but no document showing British compensation for it by 1950.

By 1942 workers met asbestos in many industries, including insulation; its use in insulation was recognised by 1930 (0:11:49)

US deaths from asbestosis were in print by 1936 (Hueper lists Lynch, Stewart, Coleman, Shull and others) (0:13:32)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed)
  • On the recording: "has your review of the literature revealed to you that by 1936 there were writings in the literature of persons dying of Asbestosis of asbestosis yes sir" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Merewether and Price (1930) "collects ten deaths up to the end of 1929" and shows asbestosis "could kill on its own without tuberculosis." The "Shule" in Hueper's list is Dr. J. Rush Shull, whose 1936 "Asbestosis: A Roentgenologic Review of 71 Cases" circulated through the industry: Fabel to Sumner Simpson (1936). The library also cites Coleman's "Asbestosis, Report of Two Cases." The library has nothing on Metropolitan Life's figure of 17 deaths from 1924 to 1936 (NOT IN LIBRARY).

Latency: asbestosis takes 3–15 years and may show up years after exposure ends (0:14:40)

  • Said by: Motley (question, reading Hueper); Kotin accepts it "as expressed in the literature"
  • On the recording: "Asbestosis usually develops after an exposure of three to 15 years ... but may not produce objective symptoms and for many years after the cessation of exposure"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Deposition of Dr. Paul Kotin in Burows v. Johns-Manville (1977), 1977-10-06. Kotin agrees asbestosis "can appear long after exposure begins, and even after it ends." J-M's own chronology summarises it: "Kotin testifies on 10/6/77 that latency was understood by medical community as of 1930."

Asbestosis can enlarge the right side of the heart (cor pulmonale), which can be fatal (0:19:39)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin (A: "They can, yes")
  • On the recording: "Do people who have asbestosis sometimes get sick with right side heart hypertrophy or choropulmonale? They can, yes."
  • Verdict: Supported (that the industry knew of the heart issue) (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: ATI Air Hygiene Committee Meeting with Company Doctors and Dr. Schepers (1954), 1954-10-06: with J-M's medical director present, the industry approved Dr. Theodos's study of "the relationship of the heart and pulmonary circulation to the lung changes caused by asbestosis."

A competent radiologist could diagnose asbestosis from Hueper's 1942 description, and X-rays had been used for dust diseases for many years (0:21:57)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed, adding it took "an x-ray specialist")
  • On the recording: "what he is describing is the highly sophisticated diagnosis of an x-ray specialist"
  • Verdict: Supported, with a qualification (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Gardner to Sumner Simpson Reviewing Dr. Shull's Asbestosis Article (1936), 1936-12-24. Shull's X-ray review of 71 cases shows radiologic diagnosis was in use by 1936, and Gardner agreed "There were unquestionably some cases of true asbestosis in the series." Gardner also admitted that he and "many good roentgenologists" would miss most early cases "unless we had been told that the subjects had worked in asbestos plants," which supports Kotin's point about specialist skill. The cases were Carolina workers, including from Raybestos-Manhattan's Charleston plant (Fabel to Simpson (1936)).

Asbestos bodies show up in lung tissue and sputum and were taken as markers of asbestos (0:23:02)

  • Said by: Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "a pathologist can look at a section of lung or a specimen of sputum and identify the presence of this body"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Stewart and Haddow, Asbestosis Bodies in Lung Puncture Material and Sputum (1929), 1929-01: the golden-yellow bodies had been found "in every fatal case of the disease in which they have been looked for," and were found in sputum. The note is in the Sumner Simpson Papers, so it was in industry files.

Hueper (1942) found the lung cancer rate in asbestosis "definitely excessive" and kept arguing from 1942 to 1955 that asbestos causes cancer (0:28:57)

Kotin co-wrote a 1950s paper with Hueper saying asbestos causes cancer (0:29:26)

  • Said by: Motley (question); Kotin: "I don't remember. It was in the 1950s, yes."
  • On the recording: "In fact, in the 1950s, you co-authored a paper with Dr. Hueper in which both of you wrote that asbestos caused cancer." (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: high)
  • The documents: The library has no Hueper–Kotin paper. Kotin's indexed publications in the library run from 1979 (Annals NYAS) to 1985 (J Occup Med).

Kotin concluded in 1955 that asbestos is a carcinogen (0:29:02)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed)
  • On the recording: "And I believe that in 1955, you reached the conclusion that asbestos was a carcinogen. Is that correct? Put it along, yes, sir." (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (as to Kotin) (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: No document records Kotin's own 1955 view. For context, 1955 is the year of Doll's study (in the library as "Richard Doll, Mortality from Lung Cancer in Asbestos Workers (1955)"). The film note's summary also records that Kotin agreed to this.

Lanza and Merewether treated mixing (and sawing) dry asbestos materials as hazardous (0:32:49)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin: "It can be potentially hazardous")
  • On the recording: "did you agree with Dr. Lanza and Dr. Merewether that the mixing up of dry materials which contained asbestos is a potentially hazardous activity"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium (no note for the Lanza book))
  • The documents: Home Office, Asbestos Industry (Asbestosis) Scheme (1931), 1931-04-30: the scheme that grew out of the Merewether inquiry covers "asbestos crushing, mixing, textile manufacture, insulation, mattress making and dry sawing and grinding." In 1977 Kotin said he had known the Merewether report for "20 years or more" (Burows deposition (1977)).

Gardner and Vorwald, directors of Saranac, were researching asbestos disease (0:34:59)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed)
  • On the recording: "Dr. Leroy Gardner and Dr. Arthur Vorwald who are directors of the Saranac laboratory are two of the persons who were doing research on asbestos disease"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Gardner to Woodard (1946): Gardner, "director of the Saranac Laboratory," reports "over 80% of mice exposed to asbestos dust" developed lung tumors. Vorwald to Owens-Illinois (1948): Vorwald, "director of the Saranac Laboratory."

Gardner, Vorwald and Schepers tested asbestos insulation products on animals (0:39:31)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed)
  • On the recording: "dr. Gardner bore wall and Garrett Schepers all conducted such tests on insulation products which contained asbestos" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents:

Kotin did not read the 1938 Dreessen study until he joined the government (late 1950s or early 1960s) (0:39:44)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin: "correct")
  • On the recording: "the Dreessen study that 1938 study ... you didn't even read that until you went with the government in the late 1950s early 1960s did you correct"
  • Verdict: Qualified (this concerns his personal knowledge; J-M's files had the study) (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Dreessen and Others, A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry (1938), 1938-08: "J-M's attorney was told of the bulletin within weeks," and it is in J-M's own chronology ("proposes tentative safe standard of 5 mppcf").

Kotin did not read the Fleischer (Fleischer-Drinker) study before joining the government in 1958 (0:40:33)

  • Said by: Motley (question); Kotin first says "you're wrong", then "Correct"
  • On the recording: "So you did not read the Fleischer study before you went with the government in 1958? Correct."
  • Verdict: Qualified (personal knowledge; the study was in J-M's files) (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Fleischer, Viles, Gade and Drinker (1946), 1946-01: it is in J-M's chronology as the "first study of workers using asbestos-containing products." Lois Gaul's Manville Memo on the Bulletin of Hygiene (1985), prepared for Kotin's department, lists "Philip Drinker's 1947 paper on asbestos in pipe covering in wartime shipyards." Kotin's dates for joining the government are inconsistent: 1961 at 0:00:41, 1958 here.

Selikoff first presented his findings in 1963 at the AMA's annual convention in Atlantic City and published them in JAMA in April 1964 (0:40:49)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed)
  • On the recording: "his initial findings were published, were presented in 1963 at the annual convention of the American Medical Association in Atlantic City ... published in April 1964 in the Journal of the American Medical Association. Correct."
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Selikoff, Churg and Hammond, "Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia" (1964). It was "read before the American College of Chest Physicians in Atlantic City on June 17, 1963" (J-M's chronology says "of the AMA") and published in JAMA on April 6, 1964. So the place, year and journal are right; the presenting body was the College of Chest Physicians. The industry knew beforehand: ATI minutes, June 6, 1963 say "admittedly it will be damaging to the industry."

The October 1964 New York Academy of Sciences conference was major, with about 90–95% of the world's asbestos experts (0:41:54)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin (A: "Some figure approximating that")
  • On the recording: "when Dr. Selikoff was in New York in October 1964 that was a very important conference wasn't it yes sir"
  • Verdict: Supported (the date and importance) (confidence: high; the attendance share is NOT IN LIBRARY)
  • The documents: NYAS, Program of the Conference on Biological Effects of Asbestos (1964), October 19–21, 1964: the preface calls asbestos cancers "perhaps the most important industrial cancers at this time." J-M's Dr. Kenneth W. Smith gave a paper (Preprinted Abstracts (1964)).

"Dr. Selikoff gave his report on October 26, 1964" (read from Kotin's 1977 testimony) (0:43:44)

  • Said by: Motley (question, quoting the February 1977 deposition; Kotin had answered "Correct")
  • On the recording: "I believe Dr. Selikoff gave his report on October 26, 1964. Isn't that correct? Correct." (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Contradicted (the date) (confidence: high)
  • The documents: NYAS Program (1964) and Preprinted Abstracts (1964): the conference was "held October 19 to 21, 1964." October 26 falls after it ended. This affects Kotin's alibi ("the day he presented it I was testifying before Congress"), which could be checked against the Congressional Record for October 19–21, 1964. Note that Congress had adjourned by early October 1964, an election year. That is general knowledge, not in the library; please verify before using it.

Kotin helped fund the 1964 conference but did not attend the sessions (0:42:28)

  • Said by: Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "I was appearing before Congress. I had planned to go there, I helped fund the conference, and it was my intention to go."
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: high)
  • The documents: The library's notes on the NYAS program and abstracts do not mention Kotin or name a sponsor.

An asbestos company's medical director in 1950 should have followed the literature on its products (0:42:40)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin: "You should be aware of it, yes, sir")
  • On the recording: "had a responsibility in 1950 to monitor the literature for articles on his products. You should be aware of it, yes, sir."
  • Verdict: Supported (J-M's medical department did follow it) (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Kenneth W. Smith to C. M. McGaw (1950), 1950-08-31: J-M's medical director cites what "already has been published by Merewether and Hueper." CIF Report for 1947 (1949): "The copy carries a J-M library stamp."

Donald Cummings worked with Gardner at Saranac on asbestos and was its assistant director in 1932 (1:04:28)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin did not know him)
  • On the recording: "You didn't know that he collaborated with Dr. Gardner at Saranac Laboratory on the asbestos form?" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Supported (the collaboration) (confidence: medium; his title in 1932 and whether he is the Colorado Cummings are NOT IN LIBRARY)
  • The documents: Reading Castleman, Chapter 1 cites "Gardner, L.U. and D.E. Cummings. Studies on Experimental Pneumokoniosis. VI Inhalation of Asbestos Dust ... (1931)". Program of the Fourth Silicosis Symposium at Saranac (1939) lists "Donald E. Cummings ... of Saranac."

Lanza ran a school of industrial medicine at NYU from the late 1940s (1:07:12)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed)
  • On the recording: "dr anthony lanza also had a school of industrial medicine at new york university beginning in the late 1940s"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium (the start date is not shown))
  • The documents: J. P. Woodard to Dr. A. J. Lanza (1951), 1951-04-10: Lanza was "chairman of the Institute of Industrial Medicine at New York University-Bellevue Medical Center," and was working with J-M at the time.

The Industrial Hygiene Foundation was founded in 1935 (1:17:58)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin unsure)
  • On the recording: "and the industrial hygiene foundation was founded in 1935 what that i don't"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Vandiver Brown's Memorandum on the Mellon Institute Symposium on Dust Problems (1935), 1935-01-18: a committee was formed to have the Mellon Institute propose a joint program, and J-M's lawyer Vandiver Brown sat on it for asbestos. By 1936 the body was the Air Hygiene Foundation, the name used in Brown's 1936 letters in the library, and it later became the IHF.

Saranac held symposia on occupational disease from the 1920s (1:23:06)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed)
  • On the recording: "beginning back in the 1920s for example, Saranac laboratory would have symposium Conferences on occupational diseases. Yes, sir"
  • Verdict: Contradicted (as to the 1920s date for Saranac) (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Vandiver Brown to M. F. Judd Enclosing the Saranac Silicosis Symposium Program (1935): the symposium of June 3–7, 1935. The 1939 program note calls it "The first symposium, in 1935." Conferences on dust in the early 1930s did take place (Mellon Institute, January 1935; Wisconsin Industrial Commission, November 1932, cited in Reading Castleman, Chapter 3), so "conferences on the pneumoconioses from the 1930s" is SUPPORTED.

Before 1974 Kotin had done no asbestos research, epidemiology or dust studies, never visited an asbestos plant or mine, and gave no papers at the Saranac or IHF asbestos meetings (0:37:12–0:39:22)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed to each)
  • On the recording: "number six, you never presented any papers at the Saranac Laboratory Symposia on Asbestos Diseases. Correct."
  • Verdict: Supported as far as the library goes (confidence: low)
  • The documents: Kotin is not among the participants listed in the Seventh Saranac Symposium program (1952), where Hueper and Merewether did speak. The library's earliest Kotin documents date from his J-M years, 1974 on. The rest of these points are NOT IN LIBRARY.

Exhibits identified

Exhibit Description in transcript Library note
K-10 Lanza (ed.), Silicosis and Asbestosis, 1938 No note for the book. Cited in Reading Castleman, Ch. 3 (p. 144, the "damage suit situation") and Ch. 2
K-11 Photocopied pages of Hueper, Occupational Tumors and Allied Diseases, 1942, pp. 399–405 (University of Colorado library copy) No note. Cited in Reading Castleman, Ch. 2, notes 24 and 129
K-12, K-13 Photographs: a worker sawing asbestos material; a worker in a respirator mixing material Not identified
K-14 Encyclopedia of American Associations, 1st ed., 1956, p. 172 (AIHA, IHF, Industrial Medical Association: 3,300 members, founded 1915) Not in library
K-15 Journal of Industrial Hygiene, vol. 1, May 1919 (Harry E. Mock article) Not in library
K-16 Introduction to Industrial Medicine, 1947 (probably T. L. Hazlett, ed.) No note. Cited in Reading Castleman, Ch. 9 and Ch. 10
K-17 University of Colorado School of Medicine announcement (c. 1931; course 153, Industrial Hygiene) Not in library
K-18 University of Colorado bulletin, 1948 (Division of Industrial Medicine; lab organized 1939 by Waring and Cumming[s]) Not in library
K-19 University of Colorado School of Medicine bulletin, 1950 (Sc.D. in industrial medicine) Not in library
K-20 Proceedings, Occupational Disease Symposium, Northwestern University Medical School Dept. of Industrial Medicine, Sept. 1938 Not in library
K-21 Bess Furman, A Profile of the United States Public Health Service 1798–1948 (HEW, 1973), p. 339 Not in library
K-22 Encyclopedia of Associations, 1979 No note. Castleman Ch. 10 cites the 1980 edition
K-23 Journal of Industrial Hygiene, January 1926 Not in library
(no number) Proceedings, conference on effects of dust on the respiratory system, Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 1932 No note. Cited in Reading Castleman, Ch. 3 (November 1932)
(prior testimony) Kotin's discovery deposition of the previous Friday (pp. 89, 98); Greeneville, Tenn., testimony of February 1977 (p. 53); a 1978 deposition Not in library. The nearest is the Burows deposition, Oct. 1977

Tape 1, 1:25 to 2:57

Slice: kotin-depo-1-part2.txt. Speakers inferred. Library = D:/Obsidian/ACL/AsbestosClaims.Law/Library. Only notes actually read are cited.

Russell's 1932 Wisconsin conference address shows an asbestos pipe restorer with compensated asbestosis (p. 180) (1:25:38)

  • Said by: Motley (question, read by Kotin)
  • On the recording: "his occupation is that of cleaning and restoring the asbestos on pipes in one of our government hospitals ... he has fibrosis of the lung ... the government compensated him for it"
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (as a document); the citation is confirmed. Confidence: medium
  • The documents: Reading Castleman, Chapter 5 - Asbestos Product Use. Castleman p. 324 lists "Russell, Proceedings of Conference Concerning Effects of Dusts Upon the Respiratory System (held by the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin: p. 180), Democrat Press, 1932" among the early reports of disease from product use. Chapter 4 (note 271) dates the conference to Nov. 16–17, 1932. We do not hold the proceedings. The transcript's "Bureau of Mines" could not be checked; Castleman does not give Russell's affiliation.

Dr. O. A. Sander was connected with the Asbestos Textile Institute (1:28:48)

The Seventh Saranac Symposium (1952) was "the symposium on occupational cancer," and J-M attended (1:30:11)

  • Said by: Motley (question). Kotin remembers being invited to a Saranac cancer symposium. On whether anyone from J-M attended, he said he hadn't looked.
  • On the recording: "do you recall that the seventh saranac symposium was the symposium that was on occupational cancer ... Do you see the name of anybody from Johns-Manville Corporation there?"
  • Verdict: Qualified. Confidence: high
  • The documents: Program of the Seventh Saranac Symposium (1952), Sept. 22–26, 1952. Cancer was one session, not the whole symposium: the morning of Sept. 24 "was given to 'Pneumoconiosis and Pulmonary Cancer'", and "The last two days dealt with workmen's compensation." Seventh Saranac Symposium, Session on Pneumoconiosis and Pulmonary Cancer ... (1952) shows J-M did attend: "The register lists Smith at J-M's New York address." J-M's own chronology adds "Travelers, Metropolitan, Liberty Mutual, J-M and others attended", and Merewether reported 16.2% lung cancer in British asbestosis deaths. The program lists insurers as participants, which fits Motley's question about corporations.

Dr. DuBow was a J-M plant physician; Kenneth Smith was J-M's medical director (attendees at the 1955 McIntyre-Saranac conference, K-26) (1:42:40)

  • Said by: Motley (question). Kotin did not know DuBow; he confirmed Smith.
  • On the recording: "Do you know Dr. Dubeau is the plant physician of Johns-Manville? I did not."
  • Verdict: Supported for the roles. NOT IN LIBRARY for the 1955 attendance list. Confidence: high (roles)
  • The documents: Dr. David T. DuBow to Dr. Kenneth W. Smith on the Manville Plant's "No Dust" List (1956), 1956-02-01. The note describes DuBow as "of the Medical Department at J-M's Manville, New Jersey, plant", writing to "Dr. Kenneth W. Smith at headquarters". Many 1950s notes call Smith "Johns-Manville's medical director". The name in the transcript, "Dubeau", is DuBow.

J-M's Thermobestos was a calcium silicate insulation containing asbestos (1:36:53)

McLaughlin's "The Dust Diseases in Great Britain" (Archives of Industrial Health, 1955) says asbestosis was appearing in workers lagging pipes and boilers (K-28) (1:40:15)

  • Said by: Motley (question; Kotin read the passage)
  • On the recording: "cases of asbestosis however are now appearing in workers who do asbestos lagging of pipes and boilers"
  • Verdict: Supported that the article exists and is in our research catalog. The quoted sentence was not checked. Confidence: medium
  • The documents: Reading Castleman, Chapter 5 cites "McLaughlin, A.I.G. The Dust Diseases in Great Britain. Arch. Industr. Health 12:83-98 (1955)", which matches the page 83 the witness found. The catalog page is The Dust Diseases In Great Britain.

Sir Thomas Legge's Industrial Maladies (1934) discusses asbestosis at p. 190 (K-29) (1:43:56)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed)
  • On the recording: "this is entitled industrial maladies ... that's dated 19 and 34 ... page 190 of that 1934 textbook ... a discussion of the disease asbestos"
  • Verdict: Supported. Confidence: high
  • The documents: Reading Castleman, Chapter 1, note 46: "Legge, T. Asbestosis. Industrial Maladies. London: Oxford University Press, 1934, pp. 190-194." K-16 is also confirmed as a real book: Castleman, Chapter 10, note 68, "Hazlett, T.L. (ed.) Introduction to Industrial Medicine. Chicago ... 1947."

Kotin joined J-M on June 1, 1974 (1:46:06)

Selikoff's data: over 11% of insulation workers die of mesothelioma (1:54:29)

  • Said by: Motley (question). Kotin: "In his data, yes sir."
  • On the recording: "Selikoff's statistics that over 11 percent of insulation workers die of mesothelioma"
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (for the 11% figure). Confidence: medium
  • The documents: Our only Selikoff cohort paper is the 1964 one, which reports far fewer: Selikoff, Churg and Hammond, "Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia" (1964). Of 255 deaths, "four died of mesothelioma". The 11% must come from Selikoff's later follow-up, which we do not hold.

Hueper's 1942 book discussed asbestos and lung cancer; his reviews put asbestos workers in a carcinogenic environment (1:54:47)

  • Said by: Motley (question). Kotin agreed, qualifying that Hueper was "comprehensive and of uneven quality."
  • On the recording: "Dr. Hueper's 1942 book in which he discussed asbestos and lung cancer ... all asbestos workers were in an environment where there was a carcinogen there"
  • Verdict: Supported (J-M's files show J-M knew of Hueper's cancer writing by 1950). Confidence: medium
  • The documents: Kenneth W. Smith to C. M. McGaw on Dr. Lanza's Lung Cancer Study Contract (1950), 1950-08-31. J-M's doctor wrote: "I fail to see how they can find anything more unfavorable than that which already has been published by Merewether and Hueper." Also E. L. Collis, Abstract of W. C. Hueper's "Environmental Lung Cancer" (1951): "Asbestos is another dust which has been condemned in relation to cancer." The 1942 book is not itself a library note.

Wagner's mesothelioma paper (given at the 1959 Johannesburg conference, published early 1960); most cases were not asbestos workers (1:56:36)

Wagner's case 30 was a boilermaker who lagged pipes; the 1961 Sleggs/Wagner follow-up included three insulators (Exhibits 31/32) (2:00:43)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed)
  • On the recording: "he had worked continuously with asbestos lagging pipes and boilers ... three of our patients were employed in this way"
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (detail). Confidence: medium
  • The documents: The 1960 note does not discuss individual occupations. We have no note for the 1961 Sleggs, Marchand and Wagner paper.

A company medical director should have known of Doll's 1955 study and Wagner's 1960 study (2:03:26)

Selikoff's 1963 paper (JAMA, Exhibit 33) found more lung cancer, asbestosis and mesothelioma in insulators. It was read at the AMA convention in Atlantic City on June 17, 1963, and published in April 1964. (2:04:22)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed; Kotin supplied "published in april of 64")
  • On the recording: "was that paper not read at the annual convention of the american medical association in june of 1963 yes that was published in april of 64"
  • Verdict: Qualified (small detail). Confidence: high
  • The documents: Selikoff, Churg and Hammond, "Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia" (1964). The paper was "read before the American College of Chest Physicians in Atlantic City on June 17, 1963, and published in the Journal of the American Medical Association on April 6, 1964." It reported "forty-five died of cancer of the lung or pleura, whereas only 6.6 such deaths were expected." It was the College of Chest Physicians, meeting in Atlantic City; J-M's own chronology calls that body "of the AMA." The industry knew of the paper beforehand: ATI Air Hygiene and Manufacturing Committee Minutes on Selikoff's Study ... (1963), 1963-06-06, with J-M's C. L. Sheckler present: "admittedly it will be damaging to the industry."

Mancuso reported (c. 1962) a study of an asbestos product manufacturing company (2:05:00)

  • Said by: Motley (question). Kotin: Mancuso did work in the 60s "on a variety of things."
  • On the recording: "are you familiar with the paper he reported in 1962 of a study of an asbestos product manufacturing company"
  • Verdict: Qualified. J-M's files show J-M's medical director heard Mancuso's findings in 1961. Confidence: medium
  • The documents: Dr. Kenneth W. Smith to C. W. Hite on Asbestos and Cancer for the Division Managers' Meeting (1961), 1961-06-19. At a Washington meeting, "Dr. Thomas Mancuso reported '19 cases of lung cancer among 31 people who had asbestosis' at a brake lining plant." Smith called it "a phenomenally high incidence."

Exhibit 34: Mancuso, Philip Carey's consulting medical director, wrote to the plant manager on May 23, 1963, about "a national awareness" of asbestos and lung cancer and mesothelioma (2:07:20)

  • Said by: Motley (question; Kotin confirmed the text)
  • On the recording: "a national awareness is developing relative to the potential and harmful harmful effects of asbestos ... showing a strong association between asbestos and lung cancer and mesothelioma of the pleura and peritoneum"
  • Verdict: Supported. Confidence: high
  • The documents: Dr. Thomas F. Mancuso to L. J. Knippa of Philip Carey on Asbestos Hazards and Research (1963), 1963-05-23. The note quotes "a national awareness is developing" and "showing a strong association between asbestos and lung cancer and mesothelioma (cancer) of the pleura and peritoneum". Mancuso signs as consulting medical director. The plant manager was L. J. Knippa of Lockland, Cincinnati, not "Canepa" as in the transcript. The note also confirms the recommendation for "guidance manuals and technical help for customers."

A Washington meeting of asbestos industry representatives with the U.S. Public Health Service on asbestos and cancer, "over one year" before May 1963 (2:10:46)

  • Said by: Motley (question). Kotin: there were several meetings, and he doesn't recall the date.
  • On the recording: "was a meeting in 1962 in Washington with members of representatives of the asbestos industry and the U.S. Public Health Service with respect to asbestos and cancer? There were several meetings."
  • Verdict: Qualified. J-M's files show the meeting was in 1961 and that J-M's medical director reported on it. Confidence: high
  • The documents: Dr. Kenneth W. Smith to C. W. Hite ... (1961) describes "a Washington meeting called by Dr. Harold Magnuson of the U.S. Public Health Service." It ended in "an unanimous decision that a problem exists in the asbestos industry." Smith also brought the matter to the ATI: ATI Air Hygiene Committee Minutes on a Public Health Service Cancer Survey (1961), 1961-06-08.

Did Philip Carey approach J-M in 1963 about an inter-industry safe practices manual? Kotin: "No, I did not" (see one in J-M's records) (2:14:05)

  • Said by: Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "did you see anywhere where Philip Carey had contacted Johns-Manville in respect to an inter-industry-wide safe practices manual in 1963? No, I did not."
  • Verdict: Not in the Library. Confidence: medium
  • The documents: We found no Philip Carey–J-M correspondence on a manual.

No safe practices manual before NIMA's in 1969 (2:14:22)

Exhibits 35/36: Mancuso's August 15, 1963 letter and his September 23, 1963 "Occupational Health Program" for Philip Carey, with the subcontractor-payroll recommendation (2:15:46)

  • Said by: Motley (question; Kotin agreed with the readings)
  • On the recording: "discontinue the practice of placing on philip carey's payroll employees of subcontractors ... because of the occupational disease liability"
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (as documents); the citations are confirmed. Confidence: high
  • The documents: Reading Castleman, Chapter 3, notes 186 and 188: "Mancuso, T.F., letter to L.J. Knippa, August 15, 1963" and "'The Philip Carey Manufacturing Company Occupational Health Program,' September 23, 1963 (11 pages)." A J-M parallel: Dr. Kenneth W. Smith to H. O. Blackburn of Pine Bluff Arsenal on 85% Magnesia (1959). J-M's medical director said he had no injury records for installers because "People who use this material are employees of subcontractors and not this company."

The industry's IHF lung cancer study (Braun and Truan) gave companies a basis to deny asbestos–lung cancer, despite weaknesses (2:21:47)

  • Said by: Motley (Q reading Mancuso). Kotin identified it as "the Braun and Truan study" and later said Dreessen, "unlike the Braun and Truan study, identified all the shortcomings."
  • On the recording: "provided a basis for the companies to argue against this recognition of asbestos and lung cancer ... I guess it refers to the Braun and Truan study."
  • Verdict: Supported. J-M's files show J-M shaped the published version. The $40,000 cost is not in the library. Confidence: high
  • The documents: Daniel C. Braun and T. David Truan, An Epidemiological Study of Lung Cancer in Asbestos Miners (1958). The published conclusions "leave out two of the report's": that miners with asbestosis had more lung cancer, and that smoking mattered more. The note continues: "Johns-Manville's Dr. Kenneth Smith and Hugh Jackson had accepted a condensed text with all references to asbestosis and lung cancer deleted." J-M's own chronology: "(Published as approved by J-M.)" Mancuso's view of the study is also in the May 1963 letter: the "negative" conclusion "is not really justified."

The asbestos TLV was 5 mppcf "from 1938 on to the late 1960s" (2:25:44)

  • Said by: Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "historically it was 5 million particles per cubic feet from 1938 on to the late 1960s"
  • Verdict: Qualified. Confidence: high
  • The documents:

Kotin was personally unaware of the Dreessen study until he joined the government (1959/60) (2:26:36)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed)
  • On the recording: "you were personally unaware of Dr. Dreessen's study until you went with the government sometime either in 1959 or 1960. Correct."
  • Verdict: Qualified. This is his personal knowledge, but J-M's files show J-M had it from 1938. Confidence: high
  • The documents: Bronson Batchelor to Vandiver Brown on the Public Health Service Asbestosis Study (1938), 1938-09-09: "Within weeks of its publication in August 1938, its appearance ... was being passed to J-M's attorney."

Did any asbestos maker try, 1938–64, to find the level at which disease would not appear? Kotin: "I'm unaware" (2:27:32)

  • Said by: Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "any attempt to determine the level at which disease would not appear in workers exposed to asbestos i'm unaware"
  • Verdict: Qualified. J-M's files show such studies were proposed to the industry and rejected. Confidence: high
  • The documents:

The only dust study of insulation and shipyard workers before 1964 was Fleischer's in 1946 (2:27:44)

No asbestos company gave a warning label or other communication to insulation workers, 1938–1964 (2:29:18)

  • Said by: Motley (question). Kotin: no knowledge of any.
  • On the recording: "do you know of any warning label or any communication by any asbestos company between the years 1938 and 1964 to insulation workers"
  • Verdict: Supported. J-M's files show J-M considered labels and decided against them. Confidence: high
  • The documents:

"There's no way for a worker to know that what he's breathing is dangerous unless he's told" (2:30:08)

The 5 mppcf limit counted all particles, and any reasonable reading of Dreessen would conclude so (2:31:26)

  • Said by: Motley (question). Kotin: "That is correct" / "I would have assumed that."
  • On the recording: "the threshold limit value of five million particles per cubic foot ... counted all particles? Asbestos, Kotin, rock, or any other substance ... That is correct."
  • Verdict: Supported as to Dreessen. J-M's files show J-M itself read the limit the other way. Confidence: high
  • The documents:
    • Dr. Kenneth Smith to Detroit Edison Company on Thermobestos ... (1959). J-M's medical director told a customer that "dust levels approaching 50 million particles per cubic foot would not contain an excessive amount of asbestos fibre." The note comments that this "allowed ten times the asbestos figure."
    • J-M's chronology entry on Fleischer 1946: "'Total dust counts' were above TLV but 'asbestos counts' were within TLV."
    • "Kotin fibers" in the transcript is "cotton fibers".

Dreessen's study had few long-exposed workers and called its 5 mppcf limit tentative (2:34:47)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed)
  • On the recording: "Dr. Dreessen's conclusions were set forth to be tentative until more comprehensive data could come along"
  • Verdict: Supported. Confidence: high
  • The documents: Dreessen and Others ... (1938). The study says the figure "may be regarded tentatively as the threshold value ... until better data are available," and cautions "that very few workers had long exposure at low levels." Hemeon (1947) also pointed out "abnormally few" workers exposed for more than 15 years.

About 150 workers were discharged before the Dreessen study; 43 of the 69 examined had asbestosis (2:42:01)

  • Said by: Motley (Q reading Dreessen p. 93; Kotin agreed)
  • On the recording: "only 69 could be examined 43 of whom had asbestosis"
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (detail). Confidence: medium
  • The documents: Our Dreessen note does not cover the discharged workers.

Asbestos companies "monitored their work populations," but Kotin knows of no structured studies 1938–64 (2:39:43)

  • Said by: Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "Well, they monitored their population, their work populations. Did they set up studies, a structured study? I'm unaware of any."
  • Verdict: Qualified. Confidence: high
  • The documents: J-M's files show the monitoring was kept from the workers and never reached insulators.

The critique of the U.S. asbestos TLV ("Mr. Shaw") was given at the New York Academy of Sciences in October 1964 (Exhibit 38) (2:48:13)

  • Said by: Motley (question, Kotin agreed)
  • On the recording: "Present Threshold Limit Value in the United States for Asbestos Dust, a Critique ... Do you know Mr. Shaw?"
  • Verdict: Supported. The author is E. L. Schall, not "Shaw". Confidence: high
  • The documents: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences (journal index) lists "Present threshold limit value in the U.S.A. for asbestos dust: a critique. E.L. Schall. 1965;132(1):316-21." Pages 316 onward match the transcript. Catalog page: /library/research/present-threshold-limit-value-in-the-u-s-a-for-asbestos-dust-a

Nothing before Schall criticized the TLV for lack of long-term, low-level data, and the industry never had a study critiquing the TLV (2:50:54)

  • Said by: Kotin (answering): "i'm not aware" / "I'm unaware"
  • On the recording: "aware of anything ... before mr shaw's critique criticizing the threshold limit value ... i'm not aware do you know whether or not the asbestos industry ever had a study conducted for it critiquing the threshold ... i'm unaware"
  • Verdict: Contradicted (as to the industry and J-M). Confidence: high
  • The documents: W. C. L. Hemeon, Report of Preliminary Dust Investigation for the ATI (1947), 1947-06-18. This was done for the industry's trade group, and J-M's own chronology calls it the "First significant challenge to TLV." It noted "effects of long term low exposures (implicit criticism of Dreessen)" and was "Copied to J-M and other IHF members but not publicly distributed." Hemeon wrote that 5 mppcf "does not positively insure" against asbestosis. This is the same report Motley shows next as Exhibit 37. It was not in the published literature, which keeps Kotin's literature answer literally true.

The Hemeon/IHF report is dated June 1947; ATI members included J-M, Raybestos-Manhattan, Union Asbestos & Rubber, and Southern Asbestos (2:52:14)

  • Said by: Motley (question). Kotin agreed except on Southern Asbestos, which he didn't remember.
  • On the recording: "this report bears the date june 1947 ... john's bamba was a member ... union asbestos and rubber company was a member ... southern asbestos company was a member"
  • Verdict: Supported. Confidence: high
  • The documents: Hemeon note dated 1947-06-18. Minutes of the Organization Meeting of the ATI (1944) lists "Johns-Manville, Raybestos-Manhattan, Keasbey & Mattison, Union Asbestos & Rubber." ATI Minutes on Dr. Vestal's Health Program (1946) has "George S. Fabel of Southern Asbestos" presenting the health plan.

Only five ATI plants had X-rayed workers; one survey showed about 3%, and two plants about 20%, with asbestosis (2:54:54)

  • Said by: Motley (Q reading Exhibit 37; Kotin agreed it was a health hazard)
  • On the recording: "only five plants have had any medical x-ray surveys of employees ... Two other plants appear to have about twenty percent of the employees affected"
  • Verdict: Supported. Confidence: high
  • The documents: Hemeon (1947): "Only five plants had ever X-rayed their workers ... two plants appeared to have about 20 percent of their employees affected." The note adds that a margin note marks "Plant H, which found five or six early cases a year, as J-M." The 3% figure is not in our note.

Dr. Lanza recommended X-ray surveillance of asbestos workers "back in 1945" (2:55:06)

  • Said by: Motley (question). Kotin: "I do"
  • On the recording: "Do you remember that Dr. Lanza back in 1945 recommended x-ray surveillance of asbestos workers i do" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Qualified. The library has the recommendation in 1935, not 1945. Confidence: medium
  • The documents: Lanza, McConnell and Fehnel ... (1935), 1935-01-04, recommends a chest X-ray "preferably every year, but at least every 2 years." Motley also says "Lanza's study back in 1934"; J-M reviewed the galley in late 1934 and it was published in January 1935. "1945" is probably a mishearing of "1935".

In 1948 Kotin thought the asbestos problem was being handled ("being studied ... by the Saranac people") (2:56:36)

  • Said by: Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "It was being studied, as you pointed out yourself, by the Saranac people and others as well."
  • Verdict: Qualified. J-M's files show that in 1948 J-M and the other sponsors cut the cancer findings from the Saranac report. Confidence: high
  • The documents: Vandiver Brown to W. T. Kelly of American Brake Shoe on Deleting Cancer from the Saranac Report (1948), 1948-11-12: "the references to cancer and tumors should be deleted and this is a point we will insist upon." The draft had reported pulmonary tumors in 9 of 11 mice.

Exhibits identified

Exhibit Description in deposition Library match
K-3 Dreessen, USPHS 1938 asbestos textile study Dreessen and Others (1938)
K-16 Hazlett (ed.), Introduction to Industrial Medicine, 1947 Not held; cited in Castleman Ch. 10 n. 68
(unnumbered) Proceedings, Conference on Effects of Dust upon the Respiratory System, Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 1932 (Russell p. 180) Not held; cited in Castleman Ch. 5 p. 324
K-25 Saranac symposium attendance lists from 1952, incl. the Seventh Symposium Probably Program of the Seventh Saranac Symposium (1952) (Motley 1013) and/or the session transcript with the register, Seventh Saranac Symposium Session ... (1952)
K-26 Attendee list, McIntyre-Saranac Conference, Feb. 7–9, 1955 (DuBow, Smith of J-M) Not in library
K-27 Transactions, McIntyre-Saranac Conference (1955) Not held. Its contents (McLaughlin p. 83; a hydrous calcium silicate paper) match A.M.A. Archives of Industrial Health vol. 12 (1955), where both McLaughlin (12:83-98) and Schepers et al. (12:348-360) appeared
K-28 McLaughlin, "The Dust Diseases in Great Britain," Arch. Ind. Health 1955 Research catalog: The Dust Diseases In Great Britain
K-29 Legge, Industrial Maladies, 1934, p. 190 Not held; cited in Castleman Ch. 1 n. 46
K-30 Kotin's statement for EPA's Office of Hazardous Materials Control, Nov. 12, 1973 Not in library
Exh. 31 Wagner, Sleggs and Marchand 1960 (case 30, p. 267) Wagner, Sleggs and Marchand (1960)
Exh. 32 Sleggs, Marchand and Wagner follow-up, Jan. 1961 Not in library
Exh. 33 (once misnumbered 27) Selikoff, "Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia" Selikoff, Churg and Hammond (1964)
K-34 Mancuso to Knippa ("Canepa"), May 23, 1963 Dr. Thomas F. Mancuso to L. J. Knippa ... (1963)
K-35 Mancuso to Knippa, Aug. 15, 1963 Not held; Castleman Ch. 3 n. 186
K-36 Mancuso, "Philip Carey Manufacturing Company Occupational Health Program," Sept. 23, 1963 Not held; Castleman Ch. 3 n. 188
Exh. 37 IHF / Hemeon, Report of Preliminary Dust Investigation for the ATI, June 1947 W. C. L. Hemeon ... (1947)
Exh. 38 Schall ("Shaw"), "Present Threshold Limit Value in the U.S.A. for Asbestos Dust: A Critique," Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 132 (1965) 316 Research catalog, /library/research/present-threshold-limit-value-in-the-u-s-a-for-asbestos-dust-a
(K-10, K-11) Lanza's book, Hueper 1942 (earlier in the tape) Outside this slice

Tape 1, 2:57 to 4:18

Slice covers: the 1951 Vorwald/Waukegan letter, the 1947 Hemeon report for the Asbestos Textile Institute and what the ATI did with it, the 1946 Fleischer-Drinker shipyard study, George Wright, the 1956 Frost (Danish insulators) study, Saranac animal work, the Owens-Illinois Kaylo file, Schepers 1955, the 1955 J-M president's speech, labels, and Kotin's dating of knowledge that insulators got asbestosis.

J. P. Woodard later became president of Johns-Manville (2:58:16)

  • Said by: Motley (question); Kotin did not know ("I think he was president in the 1950s, but I could stand to be corrected")
  • On the recording: "Did you know, did you didn't know that he later became president of John's Manor?" / "I think he was president in the 1950s, but I could stand to be correct." (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: No note calls Woodard president. Seward E. Miller of the Public Health Service to J. P. Woodard on the Diatomaceous Earth Study (1952) — 1952-07-15 — calls him "Johns-Manville's director of personnel policies." In 1955 and 1957 the president was A. R. Fisher (A. R. Fisher's President's Bulletin… (1957)). Kotin's "1950s" guess is not supported by anything we hold.

Vorwald was director of the Trudeau Foundation and the Saranac Laboratory (2:58:26)

  • Said by: Kotin (A, reading the letterhead)
  • On the recording: "I'm the signature director of the Trudeau Foundation and the Sarat Laboratory."
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Arthur J. Vorwald to J. P. Woodard on Asbestosis at the Waukegan Plant (1951) — 1951-04-17 — "from Dr. Arthur J. Vorwald, director of the Trudeau Foundation and the Saranac Laboratory, to J. P. Woodard of Johns-Manville."

Kotin had never seen the Vorwald letter in J-M's files (2:58:33)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed ("Never." / "No, sir.")
  • On the recording: "Have you seen this letter, Father, today? Never. It's not in the any files of John's Mammal that you've ever seen. No, sir."
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
  • The documents: This is about Kotin personally, but J-M's files held the letter. J-M's own chronology records it: "In a letter of 4/17/51, Vorwald advises Woodard he 'was astounded' to find 64 asbestosis 'cases' at Waukegan J-M plant, urges improvement in plant hygiene." (Vorwald to Woodard (1951)). It was addressed to J-M headquarters.

Dr. Samuel L. Keller was the plant physician at J-M's Waukegan plant and brought X-rays to Saranac (2:59:44)

  • Said by: Motley (question); Kotin did not know Keller
  • On the recording: "He was a plant physician at the Johns Manor Waukegan, Illinois plant."
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Dr. Samuel L. Keller of Waukegan to Arthur J. Vorwald on His Visit to Saranac (1951) — 1951-04-13 — written on J-M Products Corporation letterhead from Waukegan, thanking Vorwald for viewing "our chest films" and inviting him to see the J-M plant, "the manufacturer of asbestosis and silicosis as produced in Waukegan." J-M's chronology calls Keller the "Waukegan Plant related physician."

Vorwald was "astounded" by the asbestosis on X-rays of about 64 Waukegan employees and urged cleanup "before irresponsible agents stimulate action" (3:00:00)

  • Said by: Motley (question, reading the letter); Kotin agreed it says that
  • On the recording: "approximately 64 employees in the plant… I was astounded with the number of cases presenting x-ray evidence of asbestosis… improve the plant conditions before irresponsible agents stimulate action which might reflect unfavorably on the industry"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Vorwald to Woodard (1951) — 1951-04-17 — "was astounded with the number of cases presenting roentgenographic evidence of asbestosis"; "serious enough to warrant your most considered attention"; "to improve the plant conditions before irresponsible agents stimulate action which might reflect unfavorably on the industry." (Motley read "roentgenographic" as "x-ray"; meaning unchanged.)

Hemeon (1947): keeping dust under 5 million particles "does not positively ensure" against asbestosis after a long working life (3:01:19)

  • Said by: Motley (question, reading K-37); Kotin agreed it says that
  • On the recording: "dust elimination to this extent does not positively ensure that no asbestosis will develop in some workers after a long working life, greater than 20 to 25 years."
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: W. C. L. Hemeon, Report of Preliminary Dust Investigation for the Asbestos Textile Institute (1947) — 1947-06-18 — Hemeon warned that keeping dust under the limit "does not positively insure" that workers won't get asbestosis after a long working life. J-M's chronology calls it the "First significant challenge to TLV."

Hemeon looked at ten plants; the 1938 Dreessen study covered only four (3:04:23)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed ("I'm unaware of any"; "yeah" to four)
  • On the recording: "including the Dreessen study, where somebody looked at ten plants at one time? … and Dr. Dreessen only covered four didn't it yeah" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Dreessen and Others, A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry (1938) — 1938-08 — "The authors measured the dust in three plants and examined 541 workers." That is three plants, not four. The note doesn't count Hemeon's plants. The transcript reads them as A through J, so ten fits.

Five of Hemeon's ten plants took no X-rays, and only one took periodic X-rays (3:05:50)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed
  • On the recording: "one, two, three, four, five of the plants don't even do x-rays today… only one of the plants had periodic x-rays made. One out of ten."
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Hemeon report (1947) — "Only five plants had ever X-rayed their workers." The note doesn't confirm "only one with periodic X-rays." That needs Table 2 of the PDF.

In 1935 Lanza (transcript: "Lambert") recommended periodic X-rays (3:06:10)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed ("He recommended it.")
  • On the recording: "And Dr. Lambert, back in 1935, said that's what you're supposed to do is have x-rays, periodic x-rays" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high (assuming "Lambert" is Lanza))
  • The documents: Lanza, McConnell and Fehnel, "Effects of the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers" (1935) — 1935-01-04 — recommended a chest X-ray "preferably every year, but at least every 2 years." J-M's own chronology adds: "Recommended frequent X-rays (1 to 2 year maximum) [not adopted]."

The one plant with periodic X-rays was J-M's (3:06:17)

  • Said by: Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "Doctor, do you know whose plant that was? Johns-Manville." / "The other nine didn't have any… Johns-Manville did."
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: low)
  • The documents: The Hemeon report note records "a margin note marks Plant H, which found five or six early cases a year, as J-M." The note doesn't say Plant H was the one plant with periodic X-rays, so check the PDF's Table 2. J-M's own chronology says Lanza's 1935 X-ray recommendation was "[not adopted]" (Lanza 1935), which sits uneasily with Kotin's answer.

Plants A and J had about 20% asbestosis; J-M's Plant H found five or six early cases a year among 300 textile workers (3:07:11)

  • Said by: Motley (question, reading p. 15), Kotin agreed it says that
  • On the recording: "plan a has recorded cases diagnosed as asbestosis to the extent of about 20 percent… Plant H… finds five or six cases annually that the physician believes show early changes due to asbestos."
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Hemeon report (1947) — "two plants appeared to have about 20 percent of their employees affected by asbestosis"; "a margin note marks Plant H, which found five or six early cases a year, as J-M." The note doesn't confirm Motley's suggestion that Plant A was Manheim (Raybestos), and Kotin said he couldn't read the scribble.

Hemeon urged periodic medical and X-ray exams, a diagnostic panel and a statistical study of medical records: "a step-by-step program aimed at the elimination of asbestosis" (3:11:39)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed
  • On the recording: "This is a step-by-step program aimed at the elimination of asbestosis cases from the plants of Asbestos Textile Institute members"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Hemeon report (1947) — "He proposed periodic medical examinations, a diagnostic panel to read X-rays, and a study of existing records… The report ends by calling this a program 'aimed at the elimination of asbestosis cases' from members' plants."

Hemeon: the Public Health Service (Dreessen) study of about 500 workers had "abnormally few" exposed more than 15 years (3:15:10)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed it was the same criticism Shaw made in 1964
  • On the recording: "among the 500 odd workers who composed the subjects in the u.s public health service study there were abnormally few who had been exposed for more than 15 years"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Hemeon report (1947) — "Hemeon pointed out that the study had 'abnormally few' workers exposed more than 15 years." The Dreessen 1938 note gives 541 workers and says the study itself was "cautioning that very few workers had long exposure at low levels."

Hemeon: the information "does not permit complete assurance that 5 million is thoroughly safe" (3:17:51)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed
  • On the recording: "The information available does not permit complete assurance that 5 million… is thoroughly safe"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Hemeon report (1947) — the same words are quoted: "does not permit complete assurance that five million is thoroughly safe."

Hemeon used an electron microscope in 1947 (3:19:22)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed ("he has an electron microscope way back in 1947")
  • On the recording: "mr heenan had an electron microscope… he used an electron microscope in this report didn't he"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Hemeon report (1947) — "Electron microscope pictures taken in a well-controlled card room showed many fibers up to 50 microns long but so thin they were 'invisible in the dust counting microscope.'" That bears directly on Motley's point that dust counts mostly measured non-fibrous dust (the 80–95% figure at 3:18:36 is not in the note).

/ [3:21:19] / [3:25:06] The industry did not follow up on Hemeon's program; the ATI rejected the dust study (3:16:41)

  • Said by: Motley (question). Kotin said he was "unaware of any" follow-up, then agreed the minutes show the study was rejected
  • On the recording: "do you know whether or not the asbestos textile institute followed through on mr Hemeon's recommendation… i'm unaware of any" / "Does it not indicate that the study was rejected? Yes." (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Asbestos Textile Institute General Meeting Minutes (June 1948) — 1948-06-17 — the Air Hygiene Committee's program "has not received the necessary approval" in a poll of members. The Hemeon report note records a cover note on ATI meetings of November 1947 and June 1948 "rejecting dust study proposal." Later refusals go further than Motley's question: in 1955 the ATI called a Saranac autopsy study "ill-advised at this time due to its implication that a relationship existed between asbestosis and carcinogenic development" (ATI Minutes Calling an Autopsy Study Ill-Advised (1955)). A 1956 IHF lung-cancer study proposal, copied to J-M's Dr. K. Smith, got no decision (IHF Proposed Epidemiological Study… (1956)). J-M sat at these meetings, so J-M's files show the rejection even though Kotin personally didn't know.

K-40/41: ATI Air Hygiene Committee minutes, November 19, 1947: Hemeon's program proposed (3:22:16)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed it was "substantially" the June 1947 program
  • On the recording: "the minutes of the Air Hygiene Committee of the Asbestos Textile Institute, November 19, 1947… Mr. Hemion of the Industrial Hygiene Foundation proposes the following program."
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Asbestos Textile Institute Air Hygiene Committee Minutes on the Industrial Hygiene Foundation Program (1947) — 1947-11-19 — the committee recommended a first-year program "proposed by Mr. Hemeon" costing no more than $5,000. Not raised in the deposition: one listed advantage was that medical authority "might be extremely valuable for purposes of testimony on specific cases."

K-41: ATI general meeting, June 17, 1948, attended by J-M and Raybestos-Manhattan (3:23:32)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed ("On the list of attendees")
  • On the recording: "K-41, which is the minutes of the general meeting of the Asbestos Textile Institute, June 17, 1948… representatives from John's Mammal and Red Vestas Manhattan were there?" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: ATI General Meeting Minutes (June 1948) — 1948-06-17 — "Representatives of Johns-Manville, Keasbey & Mattison, Raybestos-Manhattan, Union Asbestos & Rubber and other members attended." ("Fred Walkum" at 3:23:58 is not identified in the note.)

The 5 million particle limit "was in effect from 1938 to 1968" (3:26:59)

  • Said by: Motley (question, as premise); Kotin did not dispute it
  • On the recording: "the threshold limit value of 5 million particles per cubic foot that was in effect from 1938 to 1968"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Dreessen 1938 proposed 5 mppcf only "tentatively… until better data are available." The ACGIH formally adopted it on 1947-04-26 (ACGIH Adopts Its 1947 Limits), and the note says it "stayed in use for asbestos until the 1970s." So 1938 is the proposal date, not an official limit. The 1968 end date isn't in the notes I read.

No asbestos company told workers before 1964 to change clothes so they wouldn't bring dust home (3:28:31)

The 1947 Hemeon report was never published, and Kotin had never seen it (3:29:04)

  • Said by: Motley (question); Kotin: "I've never seen it."
  • On the recording: "That has never been published in the literature, has it? I've never seen it."
  • Verdict: Supported (not published), and J-M's files held it (confidence: high)
  • The documents: J-M's chronology entry in the Hemeon report note reads: "Copied to J-M and other IHF members but not publicly distributed. First significant challenge to TLV." A copy is also in the Sumner Simpson Papers (Cilley to Simpson (1947)).

The Fleischer study (1946) was of shipyard workers; the 5 mppcf limit had been "in effect" for eight years (3:29:55)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed
  • On the recording: "the flasher study was a study of shipyard workers wasn't it yes sir… five million particles per cubic foot of total dust have been in effect for Eight years when that study was running"
  • Verdict: Supported (study), QUALIFIED (the "eight years") (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Fleischer, Viles, Gade and Drinker, "A Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels" (1946) — 1946-01 — 1,074 pipe coverers at Navy and contract yards. The 5 mppcf figure was only a 1938 PHS suggestion for textile plants until ACGIH adopted it in 1947 (see the ACGIH note above).

The Fleischer study was not in J-M's medical-library bibliography compiled under Kotin (K-42); Kotin read it only after joining the government (3:31:52)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed
  • On the recording: "tell the jury whether the flasher study was found in the medical articles of john samuel after you got here… it's not included"
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (the bibliography) (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: We don't hold the K-42 bibliography. J-M's own later chronology does list the study ("first study of workers using asbestos-containing products… 'Total dust counts' were above TLV but 'asbestos counts' were within TLV"; Fleischer-Drinker 1946).

Most of the Fleischer shipyard dust counts were above the 5 million limit (band saw 15.1, 39.5, 73+, 84…) (3:33:06–3:35:51)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed for each figure; added that time-weighted averages allow occasional peaks
  • On the recording: "cutting with the band saw 15.1 that's above it… 39.5 that's eight times above it… 73 plus that's astronomical" / "so 10 were below and 90 were above yes sir" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Fleischer-Drinker 1946 — "band saw cutting, cement mixing and installation on board ship produced total dust well above the 5 million particles per cubic foot," and "few workers wore respirators." This supports Motley on total dust. J-M's own chronology adds that "'asbestos counts' were within TLV," the nuance Kotin was reaching for (3:33:13). The "10 below, 90 above" is garbled; the earlier wording ("with three or four exceptions the 30-some-odd counts") suggests about 30 counts with 3 or 4 below.

George Wright was a J-M consultant in 1972 and testified at the OSHA asbestos hearings that 1930s–50s insulator exposures were grossly over the threshold (3:36:05)

  • Said by: Motley (question); Kotin knew Wright testified but not the details, and knew of no pre-1964 data to the contrary
  • On the recording: "dr george wright was a consultant to john's mammal back in 1972… are you aware that he testified that dust exposure for insulation workers in the 30s and 40s and 50s were grossly in excess of the threshold"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Wright's role is SUPPORTED: Dr. George W. Wright, Testimony at the Labor Department Hearing on the Asbestos Standard (1972) — 1972-03-16 — introduced by J-M's Pundsack as "our next testifier." He argued 5 f/cc was safe and noted insulation "cement mixing" peaks "as high as 75 fibers/cc." The notes don't contain the "grossly in excess" statement about the 1930s–50s, so check the 67-page transcript. Related: Wright to Cape Asbestos, 1975, on warnings to insulators: "In retrospect, one can see that we probably should have done it earlier" (Wright to Cross (1975)). J-M's own 1976 tests found 1960s-style Thermobestos sawing produced "18 to 28 times the 1965 dust limit" (Christensen to Markusson (1976)).

Frost (Danish Medical Bulletin, 1956): of 31 insulators with 20+ years, 9 had asbestosis and 19 had pleural changes; Kotin: "highly suspicious that asbestosis was a complication" (3:37:58)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed (about 30% incidence, "a significant amount of disease")
  • On the recording: "31 workers engaged for 20 years or more in different kinds of insulation works… Nine were found to have definite signs of pulmonary asbestosis… Nineteen showed abnormalities of the pleura"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Industrial Hygiene Digest, June 1957, with an Abstract on Asbestosis among Danish Insulation Workers (1957) — abstract 761 of Frost, Georg and Moller, Danish Medical Bulletin, November 1956: "Of 31 Danish insulation workers with more than 20 years' exposure, 22 had abnormalities, nine showed signs of asbestosis, and 19 had pleural changes"; "definitely points to an occupational origin." The dusts were "asbestos, kieselguhr, magnesia, glass wool and rock wool" (transcript "chisel glue" = kieselguhr).

K-45: the Industrial Hygiene Digest (June 1957) abstracted the Frost study, and IHF members received it (3:46:25)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed
  • On the recording: "K-45 is the Industrial Hygiene Digest, June 1957… abstract number 761… asbestosis with pleural calcification among insulation workers"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Industrial Hygiene Digest, June 1957 — "Abstract 761 summarized 'Asbestosis with Pleural Calcification among Insulation Workers'"; "this copy comes from Johns-Manville's files" (Motley document 99). J-M had the abstract in its own files.

Kotin dates knowledge that insulation and shipyard workers could get asbestosis to about 1963–64 ("between one and two decades") (4:15:08)

  • Said by: Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "the fact that insulation workers and shipyard workers could get sick from asbestosis has been known for decades? Approximately 1964-63, yeah."
  • Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
  • The documents: The library shows documented knowledge two decades earlier. U.S. Maritime Commission Conference… with Philip Drinker's Address (1942) — 1942-12-07 — Drinker: "we rather expect it to occur in shipyards, because we have seen asbestos being handled in installation work with little or no precautions" (in J-M's chronology). Dreessen and Fleischer, Asbestosis from Amosite Pipe Covering at Bath Iron Works (1944) — 1944-12-19 — 12 of 38 pipe coverers had significant X-ray changes, two with "well established asbestosis." Fleischer-Drinker 1946 found three cases. Frost 1956, abstracted in 1957, was in J-M's files (above). Yet in 1959 J-M's H. M. Jackson told the Long Beach Naval Shipyard he knew of "only two cases of asbestosis" from installing insulation (Jackson to Marr (1959)).

Saranac (Gardner, Vorwald, Schepers) were leading asbestos experts; Gardner and Cummings's animal tests showed asbestos caused asbestosis, at up to 138 million particles (3:49:01)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed
  • On the recording: "Dr. Gardner and Mr. Cummings… ran tests on animals… they concluded that asbestos caused asbestosis… from 6 million particles per cubic foot up to 138 million particles per cubic foot"
  • Verdict: Supported (with nuance) (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Saranac Laboratory, Asbestos Pneumoconiosis: Experimental Studies, Report to Johns-Manville (1949) — 1949-01-31 — asbestos produced lung fibrosis in guinea pigs, rats, cats and rabbits; "Typical asbestosis was produced in air averaging 138 million particles per cubic foot." Gardner and D. E. Cummings published "Studies on Experimental Pneumokoniosis VI: Inhalation of Asbestos Dust" in 1931 (Reading Castleman, ch. 1). Not raised: Gardner's 1939 interim report admitted "the anticipated results have not been realized" with finely ground fiber. The 1948 draft reported lung tumors in 9 of 11 mice, but they were dropped from the 1949 final report sent to J-M. The 14%-asbestos product, the 6 mppcf low end and the 2–4 year exposures are not in the notes I read.

Exhibit 46: 1955 speech by J-M's president (Fisher) on "Responsibility to the Consuming Public" and proper labeling (3:53:31)

  • Said by: Motley (question); Kotin read it and agreed products should be tested before sale
  • On the recording: "made by the president of Johns Mountain, back in 1955… industry has inspired to a very great extent the movement to label properly certain types of products that might harm the consumer"
  • Verdict: Supported (identity of speech) (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Reading Castleman, chapter 5 lists "A.R. Fisher, President of Johns-Manville Corporation, Address to Industrial Hygiene Foundation 20th Annual Meeting 1955," held in our research database as "The Economics of Industrial Health" (/library/research/the-economics-of-industrial-health). Fisher's presidency is confirmed by A. R. Fisher's President's Bulletin (1957). I did not verify the quoted wording.

Kotin: no asbestos insulation company tested its products for disease before selling them (3:56:04)

  • Said by: Motley (question); Kotin: "Any insulation company? No."
  • On the recording: "do you know of any tests that were run by any asbestos insulation company on their products… before they were sold? Any insulation company? No."
  • Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Motley's next exhibits show it. U. E. Bowes to Leroy U. Gardner Asking Saranac to Test a Hydrous Calcium Silicate (1943) — 1943-02-12 — Owens-Illinois asked Saranac to test the insulation (later Kaylo) while it was "in the pilot plant stage," including the risk to "applicators or erectors at the point of use." Saranac then ran animal tests for years (Vorwald to Bowes (1948), with Owens-Illinois paying "$5,000 a year from 1945"). The more damaging point is what happened after the test: in 1952 Owens-Illinois drafted a pamphlet saying research "proven that normal handling of Kaylo products is safe" (Howard to White (1952)).

Vorwald to Bowes (Owens-Illinois), November 16, 1948: all animals exposed more than 30 months developed asbestosis; Kaylo "must be regarded as a potentially hazardous material"; "better to discover it now in animals" (3:57:01)

  • Said by: Motley (question, reading), Kotin agreed with Vorwald
  • On the recording: "In all animals… sacrificed after more than 30 months of exposure to calo dust, unmistakable evidence of asbestosis has developed… it is better to discover it now in animals rather than later in industrial workers."
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Arthur J. Vorwald to U. E. Bowes on Kaylo Producing Asbestosis in Animals (1948) — 1948-11-16 — "unmistakable evidence of asbestosis has developed"; "must be regarded as a potentially-hazardous material"; "it is better to discover it now in animals rather than later in industrial workers," so the company, "being forewarned," could protect "exposed employees" and "its own interests." The enclosure is the Interim Report on the Biological Activity of Kaylo Dust (1948). J-M's files held it too: J-M's chronology (Vorwald to Owens-Illinois (1948)) notes "Kaylo is composed of hydrous calcium silicate like J-M's Thermobestos."

Gardner to Bowes, March 12, 1943: quartz plus asbestos is "all the ingredients for a first-class hazard" (4:01:51)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed it was a "potential hazard"
  • On the recording: "the fact that you are starting with a mixture of quartz and asbestos would certainly suggest that you have all the ingredients for a first-class hazard"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Leroy U. Gardner to U. E. Bowes on Asbestos in the Synthetic Insulation (1943) — 1943-03-12 — the same quote. Gardner was Saranac's director.

Kotin had seen nothing showing J-M had Saranac or anyone test Thermobestos; Thermobestos was a hydrous calcium silicate with asbestos, like Kaylo (4:04:26)

  • Said by: Motley (question); Kotin: "I have not seen any." / "it was a hydrous calcium silicate containing asbestos fibers"
  • On the recording: "whether Johns Manville retained the Saranac laboratory or any other laboratory to run tests on its product Thermobestos. I have not seen any."
  • Verdict: Supported (composition); QUALIFIED (testing) (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Composition: H. M. Jackson to Dr. R. E. Joyner… on Superex and Thermobestos Insulation (1956) — J-M's sworn answers list Thermobestos as "10 to 15 percent asbestos." In that 1956 letter J-M's industrial-health manager answered a customer's doctor about Thermobestos "but does not mention their asbestos." No J-M animal test of Thermobestos turned up. J-M's own chronology twice ties the Kaylo results to Thermobestos ("J-M's Thermobestos line is essentially the same composition"; Schepers 1955 note).

June 12, 1956 memo (W.J.H. to W. J. Stewart): Ira Brock asked for a Kaylo health brochure like the fiberglass one; told the Saranac article was the only published material (4:06:23)

  • Said by: Motley (question, reading); Kotin guessed "W.J.H." was W. J. Hazard
  • On the recording: "Mr. Ira Brock called this morning and asked if we ever prepared a brochure on the health aspects of calo dust similar to the one Ed Ames prepared for fiberglass"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: W. G. Hazard to W. J. Stewart on Ira Brought's Request for a Kaylo Health Brochure (1956) — 1956-06-12 — the Saranac experiments, "written 'in a highly technical manner,' were 'the only published material that has appeared.'" Name fixes: Ira Brought, Ned Ames, W. G. Hazard; "Dr. Shipp" (4:06:48) is likely Dr. C. F. Shook, who was copied.

Schepers (AMA Archives of Industrial Health, 1955): calcium silicate insulation dust caused lesions like experimental asbestosis, and the chrysotile was the cause (4:08:06)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed
  • On the recording: "The final lesions closely resemble those found in experimental asbestosis and included asbestos bodies… the crisis child [chrysotile]… rather than the hydrous calcium silicate was the cause"
  • Verdict: Supported (confidence: high)
  • The documents: G. W. H. Schepers, T. M. Durkan and A. B. Delahant, "Effect of Inhaled Commercial Hydrous Calcium Silicate Dust on Animal Tissues" (1955) — A.M.A. Archives of Industrial Health vol. 12, pp. 348–360 — lesions "closely resembled those found in experimental asbestosis and included asbestos bodies"; the chrysotile, "rather than the hydrous calcium silicate, was the cause of the deleterious effects." J-M's chronology notes the article "contains no conclusion concerning risk to users per se."

/ [4:16:08] Kotin concluded in 1955 that asbestos causes cancer in humans (4:12:38)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed ("Yes, sir.")
  • On the recording: "But in 1955, you concluded that asbestos caused cancer… In 1955, you concluded that asbestos caused cancer in human beings. Yes, sir."
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: We hold no 1955 Kotin writing. Reading Castleman, ch. 2 cites only Kotin's later air-pollution cancer papers (1956, 1957, 1958). Kotin's admission is itself the record. Note the date: in 1955 the ATI was calling an autopsy study "ill-advised" because of its implied cancer link (see above).

In 1979 J-M's labels still didn't say "cancer"; Kotin says they met OSHA requirements (4:13:40)

  • Said by: Motley (question); Kotin: labels "in full compliance with the requirements of the occupational safety and health act"
  • On the recording: "to this day doctor john's manuel doesn't have the word cancer… john's man those labels are in full compliance"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: low)
  • The documents: The Johns-Manville Knowledge Chronology records for 1972-03-16 that J-M's Fred Pundsack argued "a label warning of asbestosis and cancer is 'unnecessarily frightening'" (Pundsack's Testimony… (1972)). So J-M fought the cancer wording that would have gone beyond the minimum. The 1979 label text wasn't checked.

When Kotin came to J-M (1974) he started a database and hired a statistician; there had been none before (3:13:47)

Exhibits identified

Exhibit (as heard) Time Library note
K-39 (H. M. Jackson / Woodard / Vorwald letter) 2:57:10 Arthur J. Vorwald to J. P. Woodard on Asbestosis at the Waukegan Plant (1951). Jackson's name may be a cc; the note doesn't say.
K-37 (Hemeon 1947 ATI dust survey) 3:29:02 W. C. L. Hemeon, Report of Preliminary Dust Investigation for the ATI (1947) (also Sumner Simpson No. 05663)
"40 and 41": ATI Air Hygiene Committee minutes, Nov. 19, 1947 3:21:40 ATI Air Hygiene Committee Minutes on the IHF Program (1947) (Motley doc 64)
K-41: ATI general meeting, June 17, 1948 3:23:32 ATI General Meeting Minutes (June 1948) (Motley doc 65)
Fleischer study (Wilson's exhibit) 3:29:38 Fleischer, Viles, Gade and Drinker (1946). Motley's "table two on page 14" is the dust-count table.
K-42: J-M medical library bibliography (1974–) 3:32:02 Not in library
44: Frost et al., Danish Medical Bulletin, 1956 3:42:55 No standalone note; content via the IHD abstract below
K-45: Industrial Hygiene Digest, June 1957 3:46:25 Industrial Hygiene Digest, June 1957… (1957) (Motley doc 99)
46: 1955 speech by J-M president A. R. Fisher 3:53:31 Research-DB item "The Economics of Industrial Health" (/library/research/the-economics-of-industrial-health), per Reading Castleman ch. 5; no vault document note
Vorwald to Bowes, Nov. 16, 1948, with interim report 3:57:01 Vorwald to Bowes (1948) (Motley 231/240) and Saranac Interim Report on Kaylo Dust (1948); J-M chronology copy here
"48": Gardner to Bowes, Mar. 12, 1943 4:01:51 Leroy U. Gardner to U. E. Bowes on Asbestos in the Synthetic Insulation (1943) (Motley 236)
Owens-Illinois to Gardner, Feb. 12, 1943 4:03:10 U. E. Bowes to Leroy U. Gardner Asking Saranac to Test a Hydrous Calcium Silicate (1943) (Motley 234)
Memo 6-12-56, W.J.H. to W. J. Stewart 4:06:23 W. G. Hazard to W. J. Stewart on Ira Brought's Request… (1956) (Motley 1880)
K-27 (volume with Schepers at p. 343) and K-51 (Schepers, AMA Arch. Ind. Health 1955) 4:07:55, 4:09:39 Schepers, Durkan and Delahant (1955). K-27 seems to be another printing (p. 343 vs. journal pp. 348–360), possibly a Saranac compilation; unconfirmed.
K-52: Asbestos-Related Diseases (1977), chapter by Kotin 4:14:28 Not in library

Tape 2: redirect and recross

Source transcript: kotin-depo-2-part1.txt (whisper, unchecked). Film note: Videotaped Deposition of Dr. Paul Kotin in the South Carolina Asbestos Cases (1979)

Kotin learned asbestos caused cancer in 1955 from Doll's study of UK textile workers (0:00:25)

No evidence in 1955 that insulation or shipyard workers were at risk of cancer; only textile workers had been studied (0:00:39)

The Dreessen (1938) study was of textile plants, and the dust it counted was in effect all asbestos (0:02:06)

Fleischer-Drinker (1946) separated the asbestos part of the dust, and the medical community read its results as within the TLV (0:03:35)

  • Said by: J-M counsel (question), Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "they measured total dust and then, as they have done in a table in their paper, they had a table in which they put down that component of the total dust which was asbestos."
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Fleischer, Viles, Gade and Drinker, "A Health Survey of Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels" (1946) — 1946-01 — J-M's own chronology confirms the split: "'Total dust counts' were above TLV but 'asbestos counts' were within TLV." The note adds that band sawing, cement mixing and installation produced total dust "well above" 5 mppcf. It also says few workers wore respirators, most men had worked under ten years, and the authors wrote it was "manifestly impossible to set a threshold" for this trade. J-M's chronology itself calls the study "later criticized due short exposure period ... in spite of recognized latency period."

The 5 mppcf limit was reviewed every year and stayed because there was "no data to challenge it" (0:05:23)

After new data at the 1964 conference, the ACGIH "did, in fact, change" the asbestos limit (0:06:14)

  • Said by: Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "when the 1964 conference was held and new data were presented, they did, in fact, change" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: medium-high)
  • The documents: American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, Threshold Limit Values for 1970, with a Proposed Asbestos Limit of 5 Fibers (1970) — 1970 — the 1970 adopted list still had asbestos at 5 mppcf, with a proposed 5-fibre limit only as a notice of intended changes; the note says "The particle count limit for asbestos had stood since 1947." Whatever happened at the 1964 New York Academy conference, the ACGIH limit did not change for about six years. (Kotin may have meant that 1964 started the change; check the wording on audio.)

Asbestos makers needed to warn users only where exposure above 5 mppcf was likely (the radium watch, Anacin and car analogies) (0:06:42)

  • Said by: J-M counsel (question), Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "the need for any kind of a label warning or whatever you want to call it is directly related to the specific situation"
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium (this is opinion; the documents bear on whether J-M thought such exposure was likely))
  • The documents: Deposition of Dr. Kenneth W. Smith in DeRocco v. Forty-Eight Insulation on Caution Labels for Celite and Insulation (1976) — 1976-01-13 — Smith testified that in about 1951–52 he and Jackson recommended caution labels on asbestos fiber bags and insulation. Management's response, as he interpreted it: "Yes, we recognize the hazard. What is it going to cost us". Johns-Manville Memos on a Caution Label for Marinite (1958) — 1958-03-18 — the general attorney urged a label over dust at Newport News. The division chose a line in the instruction book instead, partly because a label "would make our selling efforts most difficult".

Selikoff's 1964 work did not show insulators exposed above 5 mppcf; studies showed they were not (0:09:21)

Selikoff's figures (12% asbestosis, 23% lung cancer, 11% mesothelioma deaths in insulators) apply only to deaths in his study period (0:12:39)

  • Said by: J-M counsel (question), Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "12% of insulators die of asbestosis, that 23% of them die of lung cancer, and that 11% of them die of mesothelioma." (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Selikoff's book (probably Selikoff and Lee, 1978) and the 17,800-insulator mortality figures are not in the library as notes. The 1964 paper (Selikoff, Churg and Hammond 1964) gives different early figures: of 255 deaths, "forty-five died of cancer of the lung or pleura, whereas only 6.6 such deaths were expected", four of mesothelioma and twelve of asbestosis. Kotin's point that these are shares of deaths, not of all insulators, is a fair statistical point.

Asbestosis is a declining disease (Dr. Robbins to Congressman Miller's committee, 1979) (0:14:18)

  • Said by: Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "Asbestosis is a declining disease. And, in fact, Dr. Robbins testified so before Congressman Miller's committee" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: low)
  • The documents: No note on the 1979 Miller committee hearing or the NIOSH testimony was found.

Epidemiology in the 1930s was only acute-disease epidemiology, so insulator risk could not be learned before 1964; CDC's EIS had no chronic-disease work until the mid-1960s (0:16:30)

  • Said by: J-M counsel (question), Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "the epidemiology in those days was purely and exclusively acute disease epidemiology."
  • Verdict: Contradicted (confidence: medium (as to asbestos; the EIS history is not in the library))
  • The documents: Kotin conceded the opposite on recross (0:52:21). Chronic dust-disease field studies of asbestos workers were done in the 1930s: Lanza, McConnell and Fehnel's Metropolitan Life study, sent by Sumner Simpson (1935) — 1935-03-02 — "Effects of the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers". Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, Asbestosis, Special Bulletin No. 42 (1935) — 1935-09-20 — "Asbestosis was found in fourteen persons ... or 25 per cent of the exposed group". Dreessen 1938 — 541 workers examined. A lung-cancer epidemiology study of asbestos workers was proposed to the industry in 1956 and turned down in 1957 (Braun 1957 notes the ATI "had turned down the Foundation's proposal to study lung cancer in factory workers").

J-M had work-practice programs and educated product users in the 1930s and 1940s ("ongoing ... clearly") (0:21:50)

There was no education for the insulation industry because the evidence (Fleischer-Drinker) showed insulation work was not hazardous (0:23:40)

  • Said by: Kotin (answering), on J-M counsel's question
  • On the recording: "The education for the insulation industry was non-existent because the evidence at the time was that insulation was, as was concluded by Dr. Fleischer and Rinker, a non-hazardous industry."
  • Verdict: Contradicted (as to the reason) (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Deposition of Dr. Kenneth W. Smith in DeRocco (1976) — 1976-01-13 — J-M's former medical director said the managers of the insulation business were "knowledgeable, quite definitely" about the asbestos hazard when they weighed labels in 1951–52. J. C. Crawford Jr. to J. G. Germuga on Respirators for Shop Prefabrication of Insulation (1952) — 1952-06-17 — headquarters recommended respirators wherever cutting insulation threw off dust, with the instructions to "be cleared with Mr. H. M. Ball of the legal staff". Johns-Manville Memos on a Caution Label for Marinite (1958) — 1958 — the label was rejected for sales reasons. The no-education part of Kotin's answer is accurate. The reason he gives is not what J-M's own files show.

Information went to the insulation trade in 1964, after the hazard was identified (0:24:16)

J-M took dust counts in its plants as a matter of course; Kotin is unaware of 1951 Waukegan counts (0:25:00)

Hemeon's 1947 ATI report: J-M was already doing industrial hygiene measurements; Hemeon was not needed to start measuring (0:27:34)

  • Said by: J-M counsel (question), Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "if he were under the illusion that he was coming into a wasteland where industrial hygiene measurements were never taken, he was wrong."
  • Verdict: Contradicted (as a description of what Hemeon recommended) (confidence: high)
  • The documents: W. C. L. Hemeon, Report of Preliminary Dust Investigation for the Asbestos Textile Institute (1947) — 1947-06-18 — the report was not mainly about whether to start measuring. Hemeon found two plants with about 20 percent of employees affected by asbestosis and "strongly recommended" X-rays of all exposed workers. He proposed a diagnostic panel, questioned the 5 mppcf limit and warned that counts miss fibres. A margin note marks Plant H, "which found five or six early cases a year, as J-M". A cover note refers to ATI meetings "rejecting dust study proposal". That rejection, Motley's premise, is supported. ATI Air Hygiene Committee Minutes on the Industrial Hygiene Foundation Program (1947) — 1947-11-19 — the committee recommended a program of $5,000 or less. ATI General Meeting Minutes (1947) — 1947-12-05 — members deferred it; "Johns-Manville sent eight men to this meeting". That J-M measured dust before 1947 is supported (Begert 1947 above).

The November 8, 1979 Occupational Health and Safety Letter and Ashford's "Crisis in the Workplace" (1976) show occupational medicine was neglected in medical schools (0:30:51)

  • Said by: J-M counsel (question), Kotin (A, reading)
  • On the recording: "Only 46 or 50 percent of the 92 responding institutions specifically taught occupational health"
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Neither the newsletter nor Ashford's book is in the library (Ashford appears only in journal-index notes). These are exhibits to collect. Note that "46 or 50 percent of the 92" fits the arithmetic.

The IOEH (Montreal) is an "independent institute"; Kotin joined its board around 1965, and the board was chaired by Dr. George Wright (0:37:08)

  • Said by: Kotin (answering), on J-M counsel's question
  • On the recording: "it is an institute located in Montreal, which is an independent institute staffed by a medical director with an advisory board" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Contradicted (on "independent") (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Institute of Occupational and Environmental Health List of Research Proposals Not Recommended for Support (1968) — 1968 — "The Institute was the research body set up by the Quebec Asbestos Mining Association". J-M's own 1984 index: "In 1966, the QAMA formed the Institute of Occupational and Environmental Health". That date also sits awkwardly with Kotin's "1965 ... the board had already been in existence". The list shows the committee turning down two Selikoff proposals and studies of non-occupational and brake exposure. The board's chairman was J-M's own medical adviser: Dr. George W. Wright to Herbert M. Ball on the Asbestosis Defense Task Force (1968) — 1968-08-20 — Wright is described as "a medical adviser to Johns-Manville" advising its general counsel on defending asbestosis cases. Kotin's own board tenure (until he joined J-M) is NOT IN LIBRARY.

Kotin attended the IOEH 1967 conference and the 1969 South African conference at government expense, years before J-M (0:40:55)

  • Said by: Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "In 1967 I was at the Antigua conference on asbestos sponsored by the IOEH." (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: low)
  • The documents: No notes on the 1967 IOEH conference or the 1969 Johannesburg conference were found. The IOEH's industry sponsorship (previous entry) is relevant to his "no way I could have dreamed" point.

South African international asbestos/pneumoconiosis conferences were held in 1934, 1939, 1949 and 1959 (0:43:54)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed ("Could very well be" / "There were a series of conferences")
  • On the recording: "In fact, there was a conference in Johannesburg in 1934, wasn't there?"
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: low)
  • The documents: Only the 1959-era Wagner work is in the library (next entry). The conference proceedings are not.

Sleggs co-authored Wagner's mesothelioma paper, which included insulation workers (about 1959) (0:45:50)

Wagner's 1960 study convinced Kotin that mesothelioma was associated with asbestos (0:46:50)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed ("Excessive asbestos exposure")
  • On the recording: "He was an author of the mesothelioma study in 1960, which convinced you that mesothelioma was a disease associated with asbestos."
  • Verdict: Supported (study and date) (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Wagner, Sleggs and Marchand (1960) — 1960 — "the paper usually credited with establishing the link between asbestos and mesothelioma". Kotin's qualifier "excessive" exposure sits uneasily with the paper's cases of people who lived on the asbestos fields "only until she was five" or played on the dumps.

Vorwald directed the Saranac Laboratory and did asbestos experiments in the 1940s and early 1950s (0:46:28)

At the 1959 Johannesburg conference, Dr. Gough reported asbestosis in people doing insulation work (in discussion with Vorwald and Sleggs) (0:48:21)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin agreed (with caveat about work history)
  • On the recording: "reported on cases of asbestosis in people who did insulation work at that conference in 1959?" (From the machine transcript; not yet checked against the tape.)
  • Verdict: Not in the Library (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: The 1959 Pneumoconiosis Conference proceedings (Motley's exhibit) are not in the library. Independent pre-1964 reports of asbestosis in insulators that are in J-M's files: Industrial Hygiene Digest, June 1957, with an Abstract on Asbestosis among Danish Insulation Workers (1957) — 1957-06 — of 31 insulators, "nine showed signs of asbestosis"; the finding "definitely points to an occupational origin". Also the 1953 Boston symposium (above).

The USPHS ran many dust-disease studies in the 1910s–30s: Dreessen 1938, Lanza 1935, Fulton 1938 in Pennsylvania, Hemeon 1947 (0:52:21)

The asbestos TLV was criticised before Selikoff in 1964 (Kotin: limits are always under review; doesn't know what "criticism" means) (0:53:46)

  • Said by: Motley (question), Kotin evaded
  • On the recording: "you're not suggesting to this jury that there wasn't any criticism of the threshold limit value for asbestos prior to dr selikoff coming along in 1964 are you"
  • Verdict: Supported (Motley's premise) (confidence: high)
  • The documents: Hemeon 1947 ("does not permit complete assurance that five million is thoroughly safe"). O. H. Cilley to W. C. Hemeon on Dust Control and a Lower Dust Limit (1954) — 1954-05-28 — England had set 1,000,000, and Raybestos's manager was "entirely in accord with lowering the limit". The ATI's 1953 "two standards" minutes. J-M's own 1 million fibre/cu ft standard of 1954 (Jackson to G. S. Smith).

Vandiver Brown was a J-M vice president and attorney, and secretary of the corporation; his views on the TLV carry no scientific weight (0:54:38)

  • Said by: Motley (question) and Kotin (answering)
  • On the recording: "He was, I believe, a vice president of Johns-Manville Corporation." / "Yes, and he was also secretary of the corporation, right? Yeah."
  • Verdict: Qualified (confidence: medium)
  • The documents: Letters on the Sixth Saranac Symposium (1947) — 1947-09-02 — Brown was "J-M's secretary". The library's Vandiver Brown lexicon entry (slug vandiver-brown; the note gives no canonical URL) says he was "Secretary and General Attorney until he resigned in July 1952". No note calls him a vice president. On Kotin's dismissal: Brown's 1947 statement is a J-M officer's own admission, not a scientific opinion. See the next entry.

J-M sent Vandiver Brown to the 1947 Saranac Symposium to present a paper (0:55:50)

Exhibits identified

  • Occupational Health and Safety Letter, November 8, 1979 (Association of Teachers of Preventive Medicine survey of occupational health teaching), handed to Kotin by J-M counsel (about 0:31:01). Not in library.
  • Nicholas Ashford, Crisis in the Workplace (MIT/Ford Foundation, 1976), manpower chapter, read by Kotin (about 0:35:14). Not in library.
  • Program of the 1959 South African conference, marked by Motley (about 0:44:36), and a partial copy of the Proceedings of the Pneumoconiosis Conference, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, February 1959 (about 0:47:15; J-M counsel objected that it was "very incomplete"). Not in library.
  • Program/proceedings of the 1947 (Sixth) Saranac Symposium, to be marked later (about 0:55:45). In library: Letters on the Sixth Saranac Symposium (1947) and Motley 1000 participant-list page.
  • Referred to from tape 1: Philip Carey correspondence about a 1963 safe practice manual (the related item in the library is Mancuso to Knippa 1963, which recommended "guidance manuals and technical help for customers"). Also the Hemeon 1947 ATI report (note), Dreessen 1938, and Fleischer-Drinker 1946, all in library.
  • Philip Carey interrogatory answers (no warning labels until 1972), cited in Motley's objection at 0:20:54. Not in library.

Cite this page

“Dr. Paul Kotin's 1979 Deposition, Checked Against the Documents.” AsbestosClaims.Law Library. https://asbestosclaims.law/library/history/kotin-deposition-fact-check.

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